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State of Utah 
Department of 
Human Services 
OLENES WAL 
Governor 
A 
GAYLE F McKBACHNIE 
Lieutenant Governor 
ROBIN ARNOLD-
WILLIAMS, DSW 
Executive Director 
EMMA CHACON 
Directoi 
Office o/Recoven Services 
JULY 26, 2004 
Case Number: C000517705 
BRIAN S KING 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
336 S 300 E STE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-
NOTICE OF LIEN 
2566 
You are hereby notified that the Department of Health, State of Utah, has 
paid medical expenses on behalf of the individual named below. You have 
been identified as the Attorney representing the Medicaid recipient. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 26-19-5, the State of Utah has a lien 
against any money payable to the Medicaid recipient relating to the incident 
outlined below. You should make no payment to the Medicaid recipient prior 
to contacting the ORS Agent listed below. 
NAME OF MEDICAID RECIPIENT: SKYLAR G QUAID 
DATE OF INJURY: 1999 
DESCRIPTION OF INJURY: DENIAL OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
LOCATION OF INJURY: N/A 
ESTIMATED EXPENSES: $420,048.15 AMENDED. 
COPIES ALSO PROVIDED TO: ALL DUPLICATE PAYMENTS DEDUCTED FROM LIEN AMOUNT. 
If you have any questions or wish to make arrangements to resolve this 
matter, please call the ORS agent listed below. ALL PAYMENTS OR CHECK'S MUST 
INCLUDE CASE #C000517705/TEAM 85. 
Team 85/855998364998514/M55B/ 
J^Jlhjj h)'fhJjj\U 
CARRIE D WORTHEN 
ORS Agent, State of Utah 
P.O. BOX 45025 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5025 
Telephone: (801)536-8811 
Toll Free Number:1-800-821-2237 
MEDICAID SECTION 
515 East 100 South • PO Box 45025 • Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0025 
App.Add.000301 
Utah! 
COLLECTION AGREEMENT 
This collection agreement entered into on the date of execution below, 
between the Utah Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services 
(OR5'Jr and tne attorney and recipient identified below; 
Lav Firtr KING u IS SAC SON 
Attorney 3RIAN S KING 
Address 4 TRIAD CENTER, SUITE 825 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84180 
Phone (801)532-1700 
Recipient SKYLAR G QUATD 
Address C/Q SUSAN QUAID 
268 W 2400 S 
CLEARFIELD, UT 84015 
Phone 779-2961 
ORS Case #: C000517705 
ORS Agent CARRIE D WORTHEN 
Address 515 E 100 S 
P O BOX 45025 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
UT 84145-5025 
Phone (801)536-8811 
Description of Incident: DENIAL OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
Incident Date: 1999 
Incident Location: N/A 
Potential Liable Third Party(s): AETNA & LOREN COOK CO. 
Estimated Medicaid Lien Amount: $302»238.39 
(NOTE: The Medicaid lien amount may change as bills are received and 
paid; ORS will update lien amounts,) 
ORS, on behalf of the Utah State Department of Heelth, Division of 
Health Care Financing is charged with enforcing the statutory priority lien 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §26-19-5. Attorney is representing the recipient 
in the incident described above to recover damages for the recipient-
Recipient has received (or will receive) medical assistance from the State 
of Utah and has assigned his/her rights to the Department of Health/ORS for 
ro.covcry of medical assistance paid, or to be paid, for which the above-
named third party may be obligated, 
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Wherefore, it is agreed as follows: 
1. CONSENT: The Attorney and the Recipient may not settle, compromise. 
release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of medical 
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the State has provided 
medical assistance without ORS consent. Upon execution of this Collection 
Agreement, ORS agrees that the Attorney and Recipient may include medical 
costs paid by the* State of Utah when making a claim against a third party 
lor recovery of medical coszs for an injury, disease, or disability. 
2. MEDICAID LIEN: Attorney and Recipient acknowledge the State's 
priority Medicaid lien and its direct right of recovery against any proceeds 
payable by an obligated third party for the total medical expenses paid, or 
to be paid, on behalf of the Recipient, as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§26-19-5(1), and which directly resulted from the third party's conduct or 
for which the third party is obligated to pay. ORS, in its sole discretion, 
may compromise its claim for any- reason that it deems to be fair and 
equitable. Any such compromise shall be in writing and signed by all parties 
to this agreement. However, both Attorney and Recipient acknowledge and 
agree that ORS 73 UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO COMPROMISE ITS CLAIM due to the 
availability of liability insurance or other assets to satisfy any recovery. 
Attorney shall have the right to negotiate any such compromise with OKS on 
behalf of Recipient and shall have the right to dispute the amount of the 
lien. ORS has the right to obtain counsel to negotiate any such compromise 
or to prosecute any action against Recipient or any other party pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann, §26-19-7(2)(b). If ORS obtains other counsel to represent the 
State in this matter, then this contract is terminated pursuant to paragraph 
12 of this agreement. 
3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST: Attorney and recipient represent that the 
terms and conditions of this Collection Agreement, as well as any potential 
conflict of interest between ORS, Attorney, and Recipient have been fully 
discussed with Recipient and RECIPIENT DOES HEREBY CONSENT TO THE ATTORNEY'S 
RECOGNITION AND OBLIGATION TO PROTECT ORS' RIGHTS, pursuant to the terms of 
this Collection, Agreement. Attorney has explained to Recipient, and the 
Recipient understands, that Attorney has an attorney/client relationship 
with the Recipient, but has an obligation to protect ORS1 rights by the 
terms and conditions of this agreement, 
4. COSTS: Except as provided for herein, ORS will pay its 
proportionate share of any reasonable costs associated with the Cause of 
Action that are related to the recovery of the medical expenses. The 
proportionate share of costs shall be based upon the percentage that ORS1 
recovery has to the total recovery. ORS has a right to demand an accounting 
of all costs in writing, 
5. SETTLEMENT: Upon the offer to pay a recovery to OKS and/or 
Recipient, Attorney agrees to detail said offer to ORS and Recipient, 
including a breakdown of how the recovery will be disbursed pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of this agreement, and to obtain approval from ORS and Recipient 
prior to accepting the offer or agreeing to any of the terms and conditions 
of the offer, including any structured settlement terms. 
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Attorney also agrees to request and obtain an updated lien statement prior 
to making any offers of settlement, ana ORS will provide said statements in 
a timely manner. 
6, ATTORNEY FEES: Upon realization of any recovery in the Cause of 
Action, Attorney and Recipient agree to remit funds to ORS, payeble to 
"Office of Recovery Services" with Case No. noted on the remittance, and 
mailed to Office of Recovery Services, Team 85 P.O. Box 45025, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 34]Vi5-5025. ORS1 recovery shall be the statutory priority lien 
as defined in Utah Code Ann. §26-19-5(1) or (4), as reduced by its 
proportionate share of costs approved pursuant to paragraph 4 of this 
Agreement, and an attorney's fee of 33% of ORS' recovery. If the court 
awards, or the third party pays, attorney fees and costs, such fees and 
costs shall be paid to the Recipient and Attorney to the extent that the 
award is based on services furnished by the Recipient and Attorney. Any 
such fees awarded by the court or paid by the third party shall be deducted 
from the fees payable to the Recipient and Law Firm as otherwise set forth 
in this paragraph 6. 
7, MEDICAL REPORTS: ORS vill assist Attorney with medical information 
and report in its files. 
8, AMENDMENTS: This Collection Agreement may be amended or 
supplemented only by written agreement, executed by the same parties hereto, 
and attached to the original signed copy of this contract- As to ORS, the 
same party as used in this paragraph, means the person authorized to execute 
collection agreements. 
9, WITHDRAWAL; In the event that the Recipient and/or Attorney 
withdraws from the case, the Recipient and/or Attorney vill openly and fully 
discuss the facts with ORS and, upon request, set forth the reasons for the 
withdrawal in writing. In the event of such withdrawal, the contingent fee 
as set forth in this Agreement shall be waived by the Recipient and/or 
Attorney and the withdrawing party shall have no further obligation to pay 
the expenses of litigation incurred after withdrawal, ORS will have no 
obligation to pay any attorney fees or expenses incurred through the date of 
withdrawal. 
10, BREACH; It shall be a breach of this agreement to disburse funds 
to the Recipient without the ORS* consent or judicial order or judgment. 
11, CONTROLLING LAW: The provisions of this Collection Agreement shall 
be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
12, RECORDS; Attorney agrees to maintain, or supervise the maintenance 
of all records necessary to properly account for the protection of the 
interests of ORS in the Cause of Action and shall maintain those records for 
at least 4 years after completion or termination of this Acknowledgement 
Agreement, or until audits initiated within the 4 years have been completed, 
whichever is later. 
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13. TERMINATION; In the event any dispute arises between Recipient and 
ORS concerning the enforceability or amount of any lien to be paid to ORS, 
the Attorney, Recipient and ORS agree that this contract is terminated upon 
written notice by either party and that Attorney will represent the 
interests of the Recipient, and that ORS will obtain separate counsel, 
However, ORS does not waive it's authority to claim attorney fees against 
recipient as allowed under Utah Code Ann, §26-19-6v 
14. CASE STATUS\ Attorney agrees to keep ORS or its appointed attorney 
informed in writing as needed but no less tnan on a quarterly basis of the 
progress of the case. 
15. AUDITS: Attorney agrees to allow State and Federal auditors, and 
State or Federal agency staff, reasonable access to all the files and 
records related to the Cause of Action and the claims of ORS
 T for audit and 
inspection and monitoring of services. 
SIGNATURES: 
Date 
Date V)U<t(oH)JQJi£ •rO 
W7JA?? 
Office oi? Recovery Services 
By: EWIC M HANSON / 
T i t l e * ORS Agent 
Attrtf: Team 35 
515^E 100 S 
P Om?T%5025 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5025 
Team 85 
0060516391 
7484701*79820883 
M52A 
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GARY L. JOHNSON [4353] 
MARTHA KNUDSON [8512] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAE), individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAID, f7k/a 
ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA US 
HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN PRODUCTS 
NEW YORK MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN 
and LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendant. 
LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
; Civil No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Defendant Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan (hereinafter "Loren 
Cook Plan"), by and through its counsel of record, Gary L. Johnson and Martha Knudson of 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, respectfully moves this Court for an order 
Ann Add 000306 
granting its partial summary judgment on liability. This case is a dispute as to who bears primary 
responsibility for medical expenses incurred in the treatment of young Skylar Quaid. 
At the time of Skylar's adoption by the Quaid family, Skylar was a covered 
dependent under his birth parents5 U.S. Healthcare/Aetna Medical Benefits Plan. Skylar's 
adoptive parents, the Quaids, were participants in the Loren Cook Plan. 
The Loren Cook Plan's Coordination of Benefits section clearly states that if a 
plan participant or beneficiary is otherwise covered by an HMO Plan, as Skylar was, then any 
medical expenses that would have been paid for by that HMO will not be considered as an 
allowable charge under the Loren Cook Plan. Because Skylar would have been entitled to 
coverage for twelve months after his transfer from New York to his new adopted home in Utah, 
Loren Cook seeks an order from this Court stating that it has no responsibility for any medical 
expenses incurred by Skylar Quaid for twelve months after his transfer from New York to Utah. 
This Motion is filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
is accompanied by a supporting Memorandum. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 2005. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
/J
.NELSOr " 
IY L. J O ^ S O N 
MARTHA KNUDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
App.Add.000307 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this £~ day of June, 2005, to the following: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
GAEDS I\DOCS\l 6118\000 i \FS5681. WPP 
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GARY L. JOHNSON [4353] 
MARTHA KNUDSON [8512] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAJD, individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAID, f/k/a 
ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA US 
HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN PRODUCTS 
NEW YORK MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN 
and LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendant. 
LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Defendant Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan (hereinafter "Loren 
Cook Plan"), by and through its counsel of record, Gary L. Johnson and Martha Knudson of 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, respectfully submits the following 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on all liability issues. 
ADD.Add.0003nc> 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. Skylar Quaid (then known as Zachary Cohen) was bom in June of 1999 in 
New York. When Skylar was about 2lA to 3 months old, an adoption specialist from Adopt 
America Network ("AAN") contacted Susan Quaid. (Susan Quaid Depo., p. 11,11. 1-25.) In mid 
November of 1999, Susan Quaid and Sandy Burningham, the director of her local adoption 
agency, TLC Adoption, flew out to New York State to meet with Skylar's birth parents. 
Mrs. Quaid had been in touch with the birth parents prior to mid-November and had already set 
up an adoption plan. (Susan Quaid Depo., p. 12,11. 1-23.) 
2. Skylar's condition, however, took a turn for the worse and he was pkced 
in ICU at Snyder's Children's Hospital in Queens, New York. At this time in mid-November, 
however, the adoption proceedings were initiated. (Susan Quaid Depo., p. 15,11. 20-25; p. 16, 
11. 1-6.) 
3. In December of 1999, Susan Quaid begins inquiry both with her husband's 
health plan (the Loren Cook Plan) and Skylar's birth parents' health care plan (Aetna HMO) 
trying to find someone to pay for medical transport of Skylar from New York to Utah. (Susan 
Quaid Depo., p. 29,11-6-13.) At some point, Medicaid got involved. Mrs. Quaid testified: 
Q. How did Medicaid get involved? 
A. I spent eight hours a day on the phone trying to find ways to 
bring my son home. It's been so long ago I don't know that 
I'm remembering all the details. All I know is that I did get 
the paperwork in place in Utah. Children who have been 
adopted but are not yet finalized all qualify for Medicaid, 
and I was able to get that paperwork in place. And the 
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worker at Medicaid did write me a letter, which I faxed to 
Aetna, saying that coverage would be in place. Loren 
Cook, even though they promised us a letter, they said they 
wouldn't give us a letter. And Aetna did say that with 
those letters they would transport him. 
(Susan Quaid Depo., p. 30,11. 24-25; p. 31,11. 1-13.) 
4. Exhibit 1 to this Memorandum is a copy of the Case Management Notes 
for Skylar Quaid prepared by Julie Freel of Med-Pay, the third-party administrator for the Loren 
Cook Plan. (Margaret Godown Depo., p. 58,11. 10-25; p. 59; p. 60,11. 1-3.) 
5. The Med-Pay Case Management Notes indicate that it was first contacted 
from Sandy with the TLC Adoption Agency on December 3, 1999, and notified that Bob and 
Susan Quaid were adopting a special needs child who was in a New York State hospital. The 
notes for this date further indicate a contact with Snyder's Children's Hospital which revealed 
that Aetna U.S. Healthcare was the primary insurance for the child under the birth parents and 
that transportation of the child from New York to Utah was not a benefit under the Loren Cook 
Plan. (Exhibit 1 at p. MP000177.) 
6. On December 9, 1999, the Case Management Notes indicate that Med-Pay 
received a call from Susan Quaid, who was very frustrated with the coordination of benefit 
process. Med-Pay "clarified that coverage is not the issue, must determine COB and primary 
payor w/Aetna." (Id.) 
3 
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7. On December 3, 1999, Bob Quaid submitted to his employer, Loren Cook 
Company, an enrollment change form to add Skylar Quaid to the health insurance plan. (Robert 
Quaid Depo. pp. 7-8.) 
8. On December 28, 1999, Med-Pay received a call from Primary Children's 
Hospital in Utah seeking precertification for the admission of Skylar Quaid on December 23, 
1999. Med-Pay advised Primary Children's that it was unable to precertify that admission due to 
the coordination of benefit issue. Because it was uninformed or unaware of the transfer, Med-
Pay then called Aetna and confirmed the transfer of Skylar Quaid on December 23, 1999. Aetna 
informed Med-Pay that "Medicaid decided to pick up coverage of baby and sent letter and so it 
proceeded w/ transfer. States they have letter from Medicaid stating they will assume primary 
coverage of baby once arrives in Utah." Med-Pay also received a call from "Amy" at Primary 
Children's Hospital in Salt Lake City.1 Med-Pay returned the call: 
Call to Amy at hosp. She reports she talked w/Sue who stated she 
called Medicaid and they told her that when baby transported to 
Utah that Aetna's responsibility ends. States that Medicaid did 
send letter to Aetna. Mom says she has a copy and she will get for 
hospital. Amy will forward when received. Amy reports advised 
mom that cannot legally bill Medicaid when has private insurance 
and all bills will go to Med-Pay. States Sue just shrugged her 
shoulders/Amy feels very strange situation that requires great deal 
of clarification. Agrees that appears Aetna holds primary payor 
respons, Medicaid does not have authority to alleviate their respon. 
and hard to believe that Medicaid would ever agree to pay primary 
payment source, always payor of last resort. Inquired about 
transfer. Amy states mom was vague when questioned about who 
1
 At all relevant times, Amy Peterson was the Process Manager, Patient Administration at 
Primary Children's Medical Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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authorized. Stated "been working on for a long time." States she 
does know that baby arrived at airport and their hospital ambulance 
picked up and transported to hosp. Not aware of any physician to 
physician agreement to transport, care, etc. States as far as she can 
tell, transfer info lists transferring physician as unknown. States 
can request medical records and information from UR Dept. 
Transferred there, left VM requesting all admission and transfer 
information. 
(Exhibit 1 atMP000179-80.) 
9. On January 5, 2000, Med-Pay had a conversation with Karen Sager, an 
employee at the Loren Cook Company. This conversation was reported as follows: 
Call this a.m. from Karen Sager. Reviewed events and 
determination of payor status by Medicaid and Hosp. Advised that 
Aetna may deny claims due to network issues, however, we will 
deny based on plan language for COB [Coordination of Benefits] 
related to HMO network services. Also need to get Aetna 
Insurance information from Mr. Quaid to assure proper COB and 
clarify if any continued coverage for disabled members... . 
(Exhibit 1 at MP000181.) 
10. James Brown is the Regional General Counsel for the Northeast Region 
for U.S. Healthcare/Aetna. The Northeast Region consists of New York and the New England 
states and Mr. Brown is primarily responsible for non-litigation issues that come up in Aetna's 
health care operations in those states. (James Brown Depo., p. 7,11. 22-25; p. 8,11. 15-24.) 
11. Exhibit 2 to this Memorandum is a copy of the HMO health care 
agreement between Aetna and Hoffman Products, the employer for Skylar Quaid's birth parents. 
(James Brown Depo., p. 12,11. 23-25; p. 13,11. 1-13.) 
12. Exhibit 2, the Aetna HMO Plan, provides at page 28: 
5 
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D. Extension of Benefits Upon Total Disability. 
Any Member who is Totally Disabled on the date coverage 
under this Certificate terminates is covered in accordance 
with the Certificate. 
This extension of benefits shall only: 
1. Commence when a Medical Service is rendered for 
the condition causing Total Disability while the 
Member is covered under this Certificate; and 
2. Provide Covered Benefits that are necessary to treat 
medical conditions causing or directly related to the 
disability as determined by HMO; and 
2.(sic) Remain in effect until the earlier of the date that: 
a. The Member is no longer Totally Disabled; 
or 
b. The Member has exhausted the Covered 
Benefits available for treatment of that 
condition; or 
c. After a period of twelve (12) months in 
which benefits under such coverage are 
provided to the Member. 
13. Concerning the provision set forth above, the extension of benefits for 
someone who is disabled under Aetna's plan, Mr. Brown testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Now, if at the time that Zachary Cohen was placed 
for adoption and received his new name, Skylar Quaid. If 
at that point in time he was disabled, would he have been 
eligible to receive benefits for up to twelve months under 
the plan that's Exhibit 2 if there was no other health care 
plan coverage available for him? 
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A. If he was totally disabled, yes. 
* * * 
Q. Were any representations made to you by anybody at 
Snyder's or from other sources that when in fact at the end 
of 1999 - November, December of 1999, Zachary Cohen 
was totally disabled? He could not live without life 
support? 
A. My recollection was that there was a common 
understanding that the child was considered totally 
disabled. 
(James Brown Depo., p. 18, II. 10-18; p. 19,11. 2-10.) 
14. Exhibit 3 to the Memorandum is a letter dated November 10, 2000, from 
James Brown to Margaret Godown at Med-Pay. The letter states Aetna's position that Skylar 
Quaid would have been entitled to twelve additional months of benefits under the HMO plan, 
that the Quaids insisted he be transferred to Utah and that Aetna was not asked to precertify 
treatment at Primary Children's Hospital. (James Brown Depo., p. 13,1. 25, p. 14,11. 1-7, p. 32, 
11. 13-23.) 
15. Margaret Godown, Project Coordinator and Compliance Officer at Med-
Pay, was deposed by plaintiffs counsel on April 5, 2005. Margaret Godown was involved with 
the assessment of coverage for Skylar Quaid under the Loren Cook Plan. (Margaret Godown 
Depo., p. 17,11. 20-25; p. 18,1. L) 
16. Exhibit 4 to this Memorandum is a copy of the Loren Cook Company 
health care benefit plan. (Margaret Godown Depo., p. 18,11. 8-25.) 
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17. Concerning the preparation of the plan documents that is Exhibit 4, 
Margaret Godown testified as follows: 
We put together the pkn document. We prepared them, but we 
used the service of Corbel, which is a nationally utilized service 
that provides plan documents, as well as input from, as I mentioned 
before, SPBA [Society of Professional Benefit Administrators] and 
SEA [Self-Insurance Institute of America] and other plan 
preparation entities. 
(Margaret Godown Depo, p. 19,11. 23-25; p. 20,11. 1-3.) 
18. The Coordination of Benefits section of the Loren Cook Plan is at page 29 
of Exhibit 4. In this section, plan participants are told that coordination of benefits sets out rules 
for the order of payment of Covered Charges when two or more plans - including Medicare - are 
paying. "When a Covered Person is covered by this Plan and another plan, or the Covered 
Person's Spouse is covered by this Plan and by another plan or the couples' Covered Children are 
covered under two or more plans, the plans will coordinate benefits when a claim is received." 
On this same page 29, there is a section that discusses "allowable charge." This section 
specifically states: 
In the case of HMO (Health Maintenance Organization), or other 
in-network only plans: This Plan will not consider any charge in 
excess of what an HMO or network provider has agreed to accept 
as payment in full. Also, when an HMO or network plan is 
primary and the Covered Person does not use an HMO or 
network provider, this Plan will not consider as an allowable 
charge, any charge that would have been covered by the HMO 
or network plan had the Covered Person used the services of 
an HMO or network provider. (Emphasis added.) 
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19. Margaret Godown was asked specifically by plaintiffs counsel as to her 
understanding about the language in this particular portion of the Loren Cook Plan. Ms. Godown 
testified: 
Q. And so is it your understanding that this language in this 
particular portion of the coordination of benefits section is 
standard language that's used within the self-funded plan? 
A. The provision itself is standard, yes. The language may 
obviously vary from company to company, but yes, the 
language is standard. 
Q. And do you have any recollection that this language was 
modified or crafted, tailored in any way specifically for 
Loren Cook as opposed to being used in a fairly standard 
form across the self-funded plan industry? 
A. It's standard. 
(Margaret Godown Depo., p. 20,11. 14-25; p. 21,1. 1.) 
20. Concerning the application of the coordination of benefits provision to 
Skylar Quaid's claim, plaintiffs' counsel specifically asked Margaret Godown about the 
application of 29 U.S.C. section 1169(c), part of COBRA's provisions which were incorporated 
into ERISA. Ms. Godown testified: 
Q. In connection with this particular claim, when it did crop 
up, did you specifically consider before the claim was 
denied, the extent to which the COBRA statute affected the 
plan's ability to apply this language that we've been talking 
about on page 29? 
A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 
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Q. It's so difficult to phrase these questions well. Let me ask 
it this way, because I can understand why you don't 
understand the question. 
MR. JOHNSON: Just so I'm clear, are you referring to the 
provision in COBRA that's incorporated with ERISA that says you 
treat adopted dependent children the same as you treat naturally 
born dependent children? 
MR. KING: Exactly, Gary. 
A. Yes. I am familiar with that, yes. 
Q. (BY MR. KING) You are familiar with that provision -
A. Yes. 
Q. - of COBRA? And my question to you is: Did you 
consider the relationship between that specific provision of 
COBRA and this language on page 29 in 1999 or 2000 or 
early 2001 when you were talking with the plan about how 
the plan should handle this particular claim? 
A. For all intents and purposes, we treat adopted children the 
same as we would any other member. A member is a 
member is a member. 
Q. So what you are saying is adopted children wouldn't be 
treated differently than any other child, in this particular 
matter of the Quaids? 
A. Correct. As long as they are an enrolled eligible individual, 
all provisions apply. 
(Margaret Godown Depo., p. 25,11. 16-25; p. 26,11. 1-23.) 
21. Steve Burney is the executive vice president of the Loren Cook Company 
and has responsibility for the Loren Cook Plan. (Steve Burney Depo., p. 6,11. 5-9; p. 9,11. 1-8.) 
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22. Mr. Bumey was also asked about the application of 29 U.S.C. section 
1169(c): 
Q. My question to you is: Has the plan ever dealt with this 
particular specific issue before; namely, the requirements 
that I just outlined from COBRA and how they relate to the 
plan language that's on page -
MR. JOHNSON: 29. 
Q. - 29 of the booklet dealing with coordination of benefits? 
A. I'm not aware of any adoption issue ever being a problem 
or ever really playing into the decisions on coverage. 
Q. So you are not aware, working as the plan administrator 
over the last 14 years, of any issue that's cropped up 
regarding a plaintiffs denial of claims of adopted children 
under this coordination of benefits clause? 
A. I'm not sure I understand the coordination of benefits 
clause. I don't - the adoption doesn't play into the 
coordination of benefits in any way, from my perception, so 
I'm not aware of any problem or conflict ever relating to 
the adoption. 
(Steve Burney Depo., p. 45,11. 5-24.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY UTAH STATE LAW ON COORDINATION OF BENEFITS AND INSURANCE 
COVERAGE FOR ADOPTED CHILDREN IS PREEMPTED BY ERISA 
Plaintiffs are simply incorrect to the extent they assert that the Utah State 
Insurance Code provisions relating to coordination of benefits and relating to insurance 
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coverages for adopted children control the outcome of this case. Relevant to this Court's 
determination concerning plaintiffs' position is an analysis of the scope of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, etseq. ("ERISA") and its 
preemption provisions. The preemption section of this controlling federal statute state that the 
provisions of ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. section 1144(a). That provision, "conspicuous 
for its breadth," FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990), was drafted expansively in 
order to establish pension and welfare benefits "as exclusively a federal concern," Allesi v. 
Raybestos - Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981), and to relieve benefit plans of the 
burden of adhering to diverse state regulations, including Utah. 
ERISA does contain, however, a "savings clause" as set forth in 29 U.S.C. section 
1144(b)(2)(A). The savings clause exempts from ERISA's preemption provision state laws 
regulating insurance, except for those regulations covered by what is called the "deemer clause." 
The deemer clause, in turn, forbids states from deeming employee benefit plans "to be an 
insurance company or other insurer... or to be engaged in the business of insurance" and 
thereby relieves the ERISA regulated benefit plan from state laws "purporting to regulate 
insurance." 29 U.S.C. section 1144(b)(2)(B). 
The deemer clause does apply to the case before this Court because the Loren 
Cook Plan is self-funded. See FMC, supra, 498 U.S. at 61; UNUMLife Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 
U.S. 358, 367 n 2 (1999) ("self-insured ERISA plans . . . are generally sheltered from state 
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insurance regulations.") Specifically, in FMC Corp., the Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempts all state regulation of self-funded ERISA employee welfare benefit plans. At the same 
time, however, the Court distinguished those plans that are insured, and found that the state may 
regulate insured plans indirectly by regulating the insurer and its contract. See id. at 63-64, 
noting that "the savings clause retains the independent effect of protecting state insurance 
regulation of insurance contracts purchased by employee benefit plans.") The United States 
Supreme Court focused on the deemer clause in making this determination and opined as 
follows: 
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans 
from state laws that "regulat[e] insurance" within the meaning of 
the savings clause.... On the other hand, employee benefit plans 
that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. 
An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for 
purposes of state laws "purporting to regulate insurance" after 
application of the deemer clause. 
Id, at page 61. 
Utah state coordination of benefit laws are preempted by ERISA and must give 
way to the Loren Cook Plan language. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
in Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Thorn Apple Valley, Inc., 31 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1994), confronted a 
coordination of benefits conflict between a Michigan insurance carrier and an ERISA-protected 
self-funded plan. The Michigan insurance carrier (Auto Owners), was relying upon a Michigan 
state law coordination of benefits provision, just as Medicaid in this case appears to be relying 
upon the Utah Insurance Code. In Auto Owners, the Sixth Circuit explained: 
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The underlying purpose of ERISA is to protect "the interest of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." 29 
U.S.C. § 1001(b). See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 113 . . . In our view, this directive means that 
congress sought to guard qualified benefit plans from claims, such 
as that advanced by Auto Owners, which have been expressly 
disavowed by the plan . . . [W]e conclude that the terms of the 
[ERISA] plan, including its coordination of benefits clause, must 
be given full effect in order to comply with the primary goal of 
ERISA, which is to safeguard the financial integrity of qualified 
plans by shielding them from unanticipated claims. 
31F.3dat375. 
Now it is true that the Loren Cook Plan does have stop-loss coverage that acts as a 
sort of excess insurance. According to the testimony of Steve Burney, the "attachment point" or 
the amount of medical expense after which the stop-loss carrier will begin to reimburse the plan 
for its expenditures is $100,000 for any plan member, with a $38,000 deductible for the first 
claim that goes over the stated attachment point. (Steve Burney Depo., p. 19.) Because there is 
stop-loss insurance coverage, however, does not alter the self-funded nature of a Loren Cook 
Plan or the preemptive application of ERISA. 
It has been held over and over again by federal courts of appeals that the purchase 
of stop-loss insurance does not make a self-funded employee benefit plan an insurance carrier 
under ERISA's "savings clause." Stop-loss insurance is not designed to insure individual plan 
participants, but rather to provide reimbursement to a plan after the plan makes benefit payments. 
See Bill Gray Enterprises v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 214 (3Td Cir. 2001); American Medical Secst 
Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997), cert, denied 524 U.S. 936 (1998); Thompson v. 
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Talquin Bldg. Prod. Co., 928 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1991); Lincoln Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lectron Prod., 
Inc. Employee Health Benefit Plan, 970 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1992); Administrative Comm. of the 
Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1283 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(numerous courts have recognized that a plan does not lose its self-insured or self-funded status 
by purchasing stop-loss or excess insurance). 
POINT II 
THE COORDINATION OF BENEFITS PROVISION IN THE LOREN COOK PLAN IS 
UNAMBIGUOUS AND BARS PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT. 
ERISA will preempt Utah state law dealing with the interpretation of an 
ERISA-governed plan unless the plan involves the purchase of an insurance policy as the method 
of providing plan benefits See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). In the absence of 
statutory guidance, federal courts have over time created federal common law for use in 
interpreting ERISA plans. In McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 
1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit provides the following guidance 
for interpreting ERISA-controlled health care plans: 
We are mindful that the objective in construing a health care 
agreement, as with general contract terms, is to ascertain and carry 
out the true intention of the parties. However, we do so giving the 
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language its common and ordinary meaning as a reasonable person 
in the position of the HMO participant, not the actual participant, 
would have understood the words to mean. 
953 F.2d at 1202. See also Lefler v. United Healthcare of Utah, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319 (D. 
Utah 2001), affd 72 Fed. Appx. 818 (10th Cir. 2003). 
As the Court can see from reviewing the Loren Cook "Coordination of Benefits" 
section in the plan, the language could not be clearer. It states in no uncertain terms that when an 
HMO such as Aetna, is primary and the Covered Person (Skylar Quaid) does not use the HMO, 
"this plan will not consider as an allowable charge any charge that would have been covered by 
the HMO or network plan had the Covered Person used the services of an HMO or network 
provider." At the time Skylar Quaid became a Covered Person (effective date of Quaid's 
enrollment form adding Skylar was November 19, 1999), Skylar Quaid was covered under the 
Atena plan and that plan was primary in providing coverage during the disability extension 
period afforded to him under the plan. 
The operative phrase from the coordination of benefits language is that the plan 
will not consider as an allowable charge "any charge that would have been covered by the HMO 
or network plan had the covered person used the services of an HMO or network provider." The 
provision does not require the Covered Person to actually use the HMO services. There is no 
dispute that Skylar Quaid was eligible for 12 additional months of additional benefits because he 
was disabled at the time his coverage would otherwise terminate. Indeed, Skylar Quaid could 
have been transferred back to another hospital within Aetna's participating provider network 
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during this 12-month period after he moved to Utah, and these charges would have been covered 
by Aetna. (See James Brown Depo., p. 29,11. 20-25; p. 33,11. 9-25; p. 34,11. 1-5.) 
The Quaids chose not to use the Aetna coverage for Skylar's treatment and they 
(and Medicaid) chose to accept the risk that there would be no coverage under the Loren Cook 
Plan. The Tenth Circuit has cautioned that "the power [of courts] to develop common law 
pursuant to ERISA does not give carte blanche power to rewrite the legislation to satisfy [the 
court's] proclivities. Instead, the courts must continue to implement the policies of ERISA." 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Financial Inst Retirement Fund, 71 F.3d 1553, 1556 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Plaintiffs assert that because they have other children, who were beneficiaries 
under the plan, the provisions of 29 U.S.C. section 1169(c), part of COBRA's provisions which 
were incorporated into ERISA, required the Loren Cook Plan to provide primary coverage under 
the circumstances of this case. The assertion is simply incorrect. This section of ERISA is 
entitled, "Group Health Plan Coverage of Dependent Children in Cases of Adoption." 
Subsection (1) under that paragraph states: 
(1) Coverage effective upon placement for adoption 
In any case in which a group health plan provides coverage 
for dependent children of participants or beneficiaries, such 
plan shall provide benefits to dependent children placed 
with participants or beneficiaries for adoption under the 
same terms and conditions as apply in the case of 
dependent children who are natural children of participants 
or beneficiaries under the plan, irrespective of whether the 
adoption has become final. 
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This provision of ERISA does not alter in any sense the terms and application of 
the coordination of benefits section in the Loren Cook Plan. The language in the Loren Cook 
Plan applies to plan participants, dependents, natural bom children, and adopted children alike, it 
does not matter. If they would have had coverage under an HMO, and they chose not to use that 
coverage, the Loren Cook Plan would not treat those medical expenses as covered. 
For example, assume that Skylar Quaid was not adopted but was a naturally born 
child to the Quaids. Further assume that at the time of his birth Mrs. Quaid was employed by a 
company that provided HMO coverage for the Quaid family, including all of the children, natural 
or adopted. This HMO also had a 12-month extension of benefits for someone who is disabled. 
Assume that Skylar becomes disabled and Mrs. Quaid decides to quit her job to spend more time 
with him. She quits her job after Skylar is placed on the Loren Cook Plan. Under these assumed 
facts, if they chose not to use the HMO network of Mrs. Quaid's former employer that provided 
12 months of extended coverage, there would be no coverage for Skylar under the Loren Cook 
Plan. 
It wouldn't matter if he was adopted or natural bom. The operative fact, the 
triggering condition that precludes coverage under the Loren Cook Plan, is that Skylar Quaid has 
the eligibility for benefits under the HMO. The choice to not utilize the HMO coverage invokes 
the disclaimer automatically that the Loren Cook Plan, as a self-funded plan, will not pay 
allowable charges that could have been paid under an HMO if the plan participant had simply 
sought coverage from the HMO. 
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The duty of clarity in drafting plan documents falls on the plan sponsor. Chiles v. 
Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996). The plan language here is clear and not 
susceptible to more than one meaning, and there is no uncertainty as to the meaning of the term 
in the coordination of benefits provision. Medicaid, through the Quaids, is not entitled to dollar 
one from the Loren Cook Plan for twelve months from the date of transfer. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts and arguments set forth above, the Loren Cook Company 
Health Care Benefit Plan respectfully requests that this Court enter partial summary judgment in 
its favor that the Loren Cook Plan has no obligation to reimburse Medicaid for any medical 
expenses incurred by Skylar Quaid from December 23,1999 until December 23, 2000. 
DATED this > - day of June, 2005. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
GARY L. JOHNSON 
MARTHA KNUDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
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EXHIBIT 1 
App.Add.000329 
Skyiar Quaid 
Case Management Notes 
*-tov 
Received call from Sandi w/ TLC Adoption Agency. States Bob and Sue Quaid are 
adopting another special needs child who is in New York state in hospital. She is calling 
on behalf of Sue for assistance to transfer baby to Utah She states United Healthcare is 
insurance of birth parents and they need letter from MedPay that we will assume financial 
resp once child in Utah. States CM w/ this ins quit yesterday so has very little 
information about this child. Advised that unable to take any action w/ child until proper 
enrollment is completed. Family has not enrolled child yet. 
Call from Marsh Ziner at Schneiders Hosp-718-470-7000, pgr 5214; wanting insurance 
information about child. Advised that not enrolled yet on plan. She reports Aetna US 
Healthcare is primary insurance for baby under birth parents. States she received verbal 
from their medical director today that they are primary until dc from facility. 
Guardianship of child is not a factor since covered under Aetna at time of adoption. 
Aetna med dir denied air transport to Utah x 2 that day. Will we split cost of transport?-
NO not benefit under LC plan; Will we guarantee payment after arrival in Utah?—NO no 
payment guarantee, all benefits applicable per plan benefits and member eligibility, If 
patients stays at Schneiders will we pay secondary to Aetna?—will need to verify 
eligibility and coverage and then COB w/ Aetna. 
12-6-99 
Call from Sue, reports sent papers to LC on Friday, wondering if we have received 
enrollment, no papers yet. States Aetna has stated they will transport if have assurance 
that other coverage when arrives in Utah. Will let Sue know when enrollment is 
completed. 
12-8-99 
Call from Sue wanting to transport baby. States improved and now stable enough for 
transport, may not stay that way, "window of opportunity" here. Wondering if we can 
talk to Aetna and expedite their review process. She is worried that their review will take 
days and then he won't be stable enough for transport. Again reviewed that must 
complete COB, legal regs, etc. 
Call from Karen Sager at LC, just received enrollment info, fbdng to MedPay. Has 
talked w/ Utah office. Review of events to date and COB issues. 
12-9-99 
Call from Sue, very frustrated w/ COB process. Explained again and reviewed that 
transport is not benefit under LC plan regardless. Also clarified that coverage is not the 
issue, must determine COB and primary payor w/ Aetna. Provided w/ contact at Aetna-
Vonnie Gilmore at 800-223-6857, est 69247. 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
^ ^ 4frv 
Call to Vonnie Gilmore She states they are reviewing now. Concerned that baby has 
never left the acute care setting and therefore will remain under their plan (HMO) 
through course of treatment for this episode of illness. Want a letter thai we will be 
responsible for payment when he arrives in Utah. Advised could not provide that She 
acknowledged this States their attorneys are still reviewing and are not ready to request 
anything from us yet. States they have indicated that they will only transport to Utah if 
there is no payor responsibility for Aetna when he arrives there. States otherwise this is 
strictly '"transport of convenience" not medically necessary. Aware that Sue becoming 
angry w/ process, however, agreed that regulations and rules must be followed. She 
states that at this time the baby is in no condition to transport anyway, 
12-10-99 
Call from Sue wanting to know current status. Advised that contact made w/ Vonnie and 
they are still in process of review. Not requesting anything from us at this time. 
12-15-99 
Call from Sue, reports she received a msg from Vonnie last night that they are ready to 
transport contingent on receipt of letter from us that MedPay will assume coverage once 
arrives in Utah. Again advised Sue that coverage is not an issue, but still need to COB w/ 
Aetna and they have not provided any information to us. Sue became angry, stated that 
she felt "getting run around" from everyone and that her child's welfare at issue here, not 
all of the paperwork She staled she was going to contact her attorney who was top 
adoption attorney in state and he would settle the matter. Acknowledged her right to 
contact attorney, however, still must COB and could not verify primary coverage until we 
received information and verification requested from Aetna. 
Call to Vonnie regarding above. She confirmed msg to Sue but states that she advised to 
her that only way will transport is if they receive letter alleviating their financial 
responsibility after transport. She acknowledges that we as insurance company can not 
do this but staled only thing she had to offer mother to appease her. Also acknowledged 
that we all must follow federal regs and guidelines. Requested that Aetna submit in 
writing a statement and determination of their position on coverage. She will do today. 
Call to Karen Sager at LC. Update of events and actions to date She is in agreement w/ 
all actions and determinations. Will apprise Steve Burney. 
Call from Sue stating she has contacted her attorney who states that MedPay is absolutely 
responsible for payment when child arrives in Utah. Again reviewed coverage not issue, 
primary payor source is issue. Sue very angry, will not discuss further. Feels I need to 
contact her attorney Advised that I am available if her attorney wishes to contact me. 
She feels very strong that we are all wrong and she will have her attorney follow up. 
Received letter from Aetna, reviewed w/ medical review committee. 
Respons to Aetna prepared and forwarded. Call from Sandi Burmingham w/ TLC 
adoption, left vm w/ # to call back. CB to #, not in service. 
12-2S-99 
No further communication about this from Aetna or parents. Today received call from 
Primary Children's hospi in Utah to precert admission for Skylar on 12/23. Advised 
unable to precert due to COB issues 
Call to Vonnie at Aetna, she confirmed transfer of baby on 12/23. States Medicaid 
decided to pick up coverage of baby and sent letter so proceeded w/ transfer. Stales they 
have letter from Medicaid stating they will assume primary coverage of baby once arrives 
in Utah. Requested a copy, she will fax to me. Inquired why they had not responded to 
my letter or advised us of transfer. She stated she thought we knew and since Medicaid 
to be primary did not feel it was an issue w/ us. 
Call to Mindy at Prim Child Hosp-801-588-2969. She states baby transferred*on 12/23 
and on admit only given MedPay as insurnace informatioa Does not show Medicaid and 
given no information about Medicaid. States she does not know who authorized transfer 
of baby and states she just found out today about Aetna insurance. Reviewed COB 
issues, she agrees that if Aetna is HMO they are primary for this baby since continuation 
of care. She will try to obtain more information about Aetna coverage and will call back. 
Stales she needs to obtain name of birth parents and policy #. Given name of my contact 
at Aetna-Vonnie Gilmore and #. 
Call from Amy at Prim Childrens Hosp; 801-588-2961, has spoke w/ mother, requests 
call back. 
Review of events w/ medical rev committee, reviewed Utah Medicaid program. 
VM from Vonnie at Aetna, states per legal dept can not send copy of letter from 
Medicaid. Need to contact Medicaid-Bev Graham at 801-444-2902, with Utah Dept of 
health, Bureau of Eligibilty or Sue Quaid has the informaiton. 
Call to Bev Graham, left vm requesting cb 
Call to Amy at hosp. She reports she talked w/ Sue who stated she called Medicaid and 
they told her that when baby transported to Utah that Aetna's responsibility ends. States 
that medicaid did send letter to Aetna Mom says she has a copy and she will get for 
hosp. Amy will forward when received. Amy reports advised Mom that can not legally 
bill Medicaid when has private insurance and all bills will go to MedPay. States Sue just 
shrugged her shoulders/ Amy feels very strange situation that requires great deal of 
clarification. Agrees that appears Aetna holds primary payor respons, Medicaid does not 
have authority to alleviate their respon and hard to believe that Medicaid would ever 
agree to primary payment source, always payor of last resort Inquired about transfer, 
Amy states Mom was vague when questioned about who authorized. Stated "been 
MP000179 
working on for a long time.59 States she does know that baby arrived at airport and then-
hasp ambulance picked up and transported to hosp. Not aware of any physician to 
physician agreement to tmasport, care, etc. States as far as she can tell transfer info list 
transferring physician as unknown. States can request medical records and information 
from UR dept. Transferred there, left vm requesting all admission and transfer 
information. 
Call to Medicaid general # to ck eligibility. Spoke w/ Vicki who stated she was able to 
pull up child on system but wouldn" release any information about child. Explained 
needing to COB, referred to Office of Recovery Services at 801-536-8798 to coordinate 
benefits. She did state that Medicaid is never primary if any prvt ins, always payor of last 
resort 
Call back to Bev Graham, transferred to Cindy. States Bev is out this week. Explained 
call and information I was told by Aetna and mother. She states feels that information is 
very "odd", all notices are sent through computer and no hx of any notices being sent to 
anyone. Does acknowledge child in system and case worker is Linda. States Medicaid is 
always payor of last resoit and she finds it "interesting and confusing" that Aetna would 
declare they received a letter from medicaid declaring primary payment status. She also 
feels it is ceodd" that they would refer to Bev Graham since she does not feel any such 
letter would have ever been sent by Bev. Finds the whole situation very odd and 
wondering where Aetna is coming from States if indeed this is an HMO policy they will 
have primary payor responsibility and Medicaid would also be very interested in that 
information. States Bev is to return to office on 1/3 and she will discuss w/ her and have 
her call me. 
12-29-99 
Call to Karen Sager at LC. Advised of events, states she spoke w/ Sean in Utah HE. dept 
this am. Bob was in this am, no mention of transfer of baby to Utah, they thought child 
still in NY> Advised of events and problems w/ COB. In agreement w/ actions and 
determinations to date. States Bob brought in all adoption papers and she will forward all 
info to me when received. 
12-30-99 
Call to Quaid home, Sue is not there. Left msg requesting call back. 
1-4-flO 
Call from Bev Graham w/ Utah Medicaid. Reviewed events to date. She reports that 
mother did not advise of pvt insurance at time of application and when she discussed w/ 
her later Mom reported she did not think Skylar eligible under LC plan until adoption 
final States this is why she did not include coverage in application- However, Bev feels 
questionable since only payor source listed on adm to Prim Child Hosp is Med Pay. 
However, after review of plans w/ Amy at Prim Child, following determination has been 
made: 
Aetna is primary payor for this episode of care 
Will bill MedPay secondary and Medicaid third. 
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She reports that Aetna did request 2 letters from Medicaid, however, neither letter stated 
that Medicaid would be primary payor. Basically state that Skylar had coverage eff 
12/01 and that this coverage would be effective upon arrival in Utah. She states Amy has 
copies of letters and will fax to me 
Call to Amy at hosp, confirmed billing as reported by Medicaid Amy stated Aetna has 
indicated there will be no payment or reduced payment because child now out of 
network. However, she will bill them as primary and see what happens Will fax 
Medicaid letters to me today. 
Call to Karen Sager at LC, left msg to call. 
1-5-00 
Call this am from Karen Sager. Reviewed events and determination of payor status by 
Medicaid and hosp. Advised that Aetna may deny claims due to network issues, 
however, we will deny based on plan language for COB related to HMO network 
services. Also need to get Aetna insurance information from Mr. Quaid to assure proper 
COB and clarify if any continued coverage for disabled members. Will need policy 
information and then will contact New York DOI to clarify. Karen will contact Utah HR 
dept to get this information. States Bob off work now w/ EMLA due to adoption of this 
child. She also has adoption papers, will forward. 
Received fax of adoption papers, however, these are for previous child, Tren. VM to 
Karen w/ info. CB from her, request I fax release form to Shawn Weaver in Utah for Mr. 
Quaid to sign. Fax sent. 
01-12-00 
Claims received from Primary Childrens Hosp. Letter prepared (see file) and claims 
returned w/ attached letter. Directive to first file w/ primary payor, Aetna-
Call to Karen Sager at LC, have not received forms forwarded to Shawn Weaver. 
Explained we are starting to received claims on Skylar. She will contact Shawn and 
request he call me. 
01-14-00 
Call from Shawn Weaver, reports previously papers signed and mailed to Karen Sager, 
however, she reports she has never received them. Will re-fax papers to Shawn. CB 
from Shawn, Bob not there today, will have him sign on Monday and send to me. 
01-17-00 
Call from Shawn, faxing papers from Bob, however, did not sign paper or provide any 
information about Aetna coverage Shawn states Bob told him that Skylar is in critical 
condition and is not expected to live. Bob said doesn't have this information and we 
shouldn't need it and he doesn't know who is going to pay the bills so can't tell us 
anymore. Lengthy discussion w/ Shawn regarding COB issues since adoption, Shawn 
M 
was not aware. Shawn states he will take back to Bob and get information. Review right 
to information clause on p33 of plan doc, member has responsibility to provide info. 
Call to Primary Children's Hospital UR line, left vm requesting current update. 
01-18-00 
Continue w/ attempts to COB. Call to Schneiders Hosp to medical records, clarify what 
is needed to obtain hosp records, aware that listed under 2 names and adoption during 
admission. Spoke w/ Mark Smith at 71B-470-7446. Requested I send written request w/ 
copy of consent from Bob Quaid, will have to review. Would not confirm or deny would 
be able to provide records. States he will call me when request received. Mail to Mark 
Swain attention/ Long Island Jewish Hospital/ 270-05/76* ave/ New Height, NY 11040 
Received and reviewed current records from Primary. Indicate that baby has been 
trached, using trach mask, starting dc planning. Concerned about COB for home care 
and needs. 
Call to Amy at Primary, reports still no cooperation from Aetna, has spoke w/ Vonnie, 
reports her to be uncooperative and hateful States she has verbally stated will deny all 
claims, explanation to be in letter of denial. Aware that we are still attempting to obtain 
info to COB. States she understands child is declared terminal and arrangements to take 
home to prepare for death. 
Discussed w/ Terry. Will have Jackie contact Aetna CS in attempt to COB. Info to 
Jackie. Aware of CS note on 011100. 
02-04-00 
Still no cooperation from Aetna to COB. Call from Carleen w/ IHC Home Care, trfr 
from CS, requesting auth for pvt duty nursing. Advised unable to auth due to COB issues 
w/ Aetna, considered primary payor. She will contact parents for Aetna information. See 
CS note this date. 
02-09-00 
Would like to resolve COB issues, group renewal 04/01. Discussed w/ Terry. Call to 
Amy at Prim Childrens, Utah. States Aetna still not cooperating w/ them either. Have 
submitted claims on 01/28, not heard back yet, no payment or denial Was re-admitted 
1/27, hosp assumed Aetna not involved in this admission. Clarified not sure until receive 
COB info from them, some HMO plans state coverage for 12 mo if member disabled at 
time of termination. Also need to clarify this issue. She understands can not pay claims 
as primary until we receive COB info from Aetna w/ documentation defining when their 
responsibility ends. Terry advised, will wait to see how Aetna responds to claims 
submitted. Amy did state that she was able to verify eligibility of child w/ Aetna through 
CS, however, not sure how he is listed at this time. She states this verification of. 
eligiblity was done after his transfer to Utah. 
M 
02^10-00 
Call placed to home to ck on Tren. Spoke w/ Sue. She was pleasant, however, still 
reserved and very frustrated. Reports Skylar is doing well at home, not on vent but 
receiving 02 via trach mask States she doesn't understand why claims are being denied, 
very worried, states they can't pay all of these medical bills and that Medicaid won't pay 
anything until all of these insurance issues are resolved She doesn't understand why we 
can't get resolution. Empathized w/ her frustration, explained that no action can be taken 
until Aetna cooperates. She states they are not providing her w/ any information, 
including policy #, plan benefits, etc. States they have hired attorney to resolve. 
2-10-00 
Connie w/ Utah Medicaid w/ questions about benefits and eligibility; call back to her, not 
available, left msg returning call 
2-14-00 
Rec letter from CS that they had from Medicaid. Wanting benefit and eligibility info on 
all Quaid children. Completed and mailed, (see file) 
2-24-00 
Mark-Long Island Jewish Hosp, can release records, however, very large chart, fees est at 
approx S1200. Request he send H&P and dc summary only. 
03-08-00 
Return claims letter updated See file. 
03-14-00 
Call from Amy w/ Prim Childrens, Utah/ Skylar admitted again, can we precert 
Advised still no COB from Aetna, until documentation received defining their 
responsibility and term of coverage unable to auth. She verb understanding. States 
claims have been submitted to Aetna x 2, still no response. Will forward as soon as 
received w/ payment or denial explanation. Will forward admission info for our files. 
03-25-00 
Due to plan renewal^  another attempt to resolve COB issues w/ Aetna. Call to main 
operator, transferred to corporate office at 8006240756. Andrea in PA; states doesn't 
handle NY area, transferred to NY area, reached AT&T operator, who stated this was 
incorrect & Call to general info # 8008723862 requesting COB dept Spoke w/Sue 
regarding COB; she stated show eff date 062499 w/term date 010100, however states 
cVery strange" no data in COB screen for this member. Again stated "this was 
interesting, because absolutely no data available that defined COB." Provided w/ # for 
NE region COB-2157753632, also gave address-PO Box 997 Blue Bell, PA 19422. 
Call to NE region COB ofiice, reached vm of Jean ?, returned to operator, held on line as 
directed if need assistance x 5 min w/ no answer. CB to general info # and referred to 
member services. No cooperation from this area, advised to send letter, states that COB 
office does not respond to phone calls anyway. CB to Jean # and left vm requesting CB 
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Attempted another call to Aetna, several 800 #'s before any response -
8008723862/8006240756/8008161808. Finally reached Doug who stated must mail 
letter regarding COB-provided another address: Aetna, Triad Group 1919 1425, Union 
Meeting Rd, Blue Bell, PA 19422; Attn Employer Services. 
05.24-00 
Letter prepared and mailed certified to Aetna (see file) 
cc to NY Dept of Ins-NY State Insurance, Health Bureau, 25 Beaver St. NY, NY 10004 
MO Dept Ins, -PO Box 690 Jefferson City, MO 65102 
Steve Burney at LC 
Call to Amy at Primary Children's Hosp, still no response from Aetna to date. Advised 
have sent certified letter. She reports they are also preparing letter. States they did have 
one person at Aetna who read COB info over telephone but refused to send copy. Have 
received one denial for claim sent on Skylar Quaid that unable to find in census, re sent 
bill under name of Zachary Cohen, Bill to date at Primary: 
12/23/99- 1/21/00293, 696.66 
1/27/00-2/2/00 516,176.43 
2/6/00 - $420.04 
2/9/00 SI 68.26 
2/12/00 - $225.00 
3/12-00 - 3/13/00 - 22,142.09 
03-27-00 
CaD from Amy, admit to hosp 3/24 w/ dc 327, then readmit 3/ 28. Call to UR to fax info. 
03-29-00 
Reviews received, adm resp distress, needed to bag, increased fever after dc home first 
time w/ cont resp distress and 02 needs. Apparently pulmonary edema, ? aspiration 
pneumonia. Is now taking oral feeds of formula. PICC line placed, assume long term 
antibiotics. Hx refers to live in nurse (?) noted increased resp distress, called 911; 
admitted for cont care and antib. 
Q3-30-00 
Update to Marilyn Hogan w/ Intracoip 
04-07-00 
Call from Teresa Stracke w/ reinsurance. Reports just received report from Dr. Cannon, 
Skylar admitted again w/ resp distress, needed to place on vent and will be going home 
on vent. No additional news. 
Have not received return of receipt for letter sent to Aetna. Contacted post of£ need to 
allow 21 days for receipt, however, unable to track certified mail. If do not receive in 21 
days will need to go to PO and fill out form. 
04-12-00 
Received letter from NY DOI 
04-17-00 
Call from Faye w/IHC access (Medicaid) 1 -800-442-90239 ext 887561, requesting info 
about effective date, coverage;, etc. Provided w/ eff date and explained ongomg attempt 
to COB w/ Aetna. Provided what info I have, she states does not have any information 
about Aetna. Advised that I have spoke w/ someone at Medicaid previously. 
CB from Faye, reports that Aetna states eff date 06-24-99 w/tennination 01/01/00. 
Discussed this term date, would have been inpatient w/ continued care episode on this 
date. Also disc need to determine when Aetna's responsibility ends, including 
detennination regarding extension of coverage if disabled at time of termination. I don*t 
know that their plan states this, only that some HMO plans do require this, therefore, I 
have aksed for clarification of this issue also. She states that Medicaid has processed and 
paid claims as primary, will have to be reprocessed and submitted to insurance for 
primary and secondary payments. Advised that we have requested copies of EOB's from 
Aetna from any and all providers if they have submitted claims to Aetna and have 
received a response. Once Aetna makes detennination of claims we can proceed with 
appropriate processing. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
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U.S. HEALTHCARE, INC. d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
GROUP AGREEMENT COVER SHEET 
Contract Holder Hoffman Products New York 
Contract Holder Number 004770 
D00 
HMO Benefit Level 
GND1 
PATRIOT V PLAN Benefits Package 
Group Agreement Effective Date (,^-Ujinjjarxi. 1999 
Term of Group Agreement The initial term shall be 
From January 1, 1999 to December 31,1999 
Thereafter, subsequent terms shall be 
From January 1 st to December 31st 
Initial HMO In-Network Premium Rates Single 
Parent & Child 
Parent & Children 
Couple 
Family 
S 198.40 
S488.40 
S488.40 
S488.40 
S488.40 
Term of Rates From January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999 
These rates are subject to adjustments based upon final 
regulatory determinations 
premium Due Dates Tne Group Agreement EffecUve Date and the 1 st day of 
each succeeding calendar month 
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App.Add.000340 
NOTICE: Written notice shall be given by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to HMO at 
HMO Contracts WP42 
151 Farmington Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06156-3061 
and to Contract Holder at: 
Hoffinan Products New York 
Ms. Kathy Shorts 
Hoffinan Products New York 
343 Venture Blvd 
P 0 Box 86 
Wooster OH 44691 
(Signature Date) 
HMO-
By ^ q j L u o ^ ^ V ^ ^ 
Lawrence J. Harrington 
Vice President 
HMO 
Contract Holder: 
By 
Title. 
Contract Holder Name: Hoffinan Products New York 
Contract Holder Number' 004770 
Contract Holder Locations: D00 
Contract Holder Service Areas: GN01 
Contract Holder Group Agreement Effective Date: January 1, 1999 
HMO/NY GA-l 04/97 
U.S. HEALTHCARE, INC d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
GROUP AGREEMENT 
This is a Group Agreement between U S Healthcare, Inc d/b/a Aetna U.S. Healthcare (hereinafter referred to as 
"HMO") and Hoffinan Products New York (hereinafter referred to as "Contract 
Holder"). 
HMO agrees with the Contract Holder to provide coverage for benefits, in accordance with the terms, conditions, 
rights and pnvileges as set forth in this Group Agreement and the Certificate of Coverage. Member, covered under 
this Group Agreement are subject to all the conditions and prov:sions contained herein. 
This Group Agreement is governed by applicable federal law and the laws of New York. 
If any provision of this Group Agreement is deemed to be invalid or illegal such provision shall be M y severable and 
the remaining provisions of mu Group Agreement shall continue in full force and effect In cons.deraUon of the 
Premium parents made by or on behalf of the Contract Holder, HMO shall prov.de coverage for those services 
described in ^ Certificate of Coverage subject to the terms and conditions set forth » * . Group Agreement and the 
Certificate of Coverage (herein after referred to as "Certificate") winch is attached to this G n » p Agreement, and fully 
incorporated herein by reference. The terms and conditions used in this Group Agreement have the same meaning 
given those terms in the Certificate unless otherwise specifically defined in this Group Agreement. 
Group Agreement Effective Date: January 1, 1999 
Contract Holder Number 004770 
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PREMIUMS 
A Premiums for the Covered Benefits under this Group Agreement are set forth in the Cover Sheet attached 
hereto which is fully incorporated herein by reference 
B The Premiums set forth in the Cover Sheet shall be effective for the initial term of this Group Agreement 
Thereafter, if HMO gives a minimum of 30 days prior written notice to the Contract Holder, HMO may 
change the Premiums: 
upon the renewal date of this Group Agreement, or 
upon the effective date of any applicable law or regulation having a direct and material impact on the-
cost of providing coverage to Members 
Payment of the applicable Premium on and after that date shall constitute acceptance of those changes by the 
Contract Holder, mdividually and on behalf of all Members enrolled under this Group Agreement 
C Premiums are payable to HMO on or m advance of each Premium due date at the corporate offices of HMO 
unless otherwise specified by HMO m writing. The payment of any Premium shall not maintain coverage 
under this Group Agreement in force beyond the date when the next payment becomes due, however, a 31 
day grace period, during which time this Group Agreement will remain m force, shall be granted for payment 
of each amount due after the first The Contract Holder shall remain liable for the payment of the Premium 
for the time coverage was m effect during the grace period and the Member shall remain liable for 
Copayments owed A check is not a payment until it is honored by a bank HMO reserves the right to return 
a check issued against insufficient funds without resorting to a second deposit attempt 
D Retroactive adjustments to the Contract Holder's billings may be made by HMO for the termmation of 
Members not posted to previous Contract Holder billings However, the Contract Holder may only receive 
a maximum of 2 month's credit for Member terminations which occurred more than 31 days prior to the date 
HMO was notified of such termmation by the Contract Holder Retroactive additions will be made at the 
discretion of HMO based upon eligibility guidelines, as detailed m the Certificate and on the Schedule of 
Benefits and are subject to the payment of all applicable Premiums As between HMO and the Contract 
Holder the Contract Holder shall be responsible for any claims paid by HMO with respect to a Member, to 
the extent HMO relied on the Contract Holder's submitted enrollment to confirm coverage where coverage 
was not valid 
E Premiums for Members whose coverage is effective on a day other than the first day of a month or whose 
coverage terminates on a day other than the last day of a month shall be adjusted as indicated below 
If membership is effective between the 1st through the 15th of the month ,inclusive, the Premium for 
the whole month is due If membership is effective between the 16th through the 31 st of the month, 
inclusive, no Premium is due for the first month of membership 
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If the Premiums are not paid by the Premium due date, KMO will require the Contract Holder to pa\ 
interest on the overdue amount at 1 1/2% for each month overdue, commencing on the 3 1st day after the 
Premium due date 
In the event of non-payment of any amount due, HMO shall be entitled to all remedies provided for in law or in 
equity, including but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees (which the parties acknowledge may consUtute 
at least 33 1/3% of the sum sued upon), costs of suit (including but not limited to filing fees and deposition 
transcript costs), and pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month 
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ENROLLMENT 
Enrollment for eligible individuals, as described in the Certificate, will be permitted during the Open Enrollment 
Period, or within 31 days from the date the individual and any dependent becomes eligible for coverage Complered 
enrollment information must be submitted to the Contract Holder for transmittal to HMO Eligible individuals and 
any eligible dependents who are not enrolled withm the Open Enrollment Period or 31 days of becoming eligible ma; 
be enrolled during any subsequent Open Enrollment Period Coverage shall not become effective until confirmed oy 
HMO The Open Enrollment Period shall be consistent with the Open Enrollment Period applicable to any other 
group health benefit plan being offered by the Contract Holder and m compliance with applicable law The Contract 
Holder shall permit representaUves of HMO to meet with eligible mdividuais dunng the Open Enrollment Penod 
unless the parties agree upon an alternate enrollment procedure 
There may be a waitmg period before mdividuais are ehgible for coverage under this Group Agreement The waitmg 
penod, if any, is specified on the Schedule of Benefits 
The ehgibihty of the group, the composition of the group and the eligibility requirements used to dete— me membership 
m the group which exist at the effective date of thib Group Agreement are material to the execution of this Group 
Agreement by HMO The Contract Holder shall not dunng the term of this Group Agreement modify the Open 
Enrollment Period, the waitmg penod as descnbed on the Schedule of Benefits, or any other eligibility requirements as 
descnbed m the Certificate and on the Schedule of Benefits, for the purposes of enrolling the Contract Holder's 
ehgible mdividuais and dependents under this Group Agreement, unless agreed to in wnting by HMO 
CONTRACT HOLDER TERMINATION 
A This Group Agreement may be terminated by Contract Holder on any Premium due date by giving 30 days' 
pnor wntten notice 
B The Contract Holder may terminate this Group Agreement as of its renewal date, by providing HMO 
wntten notice of non-renewal not less than 30 days pnor to the renewal date 
C The Contract Holder may terminate this Group Agreement as of the date any Premium change would 
become effective, by providing HMO with wntten notice of termmaUon not less than 30 days pnor to such 
effective date 
D Immediately upon wntten notice, HMO may terminate or non-renew the Group Agreement if 
1 HMO does not receive payment from the Contract Holder for the entire Premium due under this 
Group Agreement within the grace penod, HMO may terminate this Group Agreement as of the 
last day for which Premiums were received, subject to the grace penod The termination of this 
Group Agreement following the expirauon of the grace penod shall not relieve the Contract 
Holder of its obligation to pay the Premium for coverage provided dunng the grace penod, 
2 the Contract Holder has performed an act or practice that constitutes fraud or matenal misstatement 
by the Contract Holder, in obtaining coverage under this Group Agreement, 
3 the Contract Holder has failed to comply with a matenal plan provision relating to any employer 
contnbution or group participation rules, under applicable state or federal law, 
4 HMO ceases to offer coverage in the market m accordance with state law, 
5 HMO ceases to offer coverage of a specific product in the market in accordance with state law, 
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6 the Contract Holder no longer has any enrollee under the plan who lives, resides, or works in the 
Service Area 
No termination shall relieve the Contract Holder from any obligation incurred poor to the date of termination of this 
Group Agreement 
No change m the eligibility or participation requirements of the Contract Holder shall be permitted to affect eligibility 
or enrollment under this Group Agreement unless such change is agreed to by HMO and the Contract Holder, and is 
not otherwise contrary to applicable state or federal laws, rules or regulations Breach of this provision is considered a 
material breach of this Group Agreement and may be the basis for termination by giving 30 days' prior wntten notice 
It is the responsibility of the Contract Holder to notify the Subscribers of the termination of the Group Agreement in 
compliance with all applicable laws, except that HMO will notify the Subscribers in cases where HMO ceases to offer 
coverage m the market or ceases to offer coverage of a specific product in the market m accordance with state law 
However, HMO reserves the nght to notify Subscriben of termination of the Group Agreement for any reason, 
including non-payment of Premium. 
In accordance with the Certificate, the Contract Holder shall provide wntten nouce to Members of their nghts upon 
termination of coverage 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS 
A Between Participating Providers and HMO 
The relationship between HMO and Participating Providers is a contractual relationship among independent 
contractors Participating Providers are not agents or employees of HMO nor is HMO an agent or 
employee of any Participating Provider. 
Participating Providers are solely responsible for any health services rendered to their Member patients 
HMO makes no express or implied warranties or representations concerning the qualifications, continued 
participation, or quality of services of any Physician, Hospital or other Participating Provider A 
Provider's participation may be terminated at any time without advance notice to the Contract Holder or 
Members 
B Between the Contract Holder and HMO 
The relationship between HMO and the Contract Holder is limited to a contractual relationship between 
independent contractors Neither party is an agent nor employee of the other m performing its obligations 
pursuant to this Group Agreement 
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ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
HMO may adopt policies, procedures, rules and interpretations to promote orderly and efficient administration of this 
Group Agreement 
A Entire Agreement 
This Group Agreement, including the Group Application, Cover Sheet, Certificate of Coverage, Schedule of 
Benefits, any Riders, and any amendments, endorsements, inserts or attachments, constitutes the entire Group 
Agreement between the Contract Holder and HMO, and on the Effective Date of Coverage, supersedes ail 
other pnor and contemporaneous arrangements, understandings, agreements, negotiations, and discussions 
between the parties, whether wntten or oral, previously issued by HMO for Covered Benefits provided by 
this Group Agreement 
Ail statements made by the Contract Holder or a Member shall be deemed representations and not 
warranties No wntten statement made by a* Member snail be used by HMO in a contest unless a copy of the 
statement is or has been furnished to the Member or his or her beneficiary, or the person making the claim 
B Amendments 
This Group Agreement is subject to all rules and regulations promulgated at any tune by any state or federal 
regulatory agency or authority having supervisory authonty over HMO, and this Group Agreement shall be 
deemed to be amended to conform therewith at ail times The Group Agreement, including the Certificate of 
Coverage, Schedule of Benefits, any Riders, and any amendments or endorsements may be changed upon 
approval by the New York Superintendent of Insurance This Group Agreement may be changed at any tone 
for any other reason by agreement between HMO and the Contract Holder, without the consent of any 
employee, Member, or other person Except as detailed below, any amendments to this Group Agreement 
snail be in writing and must be approved and executed by authorized representatives of both the Contract 
Holder and HMO No other individual has the authonty to modify this Group Agreement, waive any of its 
provisions, conditions, or restrictions, extend the time for making a payment, or bmd HMO by making any 
other commitment or representation or by giving or receiving any mformation No change m this Group 
Agreement shall be valid uniess evidenced by an endorsement, signed by an authorized representauve of 
HMO 
Formal acceptance of an amendment to this Group Agreement by the Contract Holder shall not be required 
if 
1 the change was requested by either the Contract Holder or HMO and is agreed to m writing by the 
other, or 
2 the change is required to bnng the Group Agreement into conformance with any applicable federal 
or state law or regulation, or ruling of the jurisdiction in which the Group Agreement is delivered, or 
3 the Contract Holder makes payment of any applicable Premium on and after the effective date of 
such amendment 
C Forms 
HMO shall supply the Contract Holder with a reasonable supply of its forms and descriptive literature The 
Contract Holder shall distribute HMO's forms and descriptive literature to any eligible individual who 
becomes eligible for coverage The Contract Holder shall, within 31 days of receipt from an eligible 
individual, forward all applicable forms and other required information to HMO 
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D Records 
HMO shall maintain Member records The records will contain key facts about the Member's coverage 
Each month during the period of this Group Agreement, on forms approved by HMO, the Contract Holder 
shall furnish to HMO such information as may reasonably be required to administer the Group Agreement 
This includes, but is not limited to, information needed to enroll Members of the Contract Holder, process 
terminations, and effect changes in family status and transfer of employment of Members HMO shall not be 
liable to Members for the fulfillment of any obligation prior to information being received in a form satisfac-
tory to HMO 
The Contract Holder shall make payroll and other records directly related to Member's coverage under this 
Group Agreement available to HMO for inspection, at HMO's expense, at the Contract Holder's office, 
during regular business hours, upon reasonable advance request from HMO This provision shall survive the 
termination of this Group Agreement as necessary to resolve outstanding financial or administrative issues 
pursuant to this Group Agreement 
E Clerical Errors 
Incorrect informaUon furnished to HMO may be corrected, provided that HMO has not acted to its prejudice 
in reliance thereon Clerical errors or delays in keepmg or reporting data relative to coverage will neither 
invalidate coverage which would otherwise be in force, continue coverage which would otherwise be validly 
terminated if HMO, in its sole discretion, determines that a clerical error has been made, nor grant additional 
benefits to Members Upon discovery of such errors or delay, an adjustment of Premiums shall be made In 
no case will adjustments in coverage or Premiums be made effective more than 2 Premium due dates prior to 
the date HMO is notified in wntmg, on a form satisfactory to HMO, of the requested addition, deletion, or 
change in coverage 
F Claim Determinations 
HMO has complete authonty to review all claims for Covered Benefits under this Group Agreement In 
exercismg such responsibility, HMO shall have discretionary authonty to determine whether and to what 
extent eligible individuals and beneficianes are entitled to coverage and construe any disputed or doubtful 
terms under this Group Agreement HMO shall be deemed to have properly exercised such authonty unless 
HMO abuses its discretion by acting arbitrarily and capnciously 
G Fraudulent or Matenal Misstatements 
If any relevant fact as to a Member is found to have been misstated, an equitable adjustment of Premiums 
may be made If the misstatement affects the existence or amoimt of coverage, the true facts will be used in 
determining whether coverage is to remain in force 
H Incontestability 
Except as to a fraudulent misstatement, or issues concerning Premiums due 
1 No statement made by the Contract Holder or any Member shall be the basis for voiding coverage 
or denying coverage or be used in defense of a claim unless it is m wntmg 
2 No statement made by the Contract Holder shall be the basis for voidmg this Group Agreement 
after it has been in force for 2 years from its effective date 
3 No statement made by a Member shall be used in defense of a claim for loss incurred or commencing 
after coverage has been in effect for 2 years 
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L Assignability 
No rights or benefits under this Group Agreement are assignable by the Contract Holder to any other party 
unless approved by HMO 
J Waiver 
HMO's failure to implement, or insist upon compliance with, any provision of this Group Agreement or the 
terms of the Certificate incorporated hereunder, at any given tune or times, shall not constitute a waiver of 
HMO's right to implement or insist upon compliance with that provision at any other time or tunes This 
includes, but is not limited to, the payment of Premiums or benefits This applies whether or not the 
circumstances are the same 
K. Notices 
Any notice required or permitted under this Group Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have 
been given on the date when delivered in person, or, if delivered by first-class United States mail, on the date 
mailed, proper postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the address set forth in the Group Application, or 
Cover Sheet, or to any more recent address of which the sending party has received written notice 
L Third Parties 
This Group Agreement shall not confer any rights or obligations on third parties except as specifically 
provided herein. 
M Non-Discnmmation 
The Contract Holder agrees to offer participation in HMO to all persons as described in the Subscriber 
Eligibility section of the Schedule of Benefits under terms and condiuons no less favorable than those for any 
alternate health benefit plans The Contract Holder agrees to make no attempt, whether through differential 
Contract Holder Premium contributions or otherwise to encourage or discourage enrollment in HMO of 
eligible individuals and eligible Dependents based on health status or health risk. 
N Execution of this Agreement 
This Group Agreement shall be executed by HMO and the Contract Holder once the Group Application, 
which is attacned hereto and fully incorporated herein by reference, is completed and signed. However, 
payment of the applicable Premium on and after the effective date of this Group Agreement shall consutute 
execuuon of this Group Agreement by the Contract Holder 
0 Inability to Arrange Services 
In the event that due to circumstances not within the reasonable control of HMO, including but not limited to 
major disaster, epidemic, complete or partial destruction of facilities, not, civil insurrection, disability of a 
significant part of HMO's Participating Providers or entities with whom HMO has arranged for services 
under this Group Agreement, or sumlar causes, the rendition of medical or "Hospital benefits or other 
services provided under this Group Agreement is delayed or rendered impractical, HMO shall not have any 
liability or obligation on account of such delay or failure to provide services, except to refund the amount of the 
unearned prepaid Premiums held by HMO on the date such event occurs HMO is required only to make a 
good-faith effort to provide or arrange for the provision of services, taking into account the impact of the event 
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p Use of the HMO Name and all Symbols, Trademarks, and Service Marks 
HMO reserves the right to control the use of its name and all symbols, trademarks, and service marks presently 
existing or hereinafter established with respect to it The Contract Holder agrees that it will not use such 
name, symbols, trademarks, or service marks in advertising or promotional materials or otherwise without 
prior written consent of HMO and will cease any and all usage immediately upon request of HMO or upon 
termination of this Group Agreement 
Worker's Compensation. 
The Contract Holder is responsible for protecting HMO's interests in any worker's compensaUon claims or 
settlements with any eligible individual. HMO shall be reimbursed for all paid medical expenses which have 
occurred as a result of any work related injury that is compensable or settled in any manner. 
At the signing of this Group Agreement anduipon renewal, the Contract Holder shall submit proof of their 
worker's compensation coverage or an exclusion form which has been accepted by the applicable regulatory 
authority governing Worker's Compensation. The Contract Holder is also required to submit a monthly 
report to HMO listing all worker's compensation cases. Such list will contain the name, social secunty 
number, date of loss and diagnosis of ail applicable eligible individual. 
HMO/NY GA-l 04/97 
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U.S. HEALTHCARE, ENC d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE 
This Certificate of Coverage ("Certificate") is part of the Group Agreement ("Group Agreement*) between U S 
Healthcare, Inc dTb/a Aetna U S Healthcare, hereinafter referred to as HMO, and the Contract Holder The Group 
Agreement determines the terms and conditions of coverage. Provisions of this Certificate include the Schedule of 
Benefits, and any amendments, nders or endorsements Amendments, nders or endorsements may be delivered with the 
Certificate or added thereafter. 
HMO agrees with the Contract Holder to provide coverage for benefits, in accordance with the conditions, rights, and 
privileges as set forth in this Certificate. Members covered under this Certificate are subject to all the conditions and 
provisions of the Group Agreement 
This Certificate describes covered health care benefits. Coverage for services or supplies is provided only if it is 
furnished while an individual is a Member. This* means that coverage is provided only for health care services 
furnished while this coverage is in force. Except as shown in the Continuation and Conversion section of this 
Certificate, coverage is not provided for any services received before coverage starts or after coverage ends. 
Certain words have specific meanings when used in this Certificate. The defined terms appear in bold type with initial 
capital letters. The definitions of those terms are found in the Definitions section of this Certificate. 
This Certificate is not in lieu of insurance for Worker's Compensation. This Certificate is governed by 
applicable federal law and the laws of New York. 
READ THIS ENTIRE CERTIFICATE CAREFULLY. IT DESCRIBES THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
OF MEMBERS AM) HMO. IT IS THE CONTRACT HOLDER'S AND THE MEMBER'S 
RESPONSIBILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THIS CERTIFICATE. 
IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, CERTAIN MEDICAL SERVICES ARE NOT COVERED OR MAY 
REQUIRE PREAUTHORIZATION BY HMO. 
NO SERVICES ARE COVERED UNDER THIS CERTIFICATE IN THE ABSENCE OF PAYMENT OF 
CURRENT PREMIUMS SUBJECT TO THE 31 DAY GRACE PERIOD AND THE PREMIUMS SECTION 
OF THE GROUP AGREEMENT. 
THIS CERTIFICATE APPLIES TO COVERAGE ONLY AND DOES NOT RESTRICT A MEMBER'S 
ABILITY TO RECEIVE HEALTH CARE SERVICES THAT ARE NOT, OR MIGHT NOT BE, COVERED 
BENEFITS UNDER THIS CERTIFICATE. 
NO PARTICIPATING PROVIDER OR OTHER PROVIDER, INSTITUTION, FACILITY OR AGENCY IS 
AN AGENT OR EMPLOYEE OF HMO. 
Contract Holder Hofirnan ProductsHew York 
Contract Holder Number* 004770 
Contract Hoider~Group Agreement Effective Date: January 1, 1999 
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HMO PROCEDURE 
A Selecting a Participating Primary Care Physician. 
At the time of enrollment, each Member should select a Participating Primary Care Physician
 STCP) from 
HMO's Directory of Participating Providers to access Covered Benefits as described in this Certificate Tne 
choice of a PCP is made solely by the Member If the Member is a minor or otherwise incapable of selecting 
a PCP, the Subscriber should select a PCP on the Member's behalf Unul a PCP is selected benefits will 
be limited to coverage for Medical Emergency care 
B The Primary Care Physician. 
The PCP coordinates a Member's medical care, as appropriate, either by providing treatment or oy issuing 
Referrals to direct the Member to a Participating Provider The PCP can also order lab tests and x-rays, 
prescribe medicines or therapies, and arrange hospitalization Except in a Medical Emergency or for certain 
direct access Specialist benefits as described in this Certificate, only those services which are provided by or 
referred by a Member's PCP will "be cqvered Covered Benefits are described in the Covered Benefits 
section of this Certificate It is a Member's responsibility to consult with the FCF in all matters regarding 
the Member's medical care 
If the Member's ?CV performs, suggests, or recommends a Member for a course of treatment that includes 
services that are not Covered Benefits, the entire cost of any such non-covered services will be the Member's 
responsibility 
C Availability of Providers. 
HMO cannot guarantee the availability or continued participation of a particular Provider Either HMO or 
any Participating Provider may terminate the Provider contract or limit the number of Members that will be 
accepted as pauents If the PCP initially selected cannot accept addiUonal patients, the Member will be 
notified and given an opportunity to make another PCP selection. The Member must then cooperate with 
HMO to select another PCP Unul a PCP is selected, benefits are limited to coverage for Medical 
Emergency care 
D Changing a PCP. 
A Member may change the PCP at any time by cailmg the Member Services 800 telephone number hsted on 
the Member's identification card or by written or electronic submission of the HMO's change form. A 
Member may contact HMO to request a change form or for assistance in completing that form The change 
will become effective upon HMO's receipt and approval of the request 
E Ongoing Reviews. 
HMO conducts ongomg reviews of those services and supplies which are recommended or provided by 
Health Professionals to determine whether such services and supphes are Covered Benefits under this 
Certificate If HMO determines that the recommended services and supplies are not Covered Benefits, the 
Member will be notified If a Member wishes to appeal such determination, the Member may then contact 
HMO to seek a review of the determination 
F Authorization. 
Certain services and supplies under this Certificate may require authorization by HMO to determine if thev 
are Covered Benefits under this Certificate Those services and supphes requiring HMO authonzauon are 
indicated m this Certificate 
HMO/NY COC-1 04/97 
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ELIGIBILITY AND EJVROLLMENT 
A Eligibility. 
1 To be eligible to enroll as a Subscriber, an individual must 
a meet all applicable eligibility requirements agreed upon by the Contract Holder and 
HMO, and 
b live or work in the Service Area 
2 To be eligible to enroll as a Covered Dependent, the Contract Holder must provide dependent 
coverage for Subscribers, and the dependent must be 
a, the legal spouse of a Subscriber under this Certificate, or 
b a dependent unmarried child (including natural, foster, step, legally adopted children, 
proposed adoptive children, a child under court order) who meets the eligibility 
requirements described on the Schedule of Benefits 
3 A Member who resides outside the Service Area is required to choose a PCP and return to the 
Service Area for Covered Benefits Members shall be covered for Emergency Services and 
Urgent Care services only when obtained outside the Service Area 
B Enrollment 
Unless otherwise noted, an eligible individual and any eligible dependents may enroll in HMO regardless of 
health status, age, or requirements for health services within 31 days from the eligibility date 
1 Newly Eligible Individuals and Eligible Dependents 
An eligible individual and any eligible dependents may enroll within 31 days of the eligibility date 
2 Open Enrollment Period. 
Eligible individuals or dependents who are eligible for enrollment but do not enroll as stated above, 
may be enrolled during any subsequent Open Enrollment Period upon submission of complete 
enrollment information and Premium payment to HMO 
3 Enrollment of Newly Eligible Dependents 
a. Newborn Children. 
A newborn child is covered for 31 days from the date of birth. To continue coverage beyond 
this initial period, the child must be enrolled in HMO within the initial 31 day period If 
coverage does not require the payment of an additional Premium for a Covered 
Dependent, die Subscriber must still enroll the child within 31 days after the date of birth 
The coverage for newly born, adopted children, and children placed for adoption consists of 
coverage of injury and illness, including the necessary care and treatment of congenital 
defects and birth abnormalities, subject to the limits of this Certificate Coverage includes 
necessary transportation costs from place of birth to the nearest specialized Participating 
treatment center 
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D Adopted Children 
A legally adopted child or a child for whom a Subscriber is a coun appointed legal 
guardian, and who meets the definition of a Covered Dependent, will be treated as a 
dependent from the date of adoption or upon the date the child was placed for adoption witn 
the Subscriber "Placed for adoption" means the assumption and retention of a legal 
obligation for total or partial support of a child in anticipation of adoption of the child. If the 
placement takes effect on or after the date a Subscriber's coverage becomes effective, the 
Subscriber must make a written request for coverage within 31 days of the date the child is 
adopted or placed with the Subscriber for adoption. 
The initial coverage will not be affected by any provision in this Certificate which 
i requires evidence of good health acceptable to HMO for coverage to become 
effective, 
n delays coverage due to a confinement, or 
m limits coverage as to a preexisting condition. 
4 Special Rules Which Apply to Children. 
a. Qualified Medical Support Order 
Coverage is available for a dependent child not residing with a Subscriber and who resides 
outside the Service Area, if there is a qualified medical child support order requiring the 
Subscriber to provide dependent health coverage for a non-resident child, and the child 
meets the definition of a Covered Dependent If the qualified medical support order is 
issued on or after the date the Subscriber's coverage becomes effective, the Subscriber 
must make a written request for coverage within 31 days of the court order 
The initial coverage will not be affected by any provision in this Certificate which 
l requires evidence of good health acceptable to HMO for coverage to become 
effective, 
u delays coverage due to a confinement, or 
in limits coverage as to a preexisting condition. 
b Handicapped Children, 
Coverage ts available for a child who is chiefly dependent upon the Subscriber for support 
and maintenance, and who is 19 years of age or older but incapable of self-support due to 
mental illness, developmental disability, mental retardation, or physical handicap The 
incapacity must have commenced pnor to the age the dependent lost eligibility In order to 
enroll, or continue coverage for, a handicapped child, the Subscriber must provide evidence 
of the child's incapacity and dependency to HMO within 31 days of the date the child s 
coverage would otherwise terminate Proof of continued incapacity, including a medical 
examination, must be submitted to HMO as requested, but not more frequently than 
annually beginning after the two year period following the child's attainment of the age 
-specified on the Schedule of Benefits This eligibility provision will no longer apply on trie 
date the dependent's incapacity ends 
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5. Notification of Change in Status. 
It shall be a Member's responsibility to notify HMO of any changes which affect the Member's 
coverage under this Certificate, Such status changes include, but are not limited to, change of 
address, change of Covered Dependent status, and enrollment in Medicare or any other group health 
plan of any Member. Additionally, if requested, a Subscriber must provide to HMO, within 31 
days of the date of the request, evidence satisfactory to HMO that a dependent meets the eligibility 
requirements described in this Certificate. 
An eligible individual and any eligible dependents may be enrolled during a special enrollment 
period. A special enrollment period occurs when: 
a. an eligible individual or an eligible dependent is covered under another group health plan or 
other health insurance coverage wK" rutially eligible for coverage under HMO; 
b. the eligible individual or eligible de; lent declines coverage in writing under HMO; 
c. the eligible individual or eligible dependent loses coverage under the other group health plan 
or other health insurance coverage for one of the following reasons: 
i. the other group health coverage is COBRA continuation coverage under another 
plan, and the COBRA continuation coverage under that other plan has since been 
exhausted; or 
iL the other coverage is a group health plan or other health insurance coverage, and ' 
the other coverage has been terminated as a result of loss of eligibility for the 
coverage, employer contributions towards the other coverage have been 
terminated, or the other plan or contract terminated. 
Loss of eligibility includes a loss of coverage as a result of legal separation, 
divorce, annulment, death, termination of employment, reduction in the number of 
hours of employment, and any loss of eligibility after a period that is measured by 
reference to any of the foregoing. 
Loss of eligibility does not include a loss due to failure of the individual or the 
participant to pay premiums on a timely basis or due to termination of coverage for 
cause as referenced in the Termination of Coverage section of the HMO Certificate 
of Coverage; and 
& the eligible individual or eligible dependent enrolls within 31 days of the loss. 
The effective date of coverage will be the first day of the first calendar month following the date the 
completed request for enrollment is received 
The eligible individual or the eligible dependent enrolling during a special enrollment period will not 
be subject to any late enrollment or preexisting condition provision described m-this Certificate. 
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C Effective Date of Coverage 
Coverage shall take effect at 12 01 a,m on the Member's effective date Coverage shall continue in effect 
from month to month subject to payment of Premiums made by the Contract Holder and subject to tne 
Contract Holder Termination section of the Group Agreement 
Hospital Confinement on Effective Date of Coverage 
If a Member is an inpatient m a Hospital on the Effective Date of Coverage, the Member will be covered as 
of that date Such services are not covered if the Member is covered by another health plan on that date and 
the other health plan is responsible for the cost of the services HMO will not cover any service that is no' a 
Covered Benefit under this Certificate To be covered, the Member must utilize Participating Providers 
and is subject to all the terms and conditions of this Certificate 
COVERED BENEFITS 
A Member shall be entitled to the Covered Benefits as specified below, m accordance with the terms and 
conditions of this Certificate Unless specifically stated otherwise, in order for benefits to be covered, they 
must be Medically Necessary For the purpose of coverage, HMO may determine whether any benefit pro-
vided under the Certificate is Medically Necessary, and HMO has the option to only authorize coverage for 
a Covered Benefit performed by a particular Provider Preventive care, as described below, will be 
considered Medically Necessary 
To be Medically Necessary, the service or supply must 
be care or treatment as likely to produce a significant positive outcome as, and no more likely to 
produce a negative outcome than, any alternative service or supply, both as to the disease or injury 
involved and the Member's overall health condition, 
be care or services related to diagnosis or treatment of an existing illness or injury, except for covered 
periodic health evaluations and preventive and well baby care, as determined by HMO, 
be a diagnostic procedure, indicated by the health status of the Member and be as likely to result in 
information that could affect the course of treatment as, and no more likely to produce a negative 
outcome than, any alternative service or supply, both as to the disease or injury mvolved and the 
Member's overall health condition, 
include only those services and supplies that cannot be safely and satisfactorily provided at home in a 
Physician*s office, on an outpatient basis, or m any facility other than a Hospital, when used in 
relation to inpatient Hospital services, and 
as to diagnosis, care and treatment be no more costly (taking into account all health expenses incurred 
m connection with the service or supply) than any equally effective service or supply in meeting the 
above tests 
In determining if a service or supply is Medically Necessary, HMO's Patient Management Medical Director 
-or its Physician designee will c^nsideF-
information provided on the Members health status, 
reports in peer reviewed medical literature, 
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reports and guidelines published by nationally recognized health care organizations that include 
supporting scientific data; 
professional standards of safety and effectiveness which are generally recognized in the United States 
for diagnosis, care or treatment; 
the opinion of Health Professionals in the generally recognized health specialty involved; 
the opinion of the attending Physicians, which have credence but do not overrule contrary opinions; 
and 
any other relevant information brought to HMO's attention. 
All Covered Benefits will be covered in accordance with the guidelines determined by HMO. 
If a Member has questions regarding coverage under this Certificate, the Member may call the Member 
Services 800 telephone number listed on the Member's identification card 
THE MEMBER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF THE APPLICABLE COPAYMENTS 
LISTED ON THE SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS. 
EXCEPT FOR DIRECT ACCESS SPECIAUST BENEFITS OR IN A MEDICAL EMERGENCY 
OR URGENT CARE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED IN THIS CERTIFICATE, THE FOLLOWING 
BENEFITS MUST BE ACCESSED THROUGH THE PCP'S OFFICE THAT IS SHOWN ON THE 
MEMBER'S IDENTIFICATION CARD, OR ELSEWHERE UPON PRIOR REFERRAL ISSUED 
BY THE MEMBER'S PCP. 
A. Primary Care Physician Benefits. 
1. Office visits during office hours. 
2. Home visits. 
3. After-hours PCP services. PCPs are required to provide or arrange for on-call coverage 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. If a Member becomes sick or is injured after the PCP's regular office hours, the 
Member should: 
a. call the PCP's office; and 
b. identify himself or herself as a Member, and 
c. follow the PCP's or covering Physician's instructions. 
If the Member's injury or illness is a Medical Emergency, the Member should follow the 
procedures outlined under the Emergency Care/Urgent Care Benefits section of this Certificate. 
4. Hospital visits. 
5. Periodic health evaluations to include: 
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a well child care for Covered Dependents from birth through the attainment of 19 years of 
age 
1 an initial hospital check-up and well child visits scheduled in accordance with the 
preva/ing clinical standards of a national association of pediatric physicians, 
n well child visits including a medical history, a complete physical examination 
developmental assessment, anticipatory guidance, appropnate immunizations and 
laboratory tests ordered at the time of the visit, and 
a necessary lmrnunizauons as ordered by the superintendent of insurance in 
consultation with the commissioner of health consisting of at least adequate 
dosages of vaccine against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, measles, rubella, 
mumps, haemophilus influenza type b and hepatitis b which meets the standards 
approved by the United States public health service for such biological products 
b routine physical examinations 
c routine gynecological exahunations, including pap smears, for routine care, administered by 
the PCP Or the Member may also go directly to a Participating Provider without a 
Referral for routine GYN examinations and pap smears See the Direct Access Specialist 
Benefits section of this Certificate for a descnption of these benefits 
d routine hearing screenings 
e. immunizations (but not if solely for the purpose of travel or employment) 
f routine vision screenings 
6 Injections, including aDergy desensitization injections 
7 Casts and dressings 
8 Health Education Counseling and Information. 
9 Diabetic Equipment, Supplies and Education The following equipment, supplies and education 
services for the treatment of diabetic conditions are covered when ordered by the Member1* PCP and 
obtained through a Participating Provider 
a Blood glucose monitors and blood glucose monitors for the legally blind, 
b Data management systems, 
c Test strips for glucose monitors and visual reading and urine test strips, 
d Insulin, 
e Injection aids, 
f Cartridges for the legally blind 
g Syringes, insulin pumps and appurtenances thereto, 
h Insulin infusion devices, 
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1 Oral agents for controlling blood sugar, 
j Such other equipment and related supplies required by the commissioner of the department 
of health, 
k. Coverage for diabetes self-management education, including information on proper diets 
Such coverage for self-management education and education relating to diet shall be limited 
to visits Medically Necessary upon the diagnosis of diabetes, where a Physician diagnoses 
a significant change m the patient's symptoms or conditions which necessitate changes m a 
patient's self-management, or where reeducation or refresher education is necessary 
Coverage for self-management education and education relating to diet shall also include 
home visits when Medically Necessary 
B Diagnostic Services. 
Services mciude, but are not limited to, theibllowing 
1 diagnostic, laboratory, and x-ray services 
2 mammograms, by a Participating Provider The Member is required to obtain a Referral from her 
PCP or gynecologist, or obtain prior authorization from HMO to a Participating Provider, prior to 
receiving this benefit 
Screening mammogram benefits for female Members are provided as follows 
age 35 through 39, inclusive, one single baseline mammogram, 
age 40 and older, one routme mammogram every year, or 
when Medically Necessary 
C Specialist Physician Benefits. 
Covered Benefits mciude outpatient and inpatient services. 
D Direct Access Specialist Benefits. 
The following services are covered without a Referral when rendered by a Participating Provider 
Routme Gynecological Exammation(s) Routme gynecological visit(s) and pap smear(s), including 
annual cervical cytology screenings The number of visits, if any, is listed on the Schedule of 
Benefits 
Open Access Gynecological Care Benefits are provided to female Members for services performed 
by a Participating Provider for diagnosis and treatment of gynecological problems See the 
Infertility Services section otlnTs Certificate-for a description of Infertility benefits 
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Routine Eye Examinations, including refraction, as follows: 
1. if the Member is age 1 through 18 and wears eyeglasses or contact lenses, one exam ever/ 
12-month period. 
2. if the Member is age 19 and over and wears eyeglasses or contact lenses, one exam every 
24-month period. 
3. if the Member is age 1 through 45 and does not wear eyeglasses or contact lenses, one exam 
every 36-month period 
4. if the Member is age 46 and over and does not wear eyeglasses or contact lenses, one exam 
every 24-month period 
Preventive Dental Care for Members under the age of 12. Benefits are limited to: 
1. Oral prophylaxis (cleaning) as necessary; 
2. Topical application of fluorides and the prescription of fluorides for systematic use when not 
available in the community water supply; and 
3. Oral examination and hygiene instruction. 
E. Maternity Care and Related Newborn Care. 
Outpatient and inpatient pre-natal and postpartum care and obstetrical services provided by Participating 
Providers are a Covered Benefit. To be covered for these benefits, the Member must choose a 
Participating obstetrician from HMO's list of Participating Providers and inform HMO by calling the 
Member Services 800 telephone number listed on the Member's identification card, prior to receiving 
services. The Participating Provider is responsible for obtaining prior authorization for all obstetrical care 
from HMO after the first prenatal visit 
Coverage does not include routine maternity care (including delivery) received while outside the Service Area 
unless the Member receives prior authorization from HMO. As with any other medical condition, 
Emergency Services are covered when Medically Necessary. 
F. Inpatient Hospital & Skilled Nursing Facility Benefits. 
A Member is covered for services only at Participating Hospitals and Participating Skilled Nursing 
Facilities. Ail services are subject to preauthorization by HMO. In the event that the Member elects to 
remain in the Hospital or Skilled Nursing Facility after the date that the Participating Provider and/or the 
HMO Medical Director has determined and advised the Member that the Member no longer meets the 
criteria for continued inpatient confinement, the Member shall be fully responsible for direct payment to the 
Hospital or Skilled Nursing Facility for such additional Hospital, Skilled Nursing Facility, Physician and 
other Provider services, and HMO shall not be financially responsible for such additional services. 
As an exception to the Medically Necessary requirements of this Certificate, the following coverage is 
provided for a mother and'newly born child: 
1. a minimum of 48 hours of inpatient care in a Participating Hospital following a vaginal delivery, 
2, a minimum of 96 hours of inpatient care in a Participating Hospital following a cesarean section, or 
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3- a shorter Hospital stay, if requested by a mother, and if determined to be medically appropriate by the 
Participating Providers in consultation with the mother. 
If a Member requests a shorter Hospital stay, the Member will be covered for one home health care 
visit scheduled to occur within 24 hours of discharge or of the time of the mother's request, whichever 
is later. An additional visit will be covered when prescribed by the Participating Provider. This 
benefit is in addition to the home health maximum number of visits, if any, shown on the Schedule of 
Benefits. A Copayment will not apply for home health care visits. 
Such maternity care shall include the services of a certified nurse-midwife, under qualified medical direcuon 
affiliated or practicing in conjunction with a licensed facility, or a Physician. Maternity care coverage shall 
also include, but is not limited to, parent education, assistance, and training in breast or bottle feeding, and the 
performance of any necessary maternal and newborn clinical assessments. 
Coverage for Skilled Nuking Facility benefits is subject to the maximum number of days, if any, shown on 
the Schedule of Benefits. 
G. Transplants. 
Transplants which are non-expenmental are a Covered Benefit. Covered transplants must be ordered by the 
Member's PCP and Participating Specialist Physician and approved by HMO's Medical Director in 
advance of the surgery. The transplant must be performed at Hospitals specifically approved and designated 
by HMO to perform these procedures. A transplant is non-experimental hereunder when HMO has 
determined, m its sole discretion, that the Medical Community has generally accepted the procedure as 
appropriate treatment for the specific condition of the Member. Coverage for a transplant where a Member is 
the recipient includes coverage for the medical and surgical expenses of a live donor, to the extent these 
services are not covered by another plan or program. 
H. Outpatient Surgery Benefits. 
Coverage is provided for outpatient surgical services and supplies in connection with a covered surgical 
procedure when furnished by a Participating outpatient surgery center. All rvices and supphes are subject 
to preauthorization by HMO. 
L Substance Abuse Benefits. 
A Member is covered for the following services as authorized and provided by Participating Behavioral 
Health Providers. 
1. OutpaUent care benefits are covered for Detoxification. Benefits include diagnosis, medical 
treatment and medical referral services (including referral services for appropriate ancillary services) 
by the Member's PCP for the abuse of or addiction to alcohol or drugs. 
A Member is entitled to outpaUent visits to a Participating Behavioral Health Provider upon 
Referral by the PCP for diagnostic, medical or therapeutic Rehabilitation services for Substance 
Abuse. Coverage is subject to the limits, if any, shown on the Schedule of Benefits. 
Coverage is also included for family members, and includes visits for remediation of the adverse 
effects on the physical and mental health of family members which result from a close relationship 
with the Member receiving or m need of treatment for Substance Abuse or addiction. Such visits 
are for counseling and education. For purposes of this section, a visit includes comprehensive visits, 
day visits, or clime visits. Visits do not mclude socialization visits Coverage is subject to the limits, 
if any, shown on the Schedule of Benefits. 
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2. Inpatient care benefits are covered for Detoxification. Benefits include medical treatment and 
referral services for Substance Abuse or addiction. The following services shall be covered under 
inpatient treatment: lodging and dietary services; Physicians, psychologist, nurse, certified 
addictions counselor and trained staff services; diagnostic x-ray; psychiatric, psychological and 
medical laboratory testing; and drugs, medicines, equipment use and supplies. Rehabilitation 
services are not covered. 
J. Mental Health Benefits. 
A Member is covered for services for the treatment of the following Mental or Behavioral Conditions 
through Participating Behavioral Health Providers. 
1. Outpatient benefits are covered for short-term, outpatient evaluative and crisis intervention or home 
health mental health services, and is subject to the maximum number of visits, if any, shown on the 
Schedule of Benefits. 
2. Inpatient benefits may be covered for medical, nursing, counseling or therapeutic services in an 
inpatient, non-hospital residential facility, appropriately licensed by the Department of Health or its 
equivalent. Coverage, if applicable, is subject to the maximum number of days, if any, shown on the 
Schedule of Benefits. 
3. Inpatient benefit exchanges are a Covered Benefit When authorized by HMO, 1 mental health 
inpatient day, if any, may be exchanged for up to 4 outpatient or home health visits. This is limited to 
an exchange of up to a maximum of 10 inpatient days for a maximum of 40 additional outpatient 
visits. One (1) inpatient day, if any, may be exchanged for 2 days of treatment in a Partial 
Hospitalization and/or outpatient electroshock therapy (ECT) program in lieu of hospitalization up to 
the maximum benefit limitation upon approval by HMO. 
Requests for a benefit exchange must be initiated by the Member's Participating Behavioral 
Health Provider under the guidelines set forth by ths HMO. Member must utilize all outpatient 
mental health benefits, if any, available under the Certificate and pay all applicable Copayments 
before an inpatient and outpatient visit exchange will be considered. The Member's Participating 
Behavioral Health Provider must demonstrate Medical Necessity for extended visits and be able to 
support the need for hospitalization if addiuonal visits were not offered. Request for exchange must 
be approved in writing by HMO pnor to utilization. 
K. Emergency Care/Urgent Care Benefits. 
1. A Member is covered for Emergency Services, without prior approval, provided the service is a 
Covered Benefit and such services are Medically Necessary to stabilize or treat an emergency 
condition. 
The Copayment for an emergency room visit as described on the Schedule of Benefits will not apply 
either in the event that the Member was referred for such visit by the Member's PCP for services 
that should have been rendered in the PCP's office or if the Member is admitted into the Hospital 
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The Member will be reimbursed for the cost for Emergency Services rendered by a non-
participating Provider located either within or outside the HMO Service Area, for those expenses, 
less Copayments, which are incurred up to the time the Member is determined by HMO and the 
attending Physician to be medically able to travel or to be transported to a Participating Provider 
in the event that transportation is Medically Necessary, the Member will be reimbursed for the cost 
as determined by HMO, minus any applicable Copayments 
Medical transportation is covered during a Medical Emergency 
2 The Member will be covered for Urgent Cart services obtained from a licensed Physician or 
facility outside of the Service Area if 
a the service is a Covered Benefit, 
b a Member could not reasonably have anticipated the need for such care pnor to leaving the 
Service Area, and 
c a delay in receiving services and supplies until a Member could reasonably return and 
receive care from a Participating Provider would have caused serious deterioration of the 
Member's health 
3 A Member is covered for any follow-up care Follow-up care is any care directly related to the need 
for emergency care which is provided to a Member after the Medical Emergency care or Urgent 
Care situation has terminated AH follow-up and continuing care must be provided or arranged by a 
Member's PCP The Member must follow this procedure, or the Member will be responsible for 
payment for all services received 
L Rehabilitation Benefits. 
1 Inp atient and Outpatient Rehabilitation Benefits 
The following benefits are covered by Participating Providers upon Referral issued by the 
Member's PCP and approved by HMO m advance of treatment 
a Cardiac rehabilitation benefits are available as part of a Member's inpatient Hospital stay 
A limited course of outpatient cardiac rehabilitation is covered when Medically Necessary 
following angioplasty, cardiovascular surgery, congestive heart failure or myocardial 
infarction 
b Pulmonary rehabilitation benefits are available as part of a Member's inpatient Hospital 
stay A limited course of outpatient pulmonary rehabilitation is covered when Medically 
Necessary for the treatment of reversible pulmonary disease states 
2 Outpatient Rehabilitation Benefits 
The following benefits are covered by Participating Providers upon Referral issued by the 
Member's PCP and approved by HMO in advancexftreatment Geverage is subject to the limits, if 
any, shown on the Schedule of Benefits 
a Cognitive therapy associated with physical rehabilitation is covered for non-chronic 
conditions and acute illnesses and injuries as part of a treatment plan coordinated with 
HMO 
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b Physical therapy is covered for non-chronic condiuons and acute illnesses and injuries 
c Occupational therapy (except for vocational rehabihtauon or employment counseling) is 
covered for non-chronic conditions and acute illnesses 
d. Speech therapy is covered for non-chronic conditions and acute illnesses and injuries 
Services rendered for the treatment of delays in speech development, unless resulting from 
disease, injury, or congenital defects, are not covered 
M Home Health Benefits. 
The following services are covered when rendered by a Participating home health care agency 
Reauthorization must be obtained from the Member's attending Participating Physician HMO shall not be 
required to provide home health benefits when HMO determines the treatment setting is not appropnate, or 
when there is a more cost effective setting m which to provide appropnate care Coverage is subject to the 
maximum number of visits, if any, shown on the Schedule of Benefits. 
1. Part-time or intermittent home nursing care or skilled nursing services for a Homebound Member 
Treatment must be provided by or supervised by a registered professional nurse 
2. Part-time or intermittent services of a home health aide These services are covered only when the 
purpose of the treatment is Skilled Care and consist pnmanly of canng for the patient 
3 Medical social services, drugs and medications prescnbed by a Physician, and laboratory services by 
or on behalf of a certified home health agency to the extent such items would have been covered or 
provided if the Member had been hospitalized or confined in a Skilled Nursing Facility Treatment 
must be provided by or supervised by a qualified medical Physician or social worker, along with 
other Home Health Services The PCP must certify that such services are necessary for the 
treatment of the Member's medical conditioa 
4 Short-term physical, speech, or occupational therapy provided by the home health service or agency 
is covered. 
N Hospice Benefits, 
Hospice Care services for a terminally ill Member are covered when preauthonzed by HMO Services may 
mclude home and Hospital visits by nurses and social workers, pain management and symptom control, 
instruction and supervision of a family Member, mpauent care, counseling and emotional support, and other 
home health benefits listed above Benefits also mclude visits for bereavement counseling services, either 
before or aiter the Member5s death, provided to the family of die terminally ill Member, subject to the 
maximum number of visits, if any, shown on the Schedule of Benefits 
Coverage is not provided for funeral arrangements, pastoral counseling, financial or legal counseling 
Homemaker or caretaker services, and any service not solely related to the care of the Member, including but 
not limited to, sitter or companion services for the Member or other Members of the family, transportation, 
house cleaning, and maintenance of the house are not covered. 
0 Prosthetic Appliances. 
The Member's initial provision of a prosthetic device that temporarily or permanently replaces all or part of an 
external body part lost or unpaired as a result of disease or injury or congenital defects is covered, when such 
device is prescnbed by a Participating Provider and authorized m advance by HMO Coverage incluaes 
repair and replacement when due to normal developmental growth Instruction and appropnate services 
required for the Member to properly use the item (such as attachment or insertion) are covered 
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P. Injectable Medications. 
Injectable medications, including those medications intended to be self administered, are a Covered Benefit 
when an oral alternative drug is not available, unless specifically excluded below. Such coverage shall also 
include nutritional supplements (formulas) as MedicaDy Necessary for the therapeutic treatment of 
phenylketonuria, branched-chain ketonuria, galactosemia and homocystinuna as administered under tne 
direction of a Physician. Medications must be prescribed by a Provider licensed to prescribe federal legend 
prescription drugs or medicines, and approved in advance of treatment by HMO. If the drug therapy treatment 
is approved for seif-adrninistratiom the Member is required to obtain covered medications at an HMO 
Participating pharmacy designated to fill injectable prescriptions. 
Injectable medications shall include enteral formulas for home use when prescribed by a Provider licensed to 
prescribe federal legend prescription drugs or medicines. The written order shall state that the enteral formula 
is clearly Medically Necessary and has been proven effective as a disease-specific treatment regimen for 
Members who are or will become malnourished or suffer from disorders, which if left untreated, cause chrome 
physical disability, mental retardation or death. Specific diseases for which enteral formulas have been proven 
effective shall include, but are not limited
 vto, inherited diseases of amino-acid or organic acid metabolism, 
Crohn's disease, gastroesophageal reflux with failure to thrive, disorders of gastrointestinal motility such as 
chronic intestinal pseudo-obstruction, and multiple, severe food allergies which if left untreated will cause 
malnourishment, chronic physical disability, mental retardation or death. Enteral formulas which are 
Medically Necessary and taken under written order from a Physician for the treatment of specific diseases 
shall be distinguished from nutntional supplements taken electively. Coverage for certain inherited diseases of 
amino acid and organic acid metabolism shall include modified solid food products that are low protein or 
which contain modified protein which are Medically Necessary, and coverage for modified solid food 
products shall not exceed $2500.00 dollars per calendar year. 
Injectable drugs or medication used for the treatment of cancer or HP/ are covered when the off-label use of 
the drug has not been approved by the FDA for that indication, provided that such drug is recognized for 
treatment of such indication in one of the standard reference compendia (the United States Pharmacopoeia 
Drug Informauon, the American Medical Association Drug Evaluations, or the American Hospital Formulary 
Service Drug Information) or the safety and effectiveness of use for this indication has been adequately 
demonstrated by at least one study published m a nationally recognized peer reviewed journal. 
Coverage does not include: 
1. experimental injectable drugs or medications, or injectable drugs or medications that have not been 
proven safe and effective for a specific disease or approved for a mode of treatment by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of Health (NTH), except that this does not 
apply to injectable drugs or medications used for the treatment of cancer or HIV when the off-label 
use of the drug has not been approved by the FDA for that indication; 
2. needles, syringes and other injectable aids; 
3. injectable drugs related to the treatment of non-covered services; and 
4 injectable drugs related to the treatment of Infertility, contraception, and performance enhancing 
steroids: 
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Q Infertility Services. 
Infertility services are covered upon pnor authorization by HMO when provided by a Participating 
Provider Benefits include, but are not limited to, services to diagnose and treat the underlying medical cause 
of Infertility which are furnished to a Member Benefits also include hospital or surgical or medical care for 
diagnosis and treatment of correctable medical conditions where the meaical condmon results in Infertility 
R. Additional Benefits, 
Subluxation Benefits Services by a Participating Provider when Medically Necessary and upon 
pnor Referral issued by the PCP are covered Benefits include chiropractic care in connection witn 
the detection or correction by manual or mechanical means of structural imbalance, distortion or 
subluxation m the human body for the purpose of removing nerve mterference, and the effects thereof 
where such mterference is the result of or related to distortion, misalignment or subluxation of or in 
the vertebral column. 
A Copayment and a maximum annual out-of-pocket payment may apply to this service Refer to the 
Schedule of Benefits attached to'this Certificate 
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Hospital Outpatient Facility Ambulatory Care. 
The following ambulatory care in Hospital outpatient facilities are covered, provided that such 
services ana medications are related to and necessary for the treatment or diagnosis of the Member's 
illness or injury and ordered by a Physician 
1 Diagnosuc x-rays 
2 Laboratory and pathological examinations 
3 Physical therapy, provided that services are to be furnished in connection with the same 
illness for which the Member had been hospitalized or in connection with surgical care 
Physical therapy benefits must commence within 6 months from the date of discharge from a 
Hospital or the date surgical care was rendered Benefits will cease after 365 days from the 
date of discharge from a Hospital or the date surgical care was rendered 
4 Radiation therapy 
5 Services and medicaf ni> used for non-expenm.ntal cancer chemotherapy and cancer 
hormone therapy 
Cancer Treatment Benefits. 
The following benefits are covered upon Referral issued by the Member's PCP 
1 Inpatient care in a Participating Hospital for such periods as is determined by the 
attending Physician in consultation with the Member to be medically appropriate 
after the Member has undergone a lymph node dissecUon or a lumpectomy for the 
treatment of breast cancer or a mastectomy is covered 
2 Second medical opinion by an appropriate Specialist, including but not limited to a 
Specialist affiliated with a specialty care center for the treatment of cancer, m the 
event of a positive or negative diagnosis of cancer or a recurrence of cancer or a 
recommendation of a course of treatment for cancer is covered The Member must 
obtain a prior Referral, and coverage for a second medical opinion may be 
obtained from a Participating or non-participating Specialist The Specialist 
Copayment listed on the Schedule of Benefits applies 
3 Reconstructive surgery by a Participating Provider following mastectomy 
surgery for ail stages of reconstruction of the breast on which surgery has been 
performed and surgery and reconstruction of the other breast to produce a 
symmetrical appear in the manner determined by the Physician and the Member 
to be appropriate is covered 
EXCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Exclusions. 
The following are not Covered Benefitsjsxeept as descnbed m the Covered_Benefits section of this 
Certificate or by a nder attached to this Certificate 
Ambulance services, for routine transportation to receive outpatient or inpatient services 
Beam neurologic testing 
Biofeedback, except as specifically approved by HMO 
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Blood and blood plasma, including but not limited to, provision of blood, blood plasma, blood 
derivatives, synthetic blood or outpatient blood products or Wood products provided on an inpatient 
basis when participation in a volunteer blood replacement program is available to the Member, toe 
collection or storage of blood plasma, the cost of receiving the services of professional blood donors, 
apheresis or plasmapheresis Only administration, processing o blood, processing fees, and fees 
related to autologous blood donations are covered 
Care for conditions that state or local law require to be treated in a public facility, including but not 
limited to, mental illness commitments 
Care furnished to provide a safe surrounding, including the charges for providing a surrounding free 
from exposure that can worsen the disease or injury 
Cosmetic Surgery, except that Cosmetic Surgery shall not include reconstructive surgery when 
such service is incidental to or folibws surgery resuitmg from trauma, infection or other diseases of 
the involved part, and reconstrucuve surgery because of congenital disease or anomaly of a Covered 
Dependent child which has resulted in a functional defect 
Costs for services resulting from the commission or attempt to commit a felony by the Member 
Court ordered services, or those required by court order as a condition of parole or probation, that are 
not Medically Necessary, not a Covered Benefit, obtained from a non-participatmg Provider, or 
obtained without a pnor Referral from the PCP 
Custodial Care 
Dental services, including but not limited to, services related to the care, filling, removal or 
replacement of teeth and treatment of injunes to or diseases of the teeth, dental services related to the 
gums, apicoectomy (dental root resection), orthodontics, root canal treatment, soft tissue impactions, 
bony impacted teeth, alveolectomy, augmentaUon and vestibuloplasty treatment of periodontal 
disease, prosthetic restoration of dental implants, and dental implants This exclusion does not 
mclude bone fractures, removal of tumors, and orthodontogenic cysts, or care or treatment to sound 
natural teeth necessary due to accidental injury for 12 months following the date of such injury 
Educational services and treatment of behavioral disorders, together with services for remedial 
education including evaluation or treatment of learning disabilities, minimal brain dysfunction, 
developmental and learning disorders, behavioral training, and cognitive rehabilitation This includes 
services, treatment or educational testing and training related to behavioral (conduct) problems 
learning disabilities, or developmental delays Special education, including lessons m sign language 
to instruct a Member, whose ability to speak has been lost or impaired, to function without that 
abtht), are not covered. 
Expenmentaf Procedures, or ineffective surgical, medical, psychiatric, or dentai treatments or 
procedures, research studies, or other experimental health care procedures or pharmacological 
regimes as determined by HMO, unless approved by HMO pnor to the treatment being rendered 
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This exclusion will not apply with respect to drugs: 
1. that have been granted treatment investigational new drug (IND) or Group c/treatment IND 
status; 
2. that are being studied at the Phase III level in a national clinical trial sponsored by the 
National Cancer Institute; or 
3. HMO has determined that available scientific evidence demonstrates that the drug is 
effective or the drug shows promise of being effective for the disease. 
False teeth, except that false teeth due to accidental injury to sound natural teeth within twelve months 
of the accident is a Covered Benefit. 
Hair analysis. 
Health services, including those related to pregnancy, rendered before the effective date or after the 
termination of the Member's coverage, unless coverage is continued under the Continuation and 
Conversion section of this Certificate. 
Hearing aids. 
Household equipment, including but not limited to, the purchase or rental of exercise cycles, water 
purifiers, hypo-allergenic pillows, mattresses or waterbeds, whirlpool or swimming pools, exercise 
and massage equipment, central or unit air conditioners, air purifiers, humidifiers, dehumidifiers, 
escalators, elevators, ramps, stair glides, emergency alert equipment, handrails, heat appliances, 
improvements made to a Member's house or place of business, and adjustments made to vehicles. 
Hypnotherapy, except when specifically approved by HMO. 
Implantable drugs. 
Infertility services, including the treatment of male and female Infertility, injectable Infertility 
drugs, charges for the freezing and storage of cryopreserved embryos, charges for storage of sperm, 
and donor costs, including but not limited to, the cost of donor eggs and donor sperm, the costs for 
ovulation predictor kits, and the costs for donor egg program or gestational carriers. This exclusion 
does not apply to those benefits described in the Covered Benefits section of this Certificate. 
Military service related diseases, disabilities or injuries for which the Member is legally entitled to 
receive treatment at government facilities and which facilities are reasonably available to the 
Member. 
Missed appointment charges, including any charge incurred for a missed appointment with a 
Participating Provider. 
Non-medically necessary services, including but not limited to, those services and supplies: 
1. which are not Medically Necessary, as determined by HMO, for the diagnosis and 
treatment of illness, injury, restoration of physiological functions, or covered preventive 
services; 
2. that do not require the technical skills of a medical, mental health or a dental professional, 
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3 furnished mainly for the personal comfort or convenience of tne Member or any person 
who cares for the Member, or any person who is part of the Member's family, or anv 
Provider, 
4 furnished solely because the Member is an inpatient on any day in which the Member's 
disease or injury could safely and adequately be diagnosed or treacec while not confined, 
5 furnished solely because of the setting if the service or supply coula safely and adequately be 
furnished in a Physician's or a dentist's office or other less costly setting 
Non-standard allergy services and supplies, including skin utration (wrinkle method), cytotoxicity 
testing (Bryan's Test), treatment of non-specific Candida sensitivity, and urine autoinjections 
Orthoptics (a technique of eye exercises designed to correct the visual axes of eyes not properly 
coordinated for binocular vision) 
Outpatient prescription or non-prescnption drugs and medicines 
Outpatient supplies, including but not limited to, outpatient medical consumable or disposable 
supplies such as syringes, incontinence pads, elastic stockings, and reagent strips This exclusion 
docs not apply to those supplies covered under the home health care and diabetic supplies benefits as 
described in the Covered Benefits section of this Certificate 
Payment for benefits for which Medicare or other governmental program (except Medicaid) is the 
primary payer 
Personal comfort or convenience items, including those services and supplies not directly related to 
medical care, such as guest meals and accommodations, barber services, telephone charges, radio and 
television rentals, homemaker services, travel expenses, take-home supplies and other like items and 
services 
Private duty or special nursing care, unless pre-authonzed by HMO 
Radial keratotomy, including related procedures designed to surgically correct refractive errors 
Recreational and educational therapy, including any related diagnostic testing 
Rehabihtation services, for Substance Abuse, including treatment of chrome alcoholism or drug 
addiction 
Religious, marital and sex counseling, including services and treatment related to religious 
counseling, mantal/reiationship counseling, and sex therapy 
Reversal of voluntary sterilizations, including related follow-up care and treatment of complications of 
such procedures 
Routine foot care, including routine reduction of nails, calluses and corns 
Services for which a Member is not legally obligated to pay m the absence of this coverage. 
Services for the treatment of sexual dysfunctions or inadequacies, including therapy, supplies, or 
counseling for sexual dysfunctions or inadequacies that do not have a physiological or organic basis 
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Services performed by a relative of a Member for which, in the absence of any health benefits 
coverage, no charge would be made 
Services required by third parties including but not limited to, physical examinations, diagnostic 
services and immunizations in connection with obtaining or continuing employment, obtaining or 
maintaining any license issued b> a municipality, state, or federal government, securing insurance 
coverage, travel, school admissions or attendance, including examinations required to participate m 
athletics, except when such examinations are considered to be part of an appropnate schedule of 
wellness services 
Services which are not a Covered Benefit under this Certificate, even when a prior Referral has 
been issued by a PCP 
Special medical reports, including those not directly related to treatment of the Member, e g, 
employment or insurance physicals and reports prepared m connection with litigation-
Surgical operations, procedures or treatment of obesity, except when specifically approved by HMO 
Therapy or rehabilitation, including, primal therapy, chelation therapy, rolfing, psychodrama, 
megavitamin therapy, purging, bioenergetic therapy, vision perception training, and carbon dioxide 
Thermograms and thermography 
Transsexual surgery, sex change or transformation, including any procedure or treatment or related 
service designed to alter a Member's physical characteristics from the Member's biologically 
determined sex to those of another sex, regardless of any diagnosis of gender role or psychosexual 
orientation problems 
Treatment in a federal, state, or governmental entity, including care and treatment provided m a non-
participating Hospital owned or operated by any federal, state or other governmental entity, except to 
the extent required by applicable laws 
Treatment of mental retardation, defects, and deficiencies This exclusion does not apply to mental 
health services or to medical treatment of mentally retarded Members in accordance with the benefits 
provided m the Covered Benefits section of this Certificate 
Treatment of occupational injuries and occupational diseases, including those injuries that arise out of 
(or in the course of) any work for pay or profit, or in any way results from a disease or injury which 
does, for which benefits are provided under any state or Federal workers* compensation, employers* 
liability or occupational disease law However, if proof is furnished to HMO that the Member is 
covered under a workers' compensation law or similar law, but is not covered for a particular disease 
or injury under such law, that disease or injury will be considered "non-occupational" regardless of 
cause 
Unauthorized services, including any service obtamed by or on behalf of a Member without pnor 
Referral issued by the Member's PCP or certified by HMO This exclusion does not apply m a 
Medical Emergency, in an Urgent Care situatronror when it4S-a direct acce_ss benefit 
Vision care services and supplies 
Weight reduction programs, or dietary supplements. 
Orthotics 
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Acupuncture and acupuncture therapy, except when performed by a Participating Physician as a form 
of anesthesia in connection with covered surgery. 
Durable Medical Equipment 
B Limitations. 
In the event there are two or more alternative Medical Services which in the sole judgment of HMO 
are equivalent in quality of care, HMO reserves the right to provide coverage only for the least costly 
Medical Service, as determined by HMO, provided that HMO approves coverage for the Medical 
Service or treatment in advance. 
Determinations regarding eligibility for benefits, coverage for services, benefit denials and all other 
terms of this Certificate are at the sole discretion of HMO, subject to the terms of this Certificate. 
TERMINATION OF COVERAGE 
A Member's coverage under this Certificate will terminate upon the earliest af any of the camfciiDss listed below, and 
termination will be effective on the date indicated on the Schedule of Benefits. 
A. Termination of Subscriber Coverage. 
A Subscriber's coverage will terminate for any of the following reasons: 
1. employment terminates; 
2. the Group Agreement terminates; 
3. the Subscriber is no longer eligible as outlined on the Schedule of Benefits; or 
4. the Subscriber becomes covered under an alternative health benefit plan or under any other plan 
which is offered by, through, or in connection with, the Contract Holder in heu of coverage under 
this Certificate. 
B. Termination of Dependent Coverage. 
A Covered Dependent's coverage will terminate for any of the following reasons: 
1. a Covered Dependent is no longer eligible, as outlined on the Schedule of Benefits; 
2. the Group Agreement terminates; or 
3. the Subscriber's coverage terminates; 
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C. Termination For Cause. 
HMO may terminate coverage for cause 
1 subject to the Grievance Procedure described in this Certificate, upon 31 days advance written 
notice, if the Member is unable to establish or maintain, after repeated attempts, a satisfactory 
physician-patient relationship with a Participating Provider Notice shall be given by certified mail 
and return receipt requested At the effective date of such termination, prepayments received by 
HMO on account of such terminated Member or Members for periods after the effective date of 
termination shall be refunded to the Contract Holder 
2 upon 31 days advance written notice, if the Member has failed to make any required Copayment or 
any other payment which the Member is obligated to pay Upon the effective date of such 
jrmination, prepayments received by HMO on account of such terminated Member or Members 
T periods after the effect, date of terminal shall be refunded to Contract Holder 
3 upon 31 days advance written notice, if the Member refuses upon request to cooperate and provide 
any facts necessary for HMO to administer the Coordination of Benefits provisions set forth in this 
Certificate 
4 upon 31 days advance written notice, if the Member refuses to cooperate with HMO as required by 
this Certificate 
5 immediately, upon discovering a material misrepresentation by the Member in applying for or 
obtaining coverage or benefits under this Certificate or discovering that the Member has committed 
fraud against HMO This may include, but is not limited to, furnishing incorrect or misleading 
information to HMO, or allowing or assisting a person other than the Member named on the 
identification card to obtain HMO benefits HMO may, at its discretion, rescind a Member's 
coverage on and after the date that such misrepresentation or fraud occurred. It may also recover 
from the Member the reasonable and recognized charges for Covered Benefits, plus HMO's cost of 
recovering those charges, including reasonable attorneys' fees In the absence of fraud or material 
misrepresentation, all statements made by any Member or any person applying for coverage under 
this Certificate will be deemed representations and not warranties No statement made for the 
purpose of obtaining coverage will result in the termination of coverage or reduction of benefits 
unless the statement is contained in writing and signed by the Member, and a copy of same has been 
furnished to the Member prior to termination 
6 immediately, if a Member acts in such a disruptive manner as to prevent or adversely affect the 
ordinary operations of HMO or a Participating Provider 
FDVIO shall have no further liability or responsibility under this Certificate except for coverage for Covered Benefits 
provided prior to the date of termination of coverage 
The fact that Memben are not notified by the Contract Holder of the termination of their coverage due to the 
termination of the Group Agreement shall not deem the contmuation of a Members1 coverage beyond the date 
coverage terminates 
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A Member may request that HMO conduct a gnevance hearing, as described in the Gnevance Procedure secuon of tins 
Certificate, within 15 working days after receiving notice that HMO has or will terminate the Member's co^s-age as 
descnbed in the Termination For Cause subsection of this Certificate HMO will continue the Member's coverage in 
force until a final decision on the gnevance is rendered, provided the Premium is paid throughout the penod pnor to the 
issuance of that final decision HMO may rescind coverage, to the date coverage would have terminated had the 
Member not requested a grievance hearing, if the final decision is in favor of HMO If coverage is rescinded HMO 
will refund any Premiums paid for that penod after the termination date, minus the cost of Covered Benefits provided 
to a Member during this penod 
Coverage will not be terminated on the basis of a Members health status or health care needs, nor if a Member has 
exercised the Member's nghts under the Certificate's Gnevance Procedure to register a complaint against HMO The 
gnevance process descnbed in the preceding paragraph applies only to those terminations affected pursuant to the 
Termination for Cause subsection of this Certificate 
CONTINUATION AND CONVERSION 
A COBRA Continuation Coverage. 
COBRA is the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
This Act permits Members or Covered Dependents to elect to continue group coverage as follows 
Employees and their Covered Dependents will not be eligible for the continuation of coverage provided 
by this section if the Contract Holder h exempt from the provisions of COBRA. 
1 Minimum Size of Group 
The Contract Holder must have normally employed more than 20 employees on a tvpical business 
day during the preceding calendar year This refers to the number of employees employed not the 
number of employees covered by a health plan, and includes full-time and part-time employees 
2 Loss of coverage due to termination (other than for gross misconduct) or reduction of hours of 
employment 
Member may elect to continue coverage for 18 months after ehgibdity for coverage under this 
Certificate would otherwise cease 
3 Loss of coverage due to 
a divorce or legal separakoi, or 
b Subscriber1* death, or 
c Subscriber1? entitlement to Medicare benefits, or, 
d cessation of Covered Dependent child status under the Eligibility and Enrollment secticr of 
this-Certificate 
The Member may elect to continue coverage for 36 months after eligibility for coverage under this 
Certificate would otherwise cease 
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4 Continuation coverage ends at the earliest of the following events 
a. the last day of the 18-month penod 
b the last day of the 36-month penod 
c the first day on which timely payment of Premium is not made subject to the Premiums 
section of the Group Agreement 
& the first day on which the Contract Holder ceases to maintain any group health plan 
e the first day on which a Member is actually covered by any other group health plan In the 
event the Member has a pre-existing condition, and the Member would be denied coverage 
under the new plan for a pre-existing condition, continuation coverage will not be terminated 
until the last day of the continuauon penod, or the date upon which the Member's 
pre-existing condition becomes covered under the new plan, whichever occurs first 
f the date the Member is enutled to Medicare 
5 Extensions of Coverage Penods 
a The 18-month coverage penod may be extended if an event which would otherwise qualify 
the Member for the 36-month coverage penod occurs during the 18-month penod, but in no 
event may coverage be longer than 36 months from the event which qualified the Member 
for continuation coverage initially 
b In the event that a Member is determined, within the meaning of the Social Secunty Act, to 
be disabled and notifies the Contract Holder before the end of the initial 18-month penod, 
continuation coverage may be extended up to an additional 11 months for a total of 29 
months This provision is limited to Members who are disabled at any time during the first 
60 days of continuanon coverage under this subsection (A) and only when the qualifying 
event is the Members reduction in hours or termination The Member may be charged a 
higher rate for the extended penod 
6 Responsibility to provide Member with notice of Continuation Rights 
The Contract Holder is responsible for providing the necessary notification to Members, within the 
defined time period (sixty (60) days), as required by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
7 Responsibility to pay Premiums to HMO 
Coverage for the sixty (60) day penod as descnbed above to initially enroll, will be extended only 
where the Subscriber or Member pays the applicable Premium charges due within forty-five (45) 
days of submitting the apphcauon to the Contract Holder and Contract Holder m turn remitting 
same to HMO 
8 Premiums due HMO for the continuation of coverage under this section shall be due m accordance 
with the procedures of the Premiums section of the Group Agreement and shall be calculated in 
accordance with applicable federal law and regulaUons 
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B. Conversion Privilege. 
This subsection does not continue coverage under the Group Agreement It permits the issuance of an 
individual health care coverage agreement (conversion coverage) under certain conditions. 
Conversion is noc initiated by HMO. The conversion privilege set forth in this subsection must be initiated by 
the eligible Member. The Contract Holder is responsible for giving written notice of the conversion 
privilege in accordance with its normal procedures and within 90 days of the date of termination; however, in 
the event continuaDon coverage ceases pursuant to expiration of COBRA benefits as descnbed in the COBRA 
Continuation Coverage section of this Certificate, the Contract Holder shall notify the Member at some time 
dunng the 180-day period prior to the expiration of coverage. 
1. Eligibility. 
In the event a Member ceases to be eligible for coverage under this Certificate, such person may, 
within 45 days after written notice of termination of coverage under this Certificate, convert to 
individual coverage with HMO, ^ effective as of the date of such termination, without evidence of 
insurability provided that Member1! coverage under this Certificate terminated for one of the 
following reasons: 
a. Coverage under this Certificate was terminated, and was not replaced with continuous and 
similar coverage by the Contract Holder, or 
b. The Subscriber ceased to meet the eligibility requirements as described in the Eligibility 
and Enrollment section of this Certificate, in which case the Subscriber and Subscriber's 
dependents who are Members pursuant to this Certificate, if any, are eligible to convert; or 
c. A Covered Dependent ceased to meet the eligibility requirements as described in the 
Eligibility and Enrollment section of this Certificate because of the Member's age or the 
death or divorce of Subscriber, or 
d. Continuation coverage ceased under the COBRA Continuation Coverage section of this 
Certificate. 
Any Member who is eligible to convert to individual coverage, may do so in accordance with the 
rules and regulations governing items such as initial payment, the form of the agreement and all terms 
and conditions thereunder as KMO may have in effect at the time of Member's application for 
conversion, without iiiniishing evidence of insurability. The conversion coverage will provide 
benefits no less than what is then required by, and no benefits contrary to, any applicable law or 
regulation. However, the conversion coverage may not provide the same coverage, and may be less 
than what is provided under the Group Agreement. Upon request, HMO or the Contract Holder 
will furnish details about conversion coverage. 
I. A spouse has the right to convert upon the death of or divorce from the Subscriber and a Covered 
Dependent child has the right to convert upon reaching the age limit or upon death of the Subscriber 
(subject to the ability of minors to be bound by contract). 
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C. Extension of Benefits While Member is Receiving Inpatient Care. 
Any Member who is receiving inpatient care in a Hospital or Skilled Nursing Facility on the date coverage 
under this Certificate terminates is covered in accordance with the Certificate only for the specific medical 
condition causing that confinement or for complications arising from the condition causing that confinement, 
until the earlier of: 
1. the date of discharge from such inpatient stay; or 
2. determination by the HMO Medical Director in consultation with the attending Physician, that care 
in the Hospital or Skilled Nursing Facility is no longer Medically Necessary; or 
3. the date the contractual benefit limit has been reached; or 
4. the date the Member becomes covered for similar coverage from another health benefits plan; or 
5. 12 months from the termination date of the Group Agreement 
The extension of benefits shall not extend the time periods during which a Member may enroll for continuation 
or conversion coverage, expand the benefits for such coverage, nor waive the requirements concerning the 
payment of Premium for such coverage. 
D. Extension of Benefits Upon Total Disability. 
Any Member who is Totally Disabled on the date coverage under this Certificate terminates is covered in 
accordance with the Certificate. 
This extension of benefits shall only: 
1. commence when a Medical Service is rendered for the condition causing Total Disability while the 
Member is covered under this Certificate; and 
2. provide Covered Benefits that are necessary to treat medical conditions causing or directly related to 
the disability as determined by HMO; and 
2. remain in effect until the earlier of the date that; 
a. the Member is no longer Totally Disabled; or 
b. the Member has exhausted the Covered Benefits available for treatment of that condition; 
or 
c. after a period of twelve (12) months in which benefits under such coverage are provided to 
the Member. 
The extension of benefits shall not extend the time periods during which a Member may enroll for continuation 
or conversion coverage, expand the benefits for such coverage, nor waive the requirements cqncemmg ther 
payment of Premium for such coverage. 
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E Continuation of Coverage under New York State Law. 
Subscriben and any Covered Dependents are eligible to continue coverage under this Certificate u 
coverage ceases due to termination of employment or membership in the class or classes eligible for coverage 
under the Group Agreement, subject to the terms and conditions of this Certificate 
1 Coverage shall not be available for 
a. any person who is covered, becomes covered, or could be covered under Medicare, or 
b an employee, member or dependent who ts covered, becomes covered, or could be covered 
as an employee, member or dependent by any other insured or uninsured arrangement which 
provides Hospital, surgical or medical coverage for individuals in a group which does not 
contain any exclusion or limitation with respect to any pre-existing condition of sucn 
employee, member or dependent 
2. A Member who wishes continuation of coverage under New York law must request sucn 
continuation m writing within the 60-day penod following the later of 
a. the date of termination, or 
b the date the Subscriber is sent notice by first class mail of the right of continuation by tne 
Contract Holder 
3 A Member electing continuation must pay to the Contract Holder, but not more frequently than on a 
monthly basis m advance, the amount of the required Premium payment, but not more than 102% of 
the group rate for the benefits being continued under the Certificate on the due date of each payment 
The Member's written election of continuation, together with the first Premium payment required to 
establish Premium payment on a monthly basis m advance, must be give to the Contract Holder 
within 60 days of the date the Member's benefits would otherwise terminate 
4 A Member's continuation of benefits under this Certificate shall terminate at the first to occur of the 
following 
a 18 months after the date the Member's benefits under the Group Agreement would 
otherwise have terminated because of termination of employment or membership, or 
b the end of the penod for which Premium payments were made, if the Member fails to make 
timely payment of a required Premium payment, or 
c m the case of an eligible dependent, 36 months after the date the dependent's benefits under 
the Group Agreement would otherwise have terminated by reason of 
L death of the Subscriber, 
IL the divorce or legal separation of the Subscriber from a dependent spouse, 
ui the Subscriber becoming entitled to benefits under Medicare, or 
IV a dependent child ceasing to be a Covered Dependent under the generally 
applicable requirements of this Certificate 
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5 In the case of a Member who is determined, under title II or title XVI of toe Social Security Act^  to 
have been disabled at the time of termination of employment or membership, 29 months after the date 
the Member's benefits under the Group Agreement would otherwise have terminated because of 
termination of employment or membership or at any time dunng the nrst 60 days of continuation of 
coverage, provided, however, that if the Member is no longer disabled the benefits provided in this 
section shall terminate the later of: 
i 18 months after the date the Member's benefits under the Group Agreement would 
otherwise have terminated because of termination of employment or membership; or 
ii the month that begins more than 31 days after the date of the final determination under title I 
or title XVT of the United States Social Security Act that the Member is no longer disabled; 
iii toe date on which the Group Agreement is terminated or, in the case of a Subscriber the 
date his employer terminated participation under the Group Agreement. However, if the 
Cor-act Holder replaced coverage under the Group Agreement with similar coverage 
unc nother group contraci the Mem-r shall have the nght to become covered under the 
otht roup contract, for the balance o; • period that he would have rrnain c^ered un. s 
this nor Certificate. T& minimum ..-.el of benefits to be providec >y the other gn .p 
contact shall be the applicable level of benefits under this Certificate reduced by any 
benefits payable under this Certificate, and this Certificate shall continue to provide 
benefits to the extent of its accrued liabilities and extensions of benefits as if the replacement 
had not occurred. 
This continuation of coverage under New York law shall not be applicable where ^ontmuation benefit is 
available to the Member pursuant to Chapter 18 of the Employer Retirement Income Secunty Act, 29 U.S C 
§ 1161 et seq. Or Chapter 6A of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U S.C. § 300bb-l et seq 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
The following procedures govern complaints, grievances, and gnevance appeals made or submitted by Members. 
A. Definitions. 
A '-grievance" is a complaint that may or may not require specific corrective action, and is made . 
1 orally in connection with a denial of, or failure to pay for, a referral, or a determination as to whether a 
benefit is covered pursuant to the terms of tins Certificate, or 
2 in wnting to HMO. 
B. Oral Grievances. 
A Member may file an oral grievance, as defined above, by calling (800) 233-3105, 24-hours a day 
HMO will prepare a written acknowledgment of the oral grievance, summarizing the nature of the grievance 
and disclosing that the Member musisign and return the acknowledgment to initiate the gnevance, and mail ,t 
directly to the Member. 
The Member must sign the written acknowledgment of the oral gnevance and return the acknowledgment wth 
any amendments, in order to initiate the gnevance 
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C Gnevance Review 
1 A wntten notice shall be sent by HMO to the Member within 15 business days of receipt of tne 
gnevance 
1 acknowledging each gnevance, and 
u inviting the Member to provide any additional information to assist HMO m handling and 
deciding the gnevance, and 
ui providing the name address and telephone number of the individual or department designed 
by HMO to respond to the gnevance, and 
iv informing the Member of the Member's nght to have an uninvorved HMO representative 
assist the Member in understanding the gnevance process, and 
v informing the Member as to when a response should be forthcoming 
2 The Gnevance Committee deciding the gnevance shall be comprised of one or more employees of 
HMO When the gnevance pertains to clinical matters, the Gnevance Committee shall include, but 
not be limited to, one or more licensed, certified or registered health care professionals It shall not 
include any person whose decision is being appealed, any person who made the initial decision 
regarding the claim, or any person with previous involvement with the gnevance The Gnevance 
Committee shall review and decide the gnevance within 30 days of receipt m the case of requests for 
referrals or determinations concerning whether a requested benefit is covered under this Certificate, 
unless additional information necessary to resolve the gnevance is not received during such time, or 
by the mutual wntten agreement of HMO and the Member In all other instances, the Gnevance 
Committee shall review and decide the gnevance within 45 days of receipt of all necessary 
information. 
3 A wntten notice stating the result of the review by the Gnevance Committee shall be forwarded by 
HMO to the Member or the Member's designee within ten (10) working days of the date of the 
decision Such notice shall include 
a. a descnption of the Committee's understanding of the Member's gnevance as presented to 
the Gnevance Committee (I e , dollar amount of the disputed issue, medical facts in dispute, 
etc), and 
b the Committee's decision in clear terms, including the contract basis or medical rationale, as 
applicable, m sufficient detail for the Member to respond further to HMO's position (i e , the 
Member did not contact the PCP, the services were non-emergency services as identified in 
the medical report, the services were not covered by the Certificate, etc), and 
c the clinical raUonale for the determination in cases where the determination has a clinical 
basis, and 
d citauons to the evidence or documentation used as the basis for the decision (i e , reference to 
the Certificate, medical records, etc), and 
e a statement indicating 
i that tne decision will be final and binding unless the Member appeals in wnting to 
the Gnevance Appeal Committee within 60 business days of the date of the notice 
of the decision of the Gnevance Committee, and 
u a descnption of the process of how to appeal to the Gnevance Appeal Committee, 
including a form for the filing of such an appeal, if applicable, and 
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that the decision of the Gnevance Committee shall be final and binding unless appealed by 
the Member to HMO within 60 business days of the date of the notice of the decision of the 
Gnevance Committee 
D Appeal Hearing. 
1 Within 15 business days of receipt of a wntten appeal by the Gnevance Appeal Committee, HMO 
shall provide wntten acknowledgment to the Member filing the appeal with 
a. the name, address and telephone number of the individual designated by HMO to respond to 
the appeal, and 
b the request for any additional information to assist HMO in rendering a decision, and 
c the procedures governing appeals before tr Gnevance Appeal Committee The Member 
shall be notified of the Member's nghi o have an umnvolved HMO representative 
available to assist the Member in understarcimg the appeal process 
2. The Grievance Appeal Committee shall be established by the Board of Directors of the HMO and 
shall be compnsed of three members, one of whom shall be a non-employee of the HMO In the case 
of an appeal which is not cluneal, the Gnevance Appeal Committee shall be made by qualified 
personnel at a higher level than the personnel who made the gnevance determination In the case of 
an appeal on a clinical matter, the Gnevance Appeal Committee shall include personnel qualified to 
review the appeal, including licensed, certified, or registered health care professionals, at least one of 
whom shall be a cluneal peer reviewer The Gnevance Appeal Committee shall not include any 
person previously involved with the gnevance An HMO Medical Director may serve as a member 
of the Committee if the Medical Director was not previously involved with the gnevance 
3 The Gnevance Appeal Committee shall hold appeal hearings in HMO offices on a certain day each 
month to consider all appeals filed seven business days or more in advance of the hearing day In the 
event a Member is unable to attend the hearing on the scheduled hearing day, the Member may 
request that their appeal be heard on the next scheduled hearing day If no scheduled hearing day is 
suitable for the Member, the hearing will be scheduled for a mutually convenient day 
4 The Member shall have the nght to attend the appeal hearing, question the representative of HMO 
designated to appear at the hearing and any other witnesses, and present their case The Member 
shall also have the nght to be assisted or represented by a person of the Member's choice, and 
submit wntten matenal m support of their gnevance The Member may bring a Physician or other 
expert(s) to testify on the Member's behalf HMO shall also have the nght to present witnesses 
Counsel for the Member may present the Member's case and question witnesses, if the Member is 
so represented, HMO may be similarly represented by counsel The Gnevance Appeal Committee 
shall have the nght to question the HMO representative, the Member and any other witnesses 
5 The appeal hearing shall be informal The Gnevance Appeal Committee shall not apply formal rules 
of evidence in reviewing documentation or accepting testimony at the hearing The Chair of the 
Gnevance Appeal Committee shall have-the nght to exclude redundant testimony or excessive 
argument by any party or witness 
6 A wntten record of the appeal hearing shall be made by stenographic transcnption All testimony 
shall be under oath 
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7. Before the record is closed, the Chair of the Grievance Appeal Committee shall ask both the Member 
and the HMO representative (or their counsel) whether there is any additional evidence or argument 
which the party wishes to present to the Grievance Appeal Committee. Once ail evidence and 
arguments have been received, the record of the appeal hearing shall be closed. The deliberations of 
the Grievance Appeal Committee shall be confidential and shall not be transcribed 
8. The Grievance Appeal Committee shall render a written decision within 30 working days of the 
conclusion of the appeal hearing. The decision shall contain: 
a. a statement of the Grievance Appeal Committee's understanding of the nature of the 
grievance and the material facts related thereto; and 
b. the Grievance Appeal Committee's decision and rationale; and 
c. a summary of the evidence, including necessary documentation supporting the decision; and 
d. a statement of the Member's right to appeal to the Department of Insurance, with the phone 
number and complete address of the Department of Insurance. 
E. Emergency or Urgently Needed Care. 
1. In the event a complaint requires specific action, and the Member or HMO believes serious medical 
consequences will arise in the near future, within up to 15 days from HMO's denial to pay for the 
provision of allegedly Medically Necessary covered health services, the Member shall receive 
expedited review of their complaint 
2. In the event the issue is of an emergent nature, an HMO Medical Director shall review the matter as 
soon as possible or within 48 hours, and communicate a decision to the Member by telephone 
HMO will forward written notice of the decision within 3 business days. 
3. In the event the issue is of an urgent nature, an HMO Medical Director shall review the matter and 
make a determination within 96 hours of receipt 
4. An adverse decision by a Medical Director in either an emergent or urgent medical situation shall be 
immediately reviewed by an HMO Regional Medical Director or his designee. The decision of the 
Regional Medical Director shall be provided to the Member by telephone and confirmed in writing. 
F. Exhaustion of Process. 
The foregoing procedures and process arc mandatory and must be exhausted prior the establishing of any 
litigation or arbitration, or any administrative proceeding regarding either any alleged breach of the Group 
Agreement or Certificate by HMO, or any matter within the scope of the grievance resolution process of any 
complaint, grievance or grievance appeal. 
G. Record Retention. 
HMO shall retain the records of all grievances for a period of-aHeast 3 years in conformance with applicable 
law. 
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H. Fees and Costs. 
Nothing herein shall be construed to required HMO to pay counsel fees or any other fees or costs incurred by a 
Member in pursuing a grievance or appeal. 
COORDINATION OF BENEFITS 
Some Memben have health coverage in addition to the coverage provided under this Certificate When this is the 
case, the benefits paid by other plans will be taken into accounL This may mean a reducuon in benefits payable under 
this Certificate. 
When coverage under this Certificate and coverage under another plan applies, the order in which the vanous plans 
will pay benefits must be figured This will be done as follows using the first rule that applies; 
A. A plan with no niles for coordination with other refits will be deemed to pay its benefits before a plan which 
contains such a ^ . 
B. A plan which covers a person other than as a dependent will be deemed to pay its benefits before a plan which 
covers the person as a dependent. 
C. Except in the case of a dependent child whose parents are divorced or separated, the plan which covers the 
person as a dependent of a person whose birthday comes first in a calendar year will be prunary to the plan 
which covers the person as a dependent of a person whose birthday comes later in that calendar year. If both 
parents have the same birthday, die benefits of a plan which covered one parent longer are determined before 
those of a plan which covered the other parent for a shorter period of time. 
If the other plan does not have the rule described in this provision (C) but instead has a rule based on the 
gender of the parent and if, as a result, the plans do not agree on the order of benefits, the rule in the other plan 
will determine the order of benefits. 
D. In the case of a dependent child whose parents are divorced or separated: 
1. If there is a court decree which makes one parent financially responsible for the medical, dental or 
other health care expenses of such child, the benefits of a plan which covers the child as a dependent 
of such parent will be determined before the benefits of any other plan which covers the child as a 
dependent child. 
2. If there is not such a court decree: 
If the parent with custody of the child has not remarried, the benefits of a plan which covers the child 
as a dependent of the parent with custody of the child will be determined before the benefits of a plan 
which covers the child as a dependent of the parent without custody. 
If the parent with custody of the child has remarried, the benefits of a plan which covers the child as a 
dependent of the parent with custody shall be determined before the benefits of a plan which covers 
that child as a dependent of the stepparent The benefits of a plan which covers that child as a 
dependenLof the stepparent will be determined before the benefits of a plan which covers that child as 
a dependent of the parent without custody. 
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E If A, B» C and D above do not establish an order of payment, the plan under which the person h a s been covered 
for the longest will be deemed to pay its benefits first except that 
The benefits of a plan which covers the person as a 
1 laid-off or retired employee, or 
2> the dependent of such person, 
shall be determined after the benefits of any other plan which covers such person as 
1 an employee who is not 1 aid-off or retired, or 
2 a dependent of such person. 
If the other plan does not have a provision 
1. regarding laid-off or retired employees, and 
2» as a result, each plan determines its benefits after the other, 
then the above paragraph will not apply 
The benefits of a plan which covers the person on whose expenses claim is based under a n g h t of continuauon 
pursuant to federal or state law shall be determined after the benefits of any other plan which covers the person 
other than under such nght of continuation 
If the other plan does not have a provision 
1 regarding nght of continuation pursuant to federal or state law, and 
2 as a result, each plan determines its benefits after the other, 
then the above paragraph will not apply 
H M O has the nght to release or obtain any information and make or recover any payment it considers necessary ui 
order to administer this provision. 
Other plan means any other plan of health expense coverage under 
1 Group insurance 
2 Any other type of coverage for persons in a group This includes plans that are insured and those tnat are not 
3 Mandatory no-fault and traditional mandatory "fault" auto insurance required by law and provided on a group 
and individual basis Only the level of benefits required by the law will be counted 
4 Medicare or other governmental benefits, but not including a state plan under Medicaid or a plan when, by law, 
its benefits are excess to those of any pnvate insurance plan or other non-governmental plan. 
Other plan shall not mclude blanket school accident coverages or such coverages issued to a substantially similar group 
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Payment of Benefits. 
The combined benefits paid will not be more than the total Allowable Expenses recognized under the plans. In a 
calendar year, HMO will pay its regular benefits in full, or a reduced benefit. The reduced amount will be 100% of 
Allowable Expenses less the benefits payable by the o&er plans. If the plan provides benefits in the form of services 
rather than cash payment, the cash value will be used. When this provision operates to reduce the total amount of 
benefits otherwise payable as to a Member covered under this Certificate during a calendar year, each benefit that 
would be payable in the absence of this provision will be reduced proportionately. Such reduced amount will be 
charged against any applicable benefit limit of this coverage. 
The difference between the cost of a private Hospital room and the semiprivate rate is not considered an Allowable 
Expense unless the paUent's stay in a private Hospital room is Medically Necessary, either in terms of generally 
accepted medical practice or a.c necificaily defined in this Certificate. 
Facility of Payment 
A payment made by another p ay include an amount v. .;h should have been paid under the Group Agreemem 
it does, HMO may pay that a <nt to the plan that made that payment That amount will then be treated as though .1 
were a benefit paid by HMC KMO will not have to pay that amount again. The term "payment made" means 
reasonable cash value of the benefits provided in the form of services. 
Recovery of Overpayments, 
If the benefits paid by this Certificate, plus the benefits paid by other Plans, exceeds the total amount of Allowable 
Expenses, HMO has the right to recover the amount of that excess payment if it is the Secondary Plan, irom among one 
or more of the following: (1) any person to or for whom such payments were made; (2) other Plans; or (3) any other 
entity to which such payments were made. This nght of recovery shall be exercised at HMO's discretion. A Member 
shall execute any documents and cooperate with HMO to secure its right to recover such overpayments, upon request 
from HMO 
Medicare And Other Federal Or State Government Programs. 
The provisions of this section will apply to the maximum extent permitted by federal or state law. HMO will not reduce 
the benefits due any Member due to that Member's eligibility for Medicare where federal law requires that HMO 
determines its benefits for that Member without regard to the benefits available under Medicare. 
The coverage under this Certificate is not intended to duplicate any benefits for which Members are, or could be, 
eligible for under Medicare or any other federal or state government programs (such as Workers' Compensation). All 
sums payable under such programs for services provided pursuant to this Certificate shall be payable to and retained by 
HMO Each Member shall complete and submit to HMO such consents, releases, assignments and other documents 
as may be requested by HMO in order to obtain or assure reimbursement under Medicare or any other government 
programs for which Members are eligible. 
Active Employees and Their Dependents Who Are Eligible For Medicare, 
Certain rules apply to active employees and their Dependents who are eligible for Medicare. When an active 
Subscriber, or the Dependent of an active Subscriber, is eligible for Medicare and the Subscriber or Dependent 
belongs to a group covered by this Certificate with twenty (20) or more employees, this Certificate will be~the prim, -. 
payer. If the Member elects Medicare as the primary plan, all benefits otherwise payable to that Member under L.. > 
Certificate shall terminate. If the Member belongs to a covered group of less than twenty (20) employees, tius 
Certificate will be secondary payer and all benefits otherwise payable with respect to the Member will be paid in 
accordance with the Provision for Coordination with Medicare section below. 
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Covered Persons Who Are Disabled or Who Have End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD). 
Special rules apply to Members who are disabled or who have End Stage Renal Disease This Certificate will make 
primary and secondary payer determination in accordance with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), as 
amended 
Provision for Coordination with Medicare 
Benefits under this Certificate will cease for any Member eligible for Medicare If coverage would cease because a 
Subscriber is, or could be, eligible for Medicare or any other Federal or State government programs (such as Worker's 
Compensation) any benefits in force for the Subscriber's Covered Dependents may be continued Coverage will then 
continue until it terminates for some other reason under the rules of this Certificate A conversion privilege may be 
available in the event that a Dependent's coverage under this Certificate ends because the Subscriber becomes 
eligible for Medicare This does not apply if "the Member is eligible for any Medicare related benefits under this 
Certificate 
THIRD PARTY LIABDJTYAND RIGHT OF RECOVERY 
If HMO provides health care benefits under this Certificate to a Member for injuries or illness for which a third party 
is or may be responsible, then HMO retains the nght to repayment of the full cost of all benefits provided by HMO on 
behalf of the Member that are associated with the injury or illness for which the third party is or may be responsible 
HMO's rights of recovery apply to any recoveries made by or on behalf of the Member from the following third-party 
sources, as allowed by law, including but not limited to payments made by a third-party tortfeasor or any insurance 
company on behalf of the third-party tortfeasor, any payments or awards under an uninsured or undennsured motorist 
coverage policy; any worker's compensation or disability award or settlement, medical payments coverage under any 
automobile policy, premises or homeowners medical payments coverage or premises or homeowners insurance 
coverage, any other payments from a source intended to compensate a Member for injuries resulting from alleged 
negligence of a third party The nght of recovery will only be exercised by HMO when the amounts received by the 
Member through a third party settlement or satisfied judgment are specifically identified in the settlement or judgment 
as the amounts previously paid by HMO for the same Medical Services and benefits 
The Member specifically acknowledges HMO's nght of subrogation. When HMO provides health care benefits for 
injunes or illnesses for which a third party is or may be responsible, HMO shall be subrogated to the Member's nghts 
of recovery against any third party to the extent of the full cost of all benefits provided by HMO, to the fullest extent 
permitted by law HMO may proceed against any third party with or without the Member's consent 
The Member also specifically acknowledges HMO's nght of reimbursement This nght of reimbursement attaches, to 
the fullest extent permitted by law, when HMO has provided health care benefits for-injuries or illness for which a third 
party is or may be responsible and the Member and/or the Member's representative has recovered any amounts from 
the third party or any party making payments on the third party's behalf By providing any benefit under this 
Certificate, HMO is granted an assignment of the proceeds of any settlement, judgment or other payment received by 
the Member to the extent of the full cost of all benefits provided by HMO HMO's nght of reimbursement is 
cumulative with and not exclusive of HMO's subrogation nght and HMO may choose to exercise either or both ngh:s 
ofrecovery 
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The Member and the Member's representatives further agree to 
A Notify HMO promptly and m writing when notice is given to any third party of the intention to investigate or 
pursue a claim to recover damages or obtain compensation due to injuries or illness sustained by the Member 
that may be the legal responsibility of a third party, and 
B Cooperate with HMO and do whatever is necessary to secure HMO's rights of subrogauon and/or 
reimbursement under this Certificate, and 
C Give HMO a first-priority lien on any recovery, settlement or judgment or other source of compensation which 
may be had from a third party to the extent of the full cost of all benefits associated with injuries or illness 
provided by HMO for which a third party is or may be responsible (regardless of whether specifically set forth 
in the recovery, settlement, judgment or compensation agreement), and 
D Pay, as the first priority, from any recovery, settlement or judgment or other source of compensation, any and 
all amounts due HMO as reimbursement for the full cost < ill benefits associated with injuries or illness 
provided by HMO for which a third party is^ or may be respor&iole (regardless of whether specifically set forth 
m the recovery, settlement, judgment, or compensation agreement), unless otherwise agreed to by HMO in 
writing; and 
E Do nothing to prejudice HMO's rights as set forth above This includes, but is not limited to, refraining from 
making any settlement or recovery which specifically attempts to reduce or exclude the full cost of all benefits 
provided by HMO 
HMO may recover the full cost of all benefits provided by HMO under this Certificate without regard to any claim of 
fault on the part of the Member, whether by comparative negligence or otherwise No court costs or attorney fees mav 
be deducted from HMO's recovery without the pnor express wntten consent of HMO In the event the Member or the 
Member's representative fails to cooperate with HMO, the Member shall be responsible for all benefits paid by HMO 
in addition to costs and attorney's fees incurred by HMO in obtaining repayment 
RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBERS 
A Members or applicants shall complete and submit to HMO such application or other forms or statements as 
HMO may reasonably request Members represent that all information contained in such applications, forms 
and statements submitted to HMO incident to enrollment under this Certificate or the adrnmistration herein 
shall be true, correct, and complete to the best of the Member's knowledge and belief 
B The Member shall notify HMO immediately of any change of address for the Member or any of the 
Member's Covered Dependents 
C The Member understands that HMO is acting m reliance upon all information provided to it by the Member 
at time of enrollment and afterwards and represents that information so provided is true and accurate 
D By electing coverage pursuant to this Certificate, or accepting benefits hereunder, all Members who are 
legally capable of contracting, and the legal representatives of all Members who-are incapable of contracting, 
at time of enrollment and afterwards, represent that all information so provided is true and accurate and agree 
to all terms, conditions and provisions hereof 
E Members are subject to and shall abide by the rules and regulations of each Provider from which benefits are 
provided 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A. Identification Card. The identification card issued by HMO to Members pursuant to this Certificate is for 
identification purposes only Possession of an HMO identification cara confers no right to services or benefits 
under this Certificate, and misuse of such identification card may be grounds for termination of Member's 
coverage pursuant to the Termination of Coverage section of this Certificate If the Member who misuses the 
card is the Subscriber, coverage may be terminated for the Subscriber as well as any of the Covered 
Dependents To be eligible for services or benefits under this Certificate, the holder of the card must be a 
Member on whose behalf all applicable Premium charges under this Certificate have been paid Any person 
receiving services or benefits which such person is not entitled to receive pursuant to the provisions of this 
Certificate shall be charged for such services or benefits at billed charges 
If any Member permits the use of the Member's HMO identification card by any other person, such card may 
be retained by HMO, and all nghts of such Member and their Covered Dependents, if any, pursuant to this 
Certificate shall be terminated immediately, subject to the Grievance Procedure set forth in the Grievance 
Procedure section of this Certificate. 
B Reports and Records. HMO is entitled to receive from any Provider of services to Members, information 
reasonably necessary to £idminister this Certificate subject to all applicable confidentiality requirements as de-
fined in the General Provisions section of this Certificate By accepting coverage under this Certificate, the 
Subscriber, for himself or herself, and for all Covered Dependents covered hereunder, authorizes each and 
every Provider who renders services to a Member hereunder to 
1. disclose all facts pertaining to the care, treatment and physical condition of the Member to HMO, or 
a medical, dental, or mental health professional that HMO may engage to assist it in reviewing a 
treatment or claim, 
2. render reports pertaining to the care, treatment and physical condition of the Member to HMO, or a 
medical, dental, or mental health professional that HMO may engage to assist it m reviewing a 
treatment or claim, and 
3. permit copying of the Member's records by HMO 
C Refusal of Treatment, A Member may, for personal reasons, refuse to accept procedures, medicines, or 
courses of treatment recommended by a Participating Provider If the Participating Provider (after a 
second Participating Provider's opinion, if requested by Member) believes that no professionally acceptable 
alternative exists, and if after being so advised, Member still refuses to follow the recommended treatment or 
procedure, neither the Participating Provider, nor HMO, will have further responsibility to provide any of 
the benefits avadabie under this Certificate for treatment, of such condition or its consequences or related 
conditions HMO will provide wntten notice to Member of a decision not to provide further benefits for a 
particular condition. This decision is subject to the Grievance Procedure set forth in the Grievance Procedure 
section of this Certificate Coverage for treatment of the condition mvolved will be resumed in the event 
Member agrees to follow the recommended treatment or procedure 
D Assignment of Benefits. All nghts of the Member to receive benefits hereunder are personal to the Member 
and may not be assigned 
E Legal Action. No action at law or in equity may be maintained against HMO for any expense or bill unless 
and until the appeal process has been exhausted, and in no event pnor to the expiration of 60 days after wntten 
submission of claim has been furnished in accordance with requirements set forth in this Group Agreement 
No action shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years after the time wntten submission of claim is required 
to be furnished 
HMO/NY COC-l 04/97 
39 
App.Add.000389 
F. Independent Contractor Relationship. 
1. No Participating Provider or other Provider, institution, facility or agency is an agent oj employee 
of HMO Neither HMO nor any Member of HMO is an agent or employee of any Participating 
Provider or other Provider, instituuon, facility or agency. 
2. Neither the Contract Holder nor a Member is the agent or representative of HMQ4 its agents or 
employees, or an agent or representative of any Participating Provider or other person or 
organization with which HMO has made or hereafter shall make arrangements for services under this 
Certificate. 
3. Participating Physicians maintain the physician-patient relationship with Members and are solely 
responsible to Member for all Medical Services which are rendered by Participating Physicians. 
4. HMO cannot guarantee the continued participation of any Provider or facility with HMO. 
a. In the event a PCP terminates its contract or is terminated by HMO, HMO. shall provide 
notification to each affected Subscriber within 15 days of the termination of a PCP contract, 
if the Subscriber or any Dependent of the Subscriber is currentiy enrolled in the PCP's 
office. Any services rendered by a PCP or Hospital to an enrollee between the date of 
termination of the Provider Agreement and five business days after notification of the 
contract termination is mailed to the Member at the Member's last known address shall 
continue to be Covered Benefits. 
b. In the event any other Participating Provider terminates its contract or is terminated by 
HMO, HMO shall provide notification to each affected Subscriber who is receiving an 
ongoing course of treatment provided that HMO is aware of such ongoing course of 
treatment Notification will be provided within 15 days of the termination of the Provider's 
contract. The notice shall describe the procedures for continuing care pursuant to "state law 
and for choosing an alternative Participating Provider. 
5. Restriction on Choice of Providers: Unless otherwise approved by HMO, Members4 must utilize 
Participating Providers and facilities who have contracted with HMO to provide services. 
G. Inability to Provide Service. In the event that due to circumstances not within the reasonable control of 
HMO, including but not limited to, major disaster, epidemic, complete or partial destruction of facilities, riot, 
civil insurrection, disability of a significant part of the Participating Provider Network, the rendition of medical 
or Hospital benefits or other services provided under this Certificate is delayed or rendered impractical, 
HMO shall not have any liability or obligation on account of such delay or failure to provide services, except 
to refund the amount of the unearned prepaid Premiums held by HMO on the date such event occurs. HMO 
is required only to make a good-faith effort to provide or arrange for the provision of services, taking into 
account the impact of the event 
H. Confidentiality. InformaUon contained in the medical records of Members and information received from 
Physicians, surgeons, Hospitals or other Health Professionals incident to the physician-patient relationship 
or hospital-patient relationship shall be kept confidential in accordance with applicable law. Information may 
not be disclosed~without the consent of the Member except for use incident taiona fide medical research and 
education as may be permitted by law, or reasonably necessary by HMO in connection with the administration 
of this Certificate, or in the compiling of aggregate statistical data. 
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I Limitation on Services. Except in cases of a Medical Emergency, as provided under the Covered Benefits 
section of this Certificate, services are available only from Participating Providers HMO shall have no 
liability or obligation whatsoever on account of any service or benefit sought or received by a Member from 
any Physician, Hospital, Skilled Nursing Facility, home health care agency, or other person, entity, 
institution or organization unless prior arrangements are made by HMO 
J Incontestability. In the absence of fraud, all statements made by a Member shall be considered 
representations and not warranues, and no statement shall be the basis for voiding coverage or denying a claim 
after the Group Agreement has been in force for 2 years from its effective date, unless the statement was 
material to the nsk and was contained in a written application 
K This Certificate applies to coverage only, and does not restrict a Member's ability to receive health care 
benefits that are not, or might not be, Covered Benefits 
L Contract Holder hereby makes HMO coverage available to persons who are eligible under the Eligibility and 
Enrollment section of this Certificate However, this Certificate shall be subject to amendment, modification 
or termination in accordance with any provision hereof, by operation of law, by filing with and approval by the 
state Department of Insurance This can' also be done by mutual written agreement between HMO and 
Contract Holder without the consent of Members 
M HMO may adopt policies, procedures, rules and interpretations to promote orderly and efficient administration 
of this Certificate 
N No agent or other person,-except an authorized representative of HMO, has authority to waive any condition or 
restriction of this Certificate, to extend the time for making a payment, or to bmd HMO by making any pro-
mise or representation or by giving or receiving any information. No change in this Certificate shall be valid 
unless evidenced by an endorsement to it signed by an authorized representative 
0 This Certificate, including the Schedule of Benefits, any Riders, and any amendments, endorsements, inserts, 
or attachments, constitutes the entire Certificate between the parties hereto pertaining to the subject matter 
hereof and supersedes all pnor and contemporaneous arrangements, understandings, negotiations and discus-
sions of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof whether written or oral, and there are no warran-
ties, representations, or other agreements between the parties in connection with the subject matter hereof, 
except as specifically set forth herein. No supplement, modificauon or waiver of this Certificate shall be 
bmdmg unless executed in writing by authorized representatives of the parties 
P This Certificate has been entered into and shall be construed according to applicable state and federal law 
DEFINITIONS 
The following words and phrases when used m this Certificate shall have, unless the context clearly indicates 
odierwise, the meaning given to them below 
AUowable Expense, Any necessary, reasonable, and customary item of expense for health care, when the item 
of expense is covered at least m part under any of the plans covering the Member for whom claim is made, 
except where a statute requires a different definition. 
Behavioral Health Provider. A licensed orgamzauon or professional providing diagnostic, therapeuuc or 
psychological services for behavioral health conditions 
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Certificate. This Certificate of Coverage, including the Schedule of Benefits, and any nders, amendments, or 
endorsements, which oudines coverage for a Subscriber and Covered Dependents according to the Group 
Agreement 
Continuous Coniftement Consecutive days of m-Hospital service received as an inpatient, or successive 
confinements when discharge from and readmission to the Hospital occur within a period of time not mere 90 
days or successive confinements due to the same or related causes unless between such confinements a 
Member has been actively at work, if an employee, or engaged in normal activity if not an employee, for a 
period of not more than 90 days A confinement for an accident shall not be combined with another 
confinement for an illness m determining Continuous Confinement 
Contract Holder. An employer or organization who agrees to remit the Premiums for coverage under the 
Group Agreement payable to HMO The Contract Holder shall act only as an agent of HMO Members in 
the Contract Holder's group, and shall not be the agent of HMO for any purpose 
Contract Year. A period of one year commencing on the Contract Holder's Effective Date of Coverage 
and ends at 12 00 midnight on the last day ofthe one year penod 
Coordination of Benefits- A provision that is intended to avoid claims payment delays and duplication of 
benefits when a person is covered by two or more plans providing benefits or services for medical, dental or 
other care or treatment It avoids claims payment delays by establishing an order m which plans pay their 
claims and providing the authority for the orderly transfer of information needed to pay claims promptly It 
may avoid duplication of benefits by permitting a reduction of the benefits of a plan when, by the rules 
established by this provision, it does not have to pay its benefits first Refer to the Coordination of Benefits 
section of this Certificate for a descnption of die Coordination of Benefits provision. 
Copayment A specified dollar amount or percentage required to be paid by or on behalf of a Member in 
connection with benefits, if any, as set forth in the Schedule of Benefits Copayments may be changed by 
HMO upon 30 days written notice to die Contract Holder 
Copayment Maximum. The maximum annual out-of-pocket amount for payment of Copayments, if any, to 
be paid by a Subscriber and any Covered Dependents, if any 
Cosmetic Surgery. Any non-medically necessary surgery or procedure whose primary purpose is to improve 
or change the appearance of any portion of the body to improve self-esteem, but which does not restore bodily 
function, correct a diseased state, physical appearance, or disfigurement caused by an accident, birth defect, or 
correct or naturally improve a physiological function. Cosmetic Surgery includes, but is not limited to, ear 
piercing, rhinoplasty, hpectomy, surgery for sagging or extra skin, any augmentation or reduction procedures 
(e g, mammoplasty, liposuction, keloids, rhinoplasty and associated surgery) or non-medically necessary 
treatment relating to the consequences or as a result of Cosmetic Surgery Cosmetic Surgery does not 
include reconstructive surgery when such service is incidental to or follows surgery resulting from trauma, 
infection or other dissases of the involved part, and reconstructive surgery because of congenital disease or 
anomaly of a Covered Dependent child which has resulted in a functional defect 
Covered Dependent. Any person in a Subscriber's family who meets all the eligibility requirements of the 
Eligibility and Enrollment section of this Certificate and the Dependent Eligibility section of the Schedule of 
Benefits, has enrolled m HMO; and is subject to Premium requirements set forth m the Premiums section of 
the Group Agreement 
Covered Benefits. Those Medically Necessary Services and supplies set forth in this Certificate, which are 
covered subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Group Agreement and Certificate 
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Creditable Coverage, Coverage of the Member under a group health plan (including a governmental or 
church plan), a health insurance coverage (either group or individual insurance) Meaicare, Medicaid, a 
military-sponsored health care (CHAMPUS), a program of the Indian Healuh Service a State health benefits 
nsk pool, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), a public health plan, and any health 
benefit plan under section 5(e) of the Peace Corps Act Creditable Coverage does not include coverage onlv 
for accident, workers' compensation or similar insurance, automobile medical payment insurance, coverage for 
on-site medical clinics, or limited-scope dental benefits, limited-scope vision benefits, or long-term care 
benefits that is provided in a separate policy 
Custodial Care* Any type of care provided in accordance with Medicare guidelines, including room and 
board, that a) does not require the skills of technical or professional personnel, b) is not furnished by or under 
the supervision of such personnel or does not otherwise meet the requirements of post-hospital Skilled 
Nursing Facility care, or c) is a level such that the Member has reached the maximum level of physical or 
mental function and such person is not likely to make further significant improvement Custodial Care 
includes, but is not limited to, any type of cafe where the primary purpose of the type of care provided is to 
attend to the Member's daily living activities which do not entail or require the continuing attention of trained 
medical or paramedical personnel Examples of this includes, but is not limited to, assistance in walking, 
getting in and out of bed, bathing, dressing, feeding, using the toilet, changes of dressings of non infected, post 
operative or chronic conditions, preparation of special diets, supervision of medication which can be self-
administered by the Member, general maintenance care of colostomy or ileostomy, routine services to 
mamtam other service which, in the sole detenmnation of HMO, based on medically accepted standards, can 
be safely and adequately self-administered or performed by the average non-medical person without the direct 
supervision of trained medical or paramedical personnel, regardless of who actually provides the service, 
residential care and adult day care, protective and supportive care including educational services, rest cures, 
convalescent care 
Detoxification. The process whereby an alcohol or drug intoxicated or alcohol or drug dependent person is 
assisted, m a facility licensed by &e appropnate regulatory authority, through the period of time necessary to 
eliminate, by metabolic or other means, the intoxicating alcohol or drug, alcohol or drug dependent factors or 
alcohol m combination with drugs as determined by a licensed Physician, while keeping the physiological nsk 
to the patient at a minimum 
Durable Medical Equipment Equipment, as determined by HMO, which is a) made to withstand prolonged 
use, b) made for and mainly used in the treatment of a disease or injury, c) suited for use while not confined as 
an inpatient in the Hospital, d) not normally of use to persons who do not have a disease or injury, e) not for 
use in altering air quality or temperature, and f) not for exercise or training 
Effective Date of Coverage. The commencement date of coverage under this Certificate as shown on the 
records of HMO 
Emergency Service, Professional health services that are provided to treat a Medical Emergency 
Experimental Procedures. Services or supplies that are, as determined by HMO, experimental A drug, 
device, procedure or treatment will be determined to be experimental if 
1 there is not sufficient outcome data available from controlled cluneal trials published m the peer 
reviewed literature to substantiate its safety and effectiveness for the disease or injury involved, or 
2 required FDA approval has not been grantee lor marKeung; or 
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3 a recognized national medical or dental society or regulatory agency has determined, in writing, that it 
is experimental or for research purposes, or 
4 the written protocol or protocol(s) used by the treating facility or the protocol or protocol(s) of any 
other facility studying substantially the same drug, device, procedure or treatment or the written 
informed consent used by the treating facility or by another facility studying the same drug, device, 
procedure or treatment states that it is experimental or for research purposes, or 
5 it is not of proven benefit for the specific diagnosis or treatment of a Member's particular condition, 
or 
6 it is not generally recognized by the Medical Community as effective or appropriate for the specific 
diagnosis or treatment of a Member's particular condition, or 
7. it is provided or performed in special settings for research purposes, or 
8. it has not been proven to be safe or efficacious 
Group Agreement The Group Agreement between HMO and the Contract Holder, including the Group 
Application, Cover Sheet, this Certificate, the Schedule of Benefits, any Riders, any amendments, any 
endorsements, and any attachments, as subsequently amended by operation of law and as filed with and 
approved by the applicable public authority 
Health Professionals. A Physician or other professional who is properly licensed or certified to provide 
medical care under the laws of the state where the individual practices, and who provides Medical Services 
which are within the scope of the individual*s license or certificate 
HMO* U S Healthcare, Inc d/b/a Aetna U S Healthcare, a New York corporation licensed by the New York 
Department of Health as a Health Maintenance Organization 
Homebound Member. A Member who is confined to the home due to an illness or injury which makes 
leaving the home medically contraindicated or which restricts the Member's ability to leave the Member's 
place of residence except with the aid of supportive devices, the use of special transportation, or the assistance 
of another person. 
Home Health Services, Those items and services provided by Participating Providers as an alternative to 
hospitalization, and approved and coordinated in advance by HMO 
Hospice Care. A program of care that is provided by a Hospice organization certified pursuant to state law or 
under a similar certification process required by the state m which the Hospice organization is located, and is 
focused on a palliative rather than curative treatment for Members who have a medical condition and a 
prognosis of less than 6 months to live 
HospitaL An institution rendering mpatient and outpatient services, accredited as a Hospital by the Jomt 
Commission on Accreditauon of Health Care Organizations, the Bureau of Hospitals of the American 
Osteopathic Association, or as otherwise determined by HMO as meeting reasonable standards A Hospital 
may be a general, acute care, rehabilitation or specialty institution. 
Infertile or Infertility. The condition of a presumably healthy Member who is unable to conceive or produce 
conception after a period of one year of frequent, unprotected heterosexual sexual intercourse This does not 
mclude conditions for male Members when the cause is a vasectomy or orchiectomy or for female Members 
when the cause is a tubal ligation or hysterectomy 
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Medical Community. A majority of Physicians who are Board Certified in the appropnate specialty 
Medical Emergency. Services to treat a medical or behavioral condiuon, the onset of which is sudden, that 
manifests itself by symptoms of sufficient seventy, including severe pain, that a prudent layperson, possessing 
an average knowledge of medicme and health, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical 
attention to result in 
a placmg the health of the person afflicted with such condmon in senous jeopardy, or in the case of a 
behavioral condition, placmg the health of such person or others m senous jeopardy; or 
b senous impairment to such person's bodily functions, or 
c senous dysfunctions of any bodily organ or part of such person, or 
& senous disfigurement of such persons 
Medical Services, The professional services of Health Professionals, including medical, surgical, diagnostic, 
therapeutic, preventive care, and birthing facility services 
Medically Necessary, Medically Necessary Services, or Medical Necessity. Services that are appropnate 
and consistent with the diagnosis in accordance with accepted medical standards as descnbed in the Covered 
Benefits section of this Certificate Medical Necessity, when used in relation to services, shall have the same 
meaning as Medically Necessary Services This definition applies only to the determination by HMO of 
whether health care services are Covered Benefits under this Certificate 
Member. A Subscriber or Covered Dependent as defined in this Certificate 
Mental or Behavioral Condition. A condiuon which manifests signs and/or symptoms which are pnmanly 
mental or behavioral, for which the primary treatment is psychotherapy, psychotherapeuuc methods or 
procedures, and/or the administration of psychotropic medication, regardless of any underlying physical or 
medical cause Mental or behavioral disorders and conditions include, but are not limited to, psychosis, 
affecuve disorders, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, attention 
disorders with or without hyperactivity, and other psychological, emotional, nervous, behavioral, or stress-
related abnormalities associated with transient or permanent dysfuncuon of the brain or related neurohormone 
systems, whether or not caused or m any way resulting from chemical imbalance, physical trauma, or a 
physical or medical condition 
Non-Hospital Facility. A facihty, licensed by the appropnate regulatory authonty, for the care or treatment of 
alcohol or drug dependent persons, except for transitional living faculties 
Open Enrollment Period. A penod of not less than ten (10) consecutive working days, each calendar year, 
when eligible enrollees of the Contract Holder may enroll in HMO without a waiting penod or exclusion or 
limitation based on health status or, if already enrolled in HMO, may transfer to an alternative health plan 
offered by the Contract Holder 
Partial Hospitalization. The provision of medical, nursing, counselmg or therapeutic services on a planned 
and regularly scheduled basis m a Hospital or Non-Hospital Facility which is licensed as an alcohol or drug 
abuse or mental illness treatment program by the appropnate regulatory authonty, and which is designed for a 
patient or client who would benefit from more intensive services than are offered in outpatient treatment but 
who does not require inpatient care 
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Participating. A description of a Provider that has entered into a contractual agreement with HMO for the 
provision of services to Members 
Physician. A duly licensed member of a medical profession, who has an MD or D 0 degree, who is 
properly licensed or certified to provide medical care under the laws of the state where the individual practices, 
and who provides Medical Services which are within the scope of the individual's license or certificate 
Premium. The amount the Contract Holder or Member is required to pay to HMO to continue coverage 
Primary Care Physician. A Participating Physician who supervises, coordinates and provides initial care 
and basic Medical Services as a general or family care practitioner, or in some cases, as an internist or a 
pediatncian to Members, initiates their Referral for Specialist care, and maintains continuity of patient care 
Provider. A Physician, Health Professional, Hospital, Skilled Nursing Facility, home health agency or 
other recognized entity or person licensed to provide Hospital or Medical Services to Members 
Reasonable Charge, The charge for a Covered Benefit which is determined by the HMO to be the 
prevailing charge level made for the service or supply m the geographic area where it is furnished. HMO may 
take into account factors such as the complexity, degree of skill needed, type or specialty of the Provider, 
range of services provided by a facility, and the prevailing charge in other areas in determmmg the Reasonable 
Charge for a service or supply that is unusual or is not often provided in the area or is provided by only a small 
number of providers in the area. 
Referral Specific directions or instructions from a Member's PCP, in conformance with HMO's policies 
and procedures, that direct a Member to a Participating Provider for Medically Necessary care 
Respite Care* Care furnished during a penod of time when the Members family or usual caretaker cannot, or 
will not, attend to the Member's needs 
Service Area. The geographic are^ established by HMO and approved by the appropriate regulatory 
authority 
Skilled Care. Medical care that requires the skills of technical or professional personnel 
Skilled Nursing Facility. An institution or a distinct part of an institution that is licensed or approved under 
state or local law, and which is primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing care and related services as a 
Skilled Nursing Facility, extended care facility, or nursing care facility approved by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations or the Bureau of Hospitals of the Amencan Osteopathic Associa-
tion, or as otherwise determined by HMO to meet the reasonable standards applied by any of the aforesaid 
authorities 
Specialist. A Physician who provides medical care m any generally accepted medical or surgical specialty or 
subspecialty 
Subscriber. A person who meets all applicable eligibility requirements as described m this Certificate and on 
the Schedule of Benefits, has enrolled in HMO, and is subject to Premium requirements as set forth in the 
Premiums section of the Group Agreement 
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Substance Abuse. Any use of alcohol and/or drugs which produces a pattern of pathological use causing 
impairment in social or occupauonal functioning or which produces physiological dependency evidenceo b\ 
physical tolerance or withdrawal 
Substance Abuse Rehabilitation. Services, procedures and interventions to eliminate dependence or or 
abuse of legal and/or illegal chemical substances, according to individualized treatment plans 
Totally Disabled or Total Disability. A Member shall be considered Totally Disabled if 
1 the Member is a Subscriber and is prevented, because of injury or disease, from performing any 
occupation for which the Member is reasonably fitted by training, experience, and accomplishments, 
or 
2 the Member is a Covered Dependent and is prevented because of injury or disease, from engaging 
in substantially all of the normal activities of a person of like age and sex in good health 
Urgent Care. Covered Benefits required in order to prevent senous detenoration of a Member's health that 
results from an unforeseen illness or injury if the Member is temporanly absent from the HMO Service Area 
and receipt of the health care service cannot be delayed until the Member's return to the Service Area 
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L S HEALTHCARE, INC. d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT AMENDMENT 
Contract Holder Group Agreement Effective Date January 1, 1999 
The Premiums section of the Group Agreement is amended to include the following provision 
HMO may establish a level monthly premium payment for any applicable Contract Year These Premium payments 
shall be estimated based on expected community rates Estimated Premium rates may be higher or lower than the 
actual approved Premium rate Any difference between the approved Premium rate and the estimated annual 
Premium rate shall be reconciled by the use of an adjustment account Credits or debits to the adjustment account will 
occur due to the differences between the approved and estimated Premium rate The reconciliation to the adjustment 
account shall occur no later than 12 months after the end of the prior Contract Year or upon termination of the Group 
Agreement, if earlier 
An example of the foregomg is as follows 
Assume that the HMO estimated that the monthly rate for the upcoming year will be SI00 However, the actual 
approved rate is SI 10 The Contract Holder will continue to pay the SI00 rate for the entire year, however, at the 
end of the year the Contract Holder would have underpaid by $120 Assuming the estimated rate for the following 
year is S110, upon renewal, the Premium rate for this Contract Holder would be S120 As a result, the Contract 
Holder would be paying off the SI 20 shortfall under its renewed Group Agreement 
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U.S. HEALTHCARE, INC d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
PRESCRIPTION LENS REIMBURSEMENT RIDER 
Contract Holder Group Agreement Effective Date: January I, 1999 
Section R of the Covered Benefits section of the Certificate is hereby amended to add the following coverage: 
Lens Reimbursement Benefits. 
Member is eligible for an allowance up to $J5 for the purchase of prescription lenses and frames 
(including prescription contact lenses). This allowance is payable once in each twenty-four (24) month penod 
commencing with the date of Members initial use of this benefit 
Member will be reimbursed for the amount of this allowance. However, if the prescription lenses or frames 
are purchased from select Providers who have an agreement with HMO to bill HMO directly, the allowance 
will be directly deducted from the cost of the prescription lenses or frames. 
Section B of the Continuation and Conversion section of the Certificate is hereby amended to include the following 
provision: 
The conversion privilege does not apply to the Prescnption Lens Reimbursement Rider. 
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U.S. HEALTHCARE, INC d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
PRESCRIPTION PLAN RIDER 
Contract Holder Group Agreement Effective Date January 1, 1999 
U S Healthcare, Inc d/b/a Aetna U S Healthcare ("HMO") and Contract Holder agree to offer to Members the 
HMO Prescription Plan, subject to the following provisions 
The Definitions section of the Certificate is amended to include the following definitions 
Brand Name Prescription Drug(s) or Medicine(s) - A prescription drug with a proprietary name assigned to 
it by the manufacturer or distributor and so indicated by MediSpan or any other similar publication designated 
by HMO or an affiliate Brand Name Prescription Drugs or Medicines do not include those drugs 
classified as Generic Prescription Drugs or Medicines as defined below 
Contracted Rate - The negotiated rate between HMO or an affiliate and the Participating Pharmacy 
Drug Formulary - A listing of prescription medications established by HMO or an affiliate This list is 
distributed to Participating Providtn and is subject to periodic review and modification by HMO or an 
affiliate An updated copy of the Drug Formulary shall be available at any time upon request by the 
Member A Drug Formulary may be managed as "closed", "open", or "differential copay" based upon the 
benefit design of the Member's HMO Prescription Plan 
Generic Prescription Drug(s) or Medicine(s) - A prescription drug, whether identified by its chemical, 
proprietary, or non-proprietary name, that is accepted by the U S Food and Drug Administration as 
therapeutically equivalent and interchangeable with drugs having an identical amount of the same active 
ingredient 
Maintenance Drugs - A listing of prescription drugs or medications established by HMO or an affiliate 
which is subject to periodic review and modification by HMO or an affiliate The list consists of prescription 
drugs or medications that are taken for extended penods of time, and which do not vary frequently in terms of 
dosage (such as high blood pressure medication) 
Participating Mail Order Pharmacy - An establishment which has contracted with HMO or an affiliate, and 
where prescription drugs or medicines are legally dispensed by mail 
Participating Pharmacy - A community pharmacy which has contracted with HMO or an affiliate to provide 
prescription services to Members 
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The Covered Benefits section of the Certificate s amended to add the following provision 
Outpatient Prescnption Drugs or Medicines. 
I Outpatient prescnption drugs or medicines are covered when prescribed by a Provider licensed to 
prescribe federal legend prescnption drugs or medicines The list of covered prescnption drugs or 
medicines is subject to change from time to time at the sole discretion of HMO Except for 
Maintenance Drugs as indicated below, each prescnption is limited to a maximum 34 day supply, 
with up to 5 refills when authorized by a Provider licensed to prescnbe federal legend prescnption 
drugs or medicines Prescnpuons must be filled at a Participating Pharmacy For prescnpuons 
filled under this Rider, G«nenc Prescnption Drugs or Medicines may be substituted for Brand 
Name Prescnption Drugs or Medicines* when available and in accordance with state law 
governing drug product selection. Such coverage shall also include nutntional supplements 
(formulas) as Medically Necessary for the therapeutic treatment of phenylketonuna, branched-chain 
ketonuna, galactosemia and homocystmuna as administered under the direction of a Physician An 
open Drug Formulary applies to this HMO Prescnption Plan benefit 
Coverage shall include enteral fortnulas for home use when prescnbed by a Provider licensed to 
prescnbe federal legend prescnption drugs or medicines The wntten order shall state that the enteral 
formula is clearly Medically Necessary and has been proven effective as a disease-specific treatment 
regimen for Members who are or will become malnourished or suffer from disorders, which if left 
untreated, cause chrome physical disability, mental retardation or death. Specific diseases for which 
enteral formulas have been proven effective shall include, but are not limited to, inherited diseases of 
ammo-acid or organic acid metabolism, Crohn's disease, gastroesophageal reflux with failure to 
thnve, disorders of gastrointestinal motility such as chrome intestinal pseudo-obstruction, and 
multiple severe food allergies which if left untreated will cause mainounshrnent, chronic physical 
disability, mental retardation or death Enteral formulas which are Medically Necessary and taken 
under wntten order from a Physician for the treatment of specific diseases shall be distinguished from 
nutntional supplements taken electively Coverage for certain inherited diseases of ammo acid and 
organic acid metabolism shall include modified solid food products that are low protein or which 
contain modified protein wmch are Medically Necessary, and coverage for modified solid food 
products shall not exceed $2500 00 dollars per calendar year 
Prescnption drugs or medication used for the treatment of cancer or HIV are covered when the off-
label use of the drug has not been approved by the FDA for that indicauon, provided that such drug is 
recognized for treatment of such indication m one of the standard reference compendia (the Umted 
States Pharmacopoeia Drug Information, the Amencan Medical Association Drug Evaluations, or the 
Amencan Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information) or the safety and effectiveness of use for this 
indication has been adequately demonstrated by at least one study published m a nationally 
recognized peer reviewed journal 
The Member is responsible for a S5 Copayment per prescnption or refill The Copayment or 
comsurance is payable directly to the Participating Pharmacy for each prescnption at the time the 
prescnption is dispensed The Copayment or comsurance is not subject to the Annual Maximum 
Out-of-Pocket Limit set forth in the Schedule of Benefits, if any 
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2 Coverage for Maintenance Drugs, beyond the 34 day supply, is available under this Prescnpuon 
Plan benefit. To be covered on this extended basis, the prescription drug must be a Maintenance 
Drug on the list of drugs approved by HMO or an affiliate and appropriate for the Member's illness 
or injury. The prescription must be originally filled for up to a 34 day supply by the Participating 
Pharmacy and be covered under this Rider. Thereafter the Maintenance Drug is covered for up to 
a 90 day supply upon a written prescription by a Provider licensed to prescribe federal legend 
prescription drugs or medicines provided the strength or form is not changed If the prescription is 
not refilled within 45 days after total utilization based upon the Provider's prescribed directions, the 
next refill will be considered an initial prescription, and will be covered up to a maximum 34 day 
supply. All 90 day supply prescriptions must be filled by the Participating Pharmacy. This list is 
subject to change in HMO's or an afiiliate's sole discretion, without notice to Members or Contract 
Holder. 
B Emergency Prescriptions Out-of-Area - If an emergency prescription is needed when the Member i-
located beyond a 50-mile radius from the KNtO Service Area, HMO will reimburse, subject to professiona. 
review, 75% of tr.e cost of the prescription, less » .e Copayments * coinsurance specified m Section A above 
if a non-participating pharmacy is used If fce Member uses a Participating Pharmacy located outside the 
HMO Service Area, the Member will be subject to the Copayment or coinsurance listed in Section A 
above. 
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Mail Order Prescription Drugs and Medicines* Outpatient prescription drugs or medicines are 
covered when dispensed by a licensed Participating Mail Order Pharmacy and require a 
prescription drug or medicine order by a Participating Provider licensed to prescribe federal legend 
prescription drugs or medicines. Outpatient prescription drugs and medicines will not be dispensed in 
quantities that are less than a 34 day supply or more than a 90 day supply. 
The Member is responsible for the Copayment or coinsurance listed in Section A above for 
prescription drugs or medicines dispensed by a Participating Mail Order Pharmacy. The 
Copayment or coinsurance is payable directly to the Participating Mail Order Pharmacy for each 
dispensed order. The Copayment or coinsurance is not subject to the Annual Maximum Out-of-
Pocket Limit set forth in the Schedule of Benefits, if any. 
The Limitations and Exclusions section of the Certificate is amended to include the following limitations and 
exclusions: 
A. Exclusions. 
Unless specifically covered under this Rider, the following are not covered: 
1. Any drug which does not, by federal or state law, require a prescription order (i.e., an over- the-
counter (OTC) drug even when a prescription is written.) 
2. Any charges for the administration of prescription legend drugs or injectable insulin and other 
injectable drugs covered by HMO. 
3. Cosmetic or any drugs used for cosmetic purposes or to promote hair growth, including but not 
limited to, Retin A for wrinkles, health and beauty aids. 
4. Insulin pumps or tubing for insulin pumps. 
5. Needles and syringes, including but not limited to, diabetic needles and syringes 
6. Any medication which is consumed or administered at the place where it is dispensed, except when 
dispensed and consumed at a Participating Pharmacy. 
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7 Immunization or immunological agents> including but not limited to, biological sera, blood blood 
plasma or other blood products administered on an outpatient basis, allergy sera and testing materials 
8 Drugs used for the purpose of weight reduction (1 e appetite suppressants) 
9 Any prescnption drug for which the actual charge to the recipient is less than the required 
Copayment or which applies to the Deductible Amount or for any drug for which no charge is 
made to the recipient 
\0 Any refill in excess of the amount specified by the prescnption order Before recognizing charges, 
HMO may require a new prescnption or evidence as to need, if a prescnption or refill appears 
excessive under accepted medical practice standards 
11 Any refill dispensed more than one (1) year from the date the latest prescnption order was wntten, or 
as otherwise permitted by applicable law of the junsdiction in which the drug is dispensed 
12 Drugs prescnbed for uses other than uses approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law and regulations, or any drug labeled "Caution 
Limited by Federal Law to Investigational Use", or experimental drugs, except for the off-label use of 
drugs as specifically covered under this Rider 
13 Medical supplies, devices and equipment and non-medical supplies or substances regardless of their 
intendeduse 
14 Test agents and devices including But not limited to diabetic test agents 
15 Smoking cessation aids 
16 Injectable drugs used for the purpose of treating infertility 
17 Injectables except for insulin. 
3 8 Oral and implantable contraceptive drugs and contraceptive devices 
19 Prescnption orders filled pnor to the effective date or after the termination date of the coverage 
provided by this Rider. 
B Limitations 
A Participating Pharmacy may refuse to fill a prescnption order or refill when in the professional judgment 
of the pharmacist the prescnption should not be filled 
Section B of the Continuation and Conversion section of the Certificate is hereby amended to include the following 
provision 
The conversion pnvilege does not apply to the HMO Prescnption Plan 
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U.S. HEALTHCARE, INC. d/b/a AETNA U.S. HEALTHCARE 
(NEW YORK) 
SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS 
PATRIOT V PLAN 
HofSnan Products New York 
Contract Holder Group Agreement EfTective Date: January 1, 1999 
Contract Holder Number: 004770 
Contract Holder Locations: D00 
Contract Holder Service Areas: GN01 
Benefit 
Primary Care Physician Office Visit 
During Office Hours 
Non-Office Hours and Home Visits 
Well Child Care and Immunizations 
Specialist Physician Office Visit 
Outpatient Rehabilitation Benefits 
Treatment over a 60-day consecutive period per $5 
incident of illness or injury beginning with the 
first day of treatment 
First OB Visit 
Routine Gynecological Exams 
2 visits per calendar year 
Hospital Outpatient Department Visit and 
Diagnostic Testing 
Outpatient Emergency Services 
Hospital Emergency Room or Outpatient 
Department 
Ambulance 
Urgent Care Facility 
Outpatient Mental Health Visits 
20 visits per 365 day period 
OUTPATIENT BENEFITS 
Copayment 
S5 
S10 
so 
$5 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
S5 
S5 
$5 
S35 
SO 
S35 
Visits 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
per trip 
per visit 
I - 20: S25 
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Benefit 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Visits 
Detoxification 
OUTPATIENT BENEFITS 
(continued) 
Copayment 
S5 per visit 
Rehabilitation 60 visits per calendar 55 
year, of which up to 20 visits may be for family 
members 
Outpatient Surgery $0 
Outpatient Home Health 50 
Unlimited visits Four hours of home health aide 
service shall be considered one home care visit 
Hospice Visits 50 
Hospice Bereavement Counseling 5 visits per 
calendar year 
Injectable Medications $5 
Subluxation Benefits 55 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
per visit 
per prescription 
per visit 
Benefit 
Acute Care 
Mental Health 
Maximum of 3 5 
days per 365 day period 
INPATIENT BENEFITS 
Copayment 
SO per Continuous Confinement 
SO per Continuous Confinement 
Substance Abuse 
Detoxification 
SO per Continuous Confinement 
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Benefit 
Maternity 
INPATIENT B E N E F I T S 
( C O N T I N U E D ) 
Copaymcnt 
SO per Cont inuous Confinement 
Skilled Nursing Facility 
Maximum of unlimited days 
SO per Cont inuous Conf inement(waived if a M e m b e r 
transferred from a Hospital to a Skiiied N u r s i n g Facil ity) 
Hospice SO per Cont inuous Conf inement(waived if a M e m b e r 
transferred from a Hospital to a Hospice C a r e facil ity) 
O P T I O N A L B E N E F I T S 
Benefit 
Routine Eye Exam as per schedule in certificate 
Prevent ive Dental Benefit for children under age 
12 
Hospital Outpat ient Facility Ambulatory Care 
Copavment 
$5 per visit 
S5 per visit 
SO per visit 
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ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Subscriber Eligibility 
(waiting period): 
All full-time and part-time employees of the Contract Holder who regularly work at least th 
minimum number of hours per week as defined by the Contract Hcider and agreed tc c 
HMO. 
Dependent Eligibility: 
Termination of 
Coverage: 
Eligible for benefits immediately following 
date of hire. 
A dependent unmarried child as described in the Eligibility and Enrollment section of the 
Certificate who is: 
i. under 23 years of age, and will be covered the end of billing month after they have 
reacheu the age specified above; or 
ii. unde: 3 years of age. dependent on a parent or guardian Member, and attending a 
recogr zed college* or imversity, trade or secondary school on a full-time basis, and 
will be covered the end of billing month after they have reached the age specified 
above; or 
iii. chiefly dependent upon the Subscriber for support and maintenance, and is 19 years 
of age or older but incapable of self-support due to mental or physical incapactiy, 
either of which commenced prior to: 23, or if a student, 23. 
Coverage of the Subscriber and the Subscriber's dependents who are Members, if 
any, will terminate on the next Premium due date following the date on which the 
Subscriber ceased to meet the eligibility requirements. 
Coverage of Covered Dependents will cease on the next Premium due date foliowmg the 
date on which the dependent ceased to meet the eligibility requirements. 
In no case will adjustments in coverage or rates be made effective more than 2 Premium 
due dates prior to the date HMO is notified in writing, on a form saUsfactory to HMO, of 
the requested deletion. 
tn 
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tS'tieafth&dis' 
November JO, 2000 
Margaret. J. Godown, ETCD 
Med-Pay; fate. 
1.650 B. Battlefield, Suite. 300 
Springfield; MQ 65804 
Re: Zachery Cohen (DOW. named Skylar Quajd-)' 
Dear Ms. Godown: 
James E. Brown 
151 Farmingtcn Avenue, RT21 
Hartford, CT 06156 
(880)273-1407 
Fax: {360} 952-2059 
RECEIVED 
MED-PAYrJNC 
Th!5P#e'tter'responds to your letter of October 13, 2000, which was sent to me 
approximately three months/after you received a copy of my July 24, 2000 letter to Amy 
Peterson at-Primay Children's Medical Center. • 
As stated in my letter of.July .24., the Aetna U.S. Healthcare plan covering Zachary as a 
dependent'child prior to his adoption is as a New York HMO plan which provides benefits 
for sen/ices rendered by participating providers. A copy of .that plan is enclosed. Though 
Zachery was no longer an eligible dependent of our insured, Davjd Cohen, as a result of the 
adoption, he was nevertheless eIi^Jble^fQr,aa^xtension of benefits for_up to 12 months. As . 
was tnie under the plan with respect to benefits generally, benefits during the extension 
period are available for services rendered by participating facilities; services rendered by a 
non-participating facility would only be covered in an emergency or with prior approval of 
the plan. Services at a lion-participating facility-might be authorized, for example, if 
needed treatment was not available at a participating facility in or outside of the HMO's 
-service area. 
Zachery was an in-patient at Schneider Children's Hospital, a'participating facility at the 
time of his adoption. The surgery he needed could, have been performed at Schneider and 
would have been covered.by Aetna U.S. Healthcare; However, Schneider informed us that 
Zachery's.adoptive parents, the Quaids, refused to authorize them to perform foe procedure 
and insisted that he be transferred to Utah. Aetna U.S. Healthcare was not asked to certify 
.treatment at Primary Children's Hospital as medically necessary and, in view of the fact 
that Zachery was already in a qualified, participating facility, we would not have certified . 
care at the Utah facility in any event. The Quaids clearly understood that Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare would not be responsible for Zachery*s care at a non-participating facility 
outside of the HMO's service area. We presume they nevertheless made the decision to 
move Zachery because, they knew his care in Utah would be covered. We were aware. :hat 
Zachery \s adoptive father had coverage through the self-funded plan which Med-Pay, Inc. 
administers for his employer, the Loren Cook Company, but that Med-Pay., be . had refused 
00029 
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IVIED-PAY, I N C 
to assure coverage based upon the mistaken assumption that Aetna U.S. Healthcare would 
cover care at a non-participating facility, We requested and received assurance from the 
Utah Department of Health that Zachery would he covered by Medicaid upon his arrival in 
Utah. With that assurance, and knowing that Aetna U.S. Healthcare would not be 
responsible for benefits at a non-participating hospital, Aetna U.S. Healthcare voluntarily 
paid the cost of air transport to Utah. 
Your letter indicates that Primary Children's Hospital and Utah Medicaid have been very 
patient in trying to get specific information. This Is misleading. We explained the coverage 
situation to Primary Children's Hospital via my letter of July 24T 2000 and have not been 
contacted by them since. Moreover, Utah Medicaid has never asked Aetna U.S. Healthcare 
for information; rather, they wrote to us io assure that Zachery would have Medicaid 
coverage upon his arrival in Utah. 
I trust you now have all of the information that you need. 
fames E. Brown 
Regional General Counsel 
tcoooosf 
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INTRODUCTION 
This document Is a description of Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan (the Plan) No oral 
interpretations can change this Plan The Plan described Is designed to protect Plan Participants against 
certain calaslrophlc health expenses 
Coverage under the Plan will take effect for an eligible Employee and designated Dependents when the 
Employee and such Dependents satisfy the Waiting Period and ail Ihe eligibility requirements of the Plan 
The Employer fully Intends to maintain this Plan Indefinitely However it reserves the right to terminate 
suspend discontinue or amend the Plan at any time and for any reason 
Changes in the Plan may occur In any or all parts of the Plan including benefit coverage deductibles, 
copayments maximums, exclusions, limitations, definitions, eligibility and the fike 
The Plan will pay benefits only for the expenses incurred while this coverage is in force hlo benefits are 
payable for expenses incurred before coverage began or after coverage terminated, even if (he expenses 
were incurred as a result of an accident Injury or disease that occurred, began or existed while coverag 
was In force An expense for a service or supply Is incurred on the dale the service or supply is fumishec 
If the Plan is terminated, the rights of Covered Persons are limited to covered charges incurred before 
termination 
This document summarizes the Plan rights and benefits for covered Employees and their Dependents 
and is divided into the following parts 
Eligibi l i ty, Funding, Effective Data and Termination Explains eligibility for coverage under the Plan 
funding of Ihe Plan and when the coverage takes effect and terminales 
Schedule of Benefits Provides an outline of the Plan reimbursement formula» as well as payment limits 
on certain services 
Benefit Descr ipt ions Explains when the benefit applies and the types of charges covered 
Cost Management Services Explains the methods used to curb unnecessary and excessive charges 
This part should be read carefully since each Participant is required to take action to assure 
that the maximum payment levels under the Plan are paid. 
Daflnod Terms Defines those Plan terms thai have a specific meaning 
Plan Exclusions Shows what charges are not covered 
Claim Provisions Explains the rules for filing claims and the claim appeal process 
Coordination of Benefits Shows the Plan payment order when a person is covered under more than 
one plan 
Third Party Recovery Provision Explains the Plan s rights to recover payment of charges when a 
Covered Person has a claim against another person because of Injuries sustained 
COBRA Continuation Options Explains when a person's coverage under the Plan ceases and the 
continuation options which are available 
ERISA Information Explains (he Plan's structure and the Participants nghls under the Plan 
3roup Number 040191LC Loren Cook Conpai y 
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ELIGIBILITY, FUNDING, EFFECTIVE DATE 
AND TERMINATION PROVISIONS 
ELIGIBILITY 
Eligible Classes of Employees. 
All Active Employees of the Employer and all stockholders of the Company. 
Eligibi l i ty Requirements for Employee Coverage. A person is eligible for Employee coverage once he 
or she satisfies all of the following (refer to the Effective Date Section): 
(1) is a Full-Time, Active Employee or a stockholder of the Employer. 
(2) is m a class eligible for coverage. 
(3) completes the employment Waiting Period of 90 consecutive days as an Active Employee. A 
"Walling Period" is the time between the first day of employment and the first day of coverage 
under the Plan. The Waiting Period is counted in the Pre-Existing Conditions exclusion lime. 
Eligible Classes of Dependents. 
A Dependent is any one of the following persons: 
(1) A covered Employee's Spouse and unmarried children from birth to the limiting age of 23 
years. The Dependent children must be primarily dependent upon the covered Employee for 
support and maintenance. When a child reaches the limiting age, coverage will end on the 
child's birthday. 
The term "Spouse" shall mean the person recognized as Ihe covered Employee's husband or 
wife under the laws of the state where the covered Employee lives. The Plan Administrator 
may require documentation proving a legal marital relationship. 
The term "children" shall include natural children, step-children, adopted children or children 
placed with a covered Employee in anticipation of adoption. 
If a covered Employee is the Legal Guardian of an unmarried child or children, these children 
may be enrolled in this Plan as covered Dependents. 
The phrase "children placed with a covered Employee in anticipation of adoption" rotors lo a 
child whom the Employee intends lo adopt, whether or not the adoplion has become final, 
who has not attained the age of eighteen (18) as of the date of such placement for adoption 
The term "placed" means the assumption and retention by such Employee of a legal 
obligation for total or partial support of the child in anticipation of adoption of the child. The 
child must be available for adoption and the legal process must have commenced. 
As required by the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, any child of an 
Employee who is an alternate recipient under a qualified medical child support order shall be 
considered as having a right to Dependent coverage under this Plan with no Pre-Existing 
Conditions provisions applied. 
The phrase "primarily dependent upon" shall mean dependent upon the covered Employee 
for support and maintenance as defined by the Internal Revenue Code and the covered 
Employee must declare the child as an income tax deduction. The Plan Administrator may 
require documentation proving dependency, including birth certificates, tax records or 
initiation of legal proceedings severing parental rights. 
(2) A covered Dependent child who is Totally Disabled, incapable of self-sustaining employment 
by reason of mental or physical handicap, primarily dependent upon the covered Employee 
for support and maintenance, unmarried and covered under the Plan when reaching the 
limiting age. The Plan Administrator may require, at reasonable intervals during the two years 
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following the Dependent's reaching the limiting age, subsequent proof of the child's Total 
Disability and dependency. 
After such two-year period, the Plan Administrator may require subsequent proof not more 
than once each year, The Plan Administrator reserves the right to have such Dependent 
examined by a Physician of the Plan Administrator's choice, at the Plan's expense, to 
determine the existence of such Incapacity. 
These persons are excluded as Dependents: other individuals living in the covered Employee's home, but 
who are not eligible as defined; the legally separated or divorced former Spouse of the Employee; any 
person who is on active duty In any military service of any country; or any person who Is covered under 
the Plan as an Employee. 
If a person covered under this Plan changes status from Employee to Dependent or Dependent to 
Employee, and the person is covered continuously under this Plan before, during and after (he change in 
status, credit will be given for deductibles and all amounts applied to maximums. 
If both mother and father are Employees, their children will be covered as Dependents of the 
mother or father, but not of both. 
Eligibi l i ty Requirements for Dependent Coverage. A family member of an Employee will become 
eligible for Dependent coverage on the first day that the Employee Is eligible for Employee coverage and 
Ihe family member satisfies the requirements for Dependent coverage. 
At any time, the Plan may require proof that a Spouse or a child qualifies or continues lo qualify as a 
Dependent as defined by this Plan. 
FUNDING 
Cost of the Plan. 
The amount of contributions. If any, to the Plan are to be made on the following basis: 
The Employer shall from time to time evaluate Ihe costs of the Plan and determine the amount to be 
contributed by Ihe Employer and the amount to be contributed, if any, by each Employee. While Loren 
Cook Company currently pays the entire cost of Employee and Dependent coverage under Ihis Plan, the 
Plan Administrator reserves the right to change the level of Employee contributions. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan, the Employer's obligation lo pay claims otherwise 
allowable under the terms of the Plan shall be limited to its obligation to make contributions to the Plan as 
set forth in the preceding paragraph, Payment of said claims In accordance with these procedures shnll 
discharge completely Ihe Employer's obligation with respect lo such payment 
In the event lhat the Employer terminates the Plan, then as of the effective date of termination, the 
Employer and Employees shall have no further obligation to make additional contributions to the Plan. 
ELECTION TO DECLINE COVERAGE 
This is an advisory statement for those Individuals who decline coverage explaining the Impact of lhat 
decision and the "special events" circumstances that would offer him/her "Special Enrollment Periods" in 
the future. 
If you are declining enrollment for yourself or your dependents), which Includes your spouse, because of 
other health insurance coverage (including, but not limited to, Medicare, Medicaid, COBRA, group health 
plans and some individual policies), you may In the future be able to enroll yourself or your dependents in 
this plan, provided thai you request enrollment within thirty (30) days after your other coverage ends, in 
addition to the above, if you have a new dependent as a result of marriage, birth, adoplion or placement 
for adoption or Legal Guardianship, you may be able to enroll yourself or your dependents, provided that 
you request enrollment within thirty (30) days after the marriage, birth, adoption or placement for adoption 
or Legal Guardianship. If you apply for coverage other than at the above mentioned situations, you will 
be subject to the Late Enrollment provisions of the Plan. 
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IF YOU DECLINE COVERAGE UNDER THIS HEALTH PLAN AND DO NOT DIVULGE TO THE PLAN 
THAT THIS REASON IS DUE TO OTHER HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY 
HAVE A HEALTH COVERAGE CHANGE (SEE SPECIAL ENROLLMENT DEFINITIONS), SPECIAL 
ENROLLMENT PERIODS THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO YOU DUE TO 
THAT HEALTH COVERAGE CHANGE WOULD NOT APPLY, AS A RESULT, YOU AND/OR YOUR 
DEPENDENT(S) WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE LATE ENROLLEE/ENROLLMENT PROVISIONS OF 
THE PLAN (I.E., EIGHTEEN (18) MONTHS PRE-EXISTING CONDITION EXCLUSION PROVISION,). 
ENROLLMENT 
Enrollment Requirements. An Employee must enroll for coverage by filling out and signing an 
enrollment application. If the covered Employee chooses to elect coverage for Dependent(s), an 
enrollment form must be filled out for the Dependent(s) and submitted to the Plan Administrator. 
Enrollment Requirements for Newborn Chi ldren. 
An enrollment form must be submitted to the Plan Administrator within thirty (30) days of Ihe child's birth 
to ensure that the child's coverage will become effective on its date of birth. 
If the Covered Employee applies for coverage of the newborn after the initial thirty (30) days, the newborn 
is considered to be a Late Enrollee. The newborn will be subject to the Late Enrollment and Pre-Existing 
Conditions provisions of this Plan. There will be no payment by the Plan for charges Incurred prior lo the 
Enrollment Date. 
Charges for covered nursery care will be applied toward the Plan of the newborn child. 
Charges for covered routine Physician care will be applied toward the Plan of the newborn child. 
TIMELY OR LATE ENROLLMENT 
(1) Timely Enrol lment - The enrollment will be "timely" if the completed form is received by the 
Plan Administralor no later than 30 days after the person becomes eligible for the coverage, 
either initially or under a Special Enrollment Period. 
If two Employees (husband and wife) are covered under the Plan and the Employee who is 
covering the Dependent children terminates coverage, the Dependent coverage may be 
continued by the other covered Employee with no waiting period as long as coverage has 
been continuous. 
(2) Late Enrol lment - An enrollment Is "late" If it is not made on a "timely basis" or during a 
Special Enrollment Period. 
If an Individual loses eligibility for coverage as a result of terminating employment or a 
general suspension of coverage under the Plan, then upon becoming eligible again due to 
resumption of employment or due to resumption of Plan coverage, only the mosl recent 
period of eligibility will be considered for purposes of determining whether the individual is a 
Late Enrollee. 
The Enrollment Date for a Late Enrollee Is the first date of coverage. The time between the 
date a Late Enrollee first becomes eligible for enrollment under the Plan and the first day of 
coverage is not treated as a Waiting Period. Coverage begins no later than the first of the 
month after the enrollment form is received by the Plan Administrator. 
If the Employee applies for coverage of a newborn more than thirty (30) days after the child's 
birth, the newborn will be considered a late enrollee and be subject to the Late Enrollment 
and Pre-Existing Conditions provisions of the Plan. THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS 
PROVISION WILL APPLY FOR ANY ILLNESSES OR INJURIES FOR WHICH THE CHILD 
IS TREATED IN THE SPECIFIED TIME PRIOR TO THE ENROLLMENT DATE. 
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SPECIAL ENROLLMENT PERIODS 
The enrollment date for anyone who enrolls under a Special Enrollment Period is the first date of 
coverage. Thus, the lime between Ihe date a special enrollee first becomes eligible for enrollment under 
the Plan and the first day of coverage Is not treated as a Waiting Period. 
(1) Individuals losing other coverage. An Employee or Dependent who is eligible, but not 
enrolled in this Plan, may enroll If each of the following conditions Is met: 
(a) The Employee or Dependent was covered under a group health plan or had health 
Insurance coverage at the time coverage under this Plan was previously offered to 
the Individual. 
(b) If required by the Plan Administrator, the Employee stated In writing at the time that 
coverage was offered that the other health coverage was the reason for declining 
enrollment. 
(c) The coverage of the Employee or Dependent who had lost the coverage was under 
COBRA and the COBRA coverage was exhausted, or was not under COBRA and 
either the coverage was terminated as a result of loss of eligibility for the coverage 
(including as a result of legal separation, divorce, dealh, termination of employment 
or reduction in the number of hours of employment) or employer conlnbulions 
towards the coverage were terminated. 
(d) The Employee or Dependent requests enrollmenl In this Plan not later than 30 days 
after the date of exhaustion of COBRA coverage or the termination of coverage or 
employer contributions, described above. 
If the Employee or Dependent lost the other coverage as a result of the individual's failure lo 
pay premiums or required contributions or for cause (such as making a fraudulent claim), that 
individual does not have a Special Enrollment right. 
(2) Dependent beneficiar ies. If the Employee Is a participant under this Plan (or has met the 
Waiting Period applicable to becoming a participant under this Plan and Is eligible to be 
enrolled under this Plan but for a feilure to enroll during a previous enrollment period), and 
(a) A person(s) becomes a Dependent of the Employee through marriage, then the 
Dependent(s) may be enrolled under this Plan as a covered Dependent of the 
covered Employee; or 
(b) A person(s) becomes a Dependent of the Employee through birth, Legal 
Guardianship, adoption or placement for adoption, then the Spouse and new 
child(ren) of the covered Employee may be enrolled as a Dependent(s) of the 
covered Employee If the Spouse is otherwise eligible for coverage. 
Eligible Dependents other than those described In (a) or (b) who were not enrolled when first 
eligible may enroll as Late Enrollees, If allowed by the Plan. 
If the Employee is not enrolled In the Plan, he or she may enroll as a Special Enrollee as a 
result of the Special Enrollment Events Hated In (a) and (b). The newly eligible Dependents 
may not enroll If Ihe Employee does not elect coverage. 
The Dependent Special Enrollment Period must be a period not to exceed 30 days and must 
begin on the date of the marriage, birth, adoption or placement for adoption or Legal 
Guardianship. 
The coverage of the Dependent enrolled In the Special Enrollment Period will be effective: 
(a) in the case of marriage, not later than the first day of the first month beginning after 
the date of the completed request for enrollment is received; 
^(b) in the case of a Dependent's birth, as of the date of birth; or 
(c) in the case of a Dependent's adoption or placement for adoption or Legal 
Guardianship, the date of the adoption or placement for adoption or Legal 
Guardianship, 
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EFFECTIVE DATE 
Effective Date of Employee Coverage. An Employee will be covered under this Plan as of the first day 
that the Employee satisfies all of the following: 
(1) The Eligibility Requirement. 
(2) The Active Employee Requirement. 
(3) The Enrollment Requirements of the Plan. 
If the individual applies for coverage within the thirty (30) days following the eligibility date (end of waiting 
period), coverage will be effective the first of the month following the date the enrollment form is received 
by the Plan Administrator. 
Active Employee Requirement. 
An Employee must be an Active Employee (as defined by this Plan) or a stockholder of the Company for 
this coverage to take effect. 
Effective Date of Dependent Coverage. A Dependent's coverage will take effect on the day that the 
Eligibility Requirements are met; the Employee Is covered under the Plan; and all Enrollment 
Requirements are met, 
TERMINATION OF COVERAGE 
When coverage under this Plan stops, Plan Participants will receive a certificate that will show 
the period of coverage under this Plan. Please contact the Plan Administrator for further 
details. 
When Employee Coverage Terminates. Employee coverage will terminate on the earliest of these dates 
(except in certain circumstances, a covered Employee may be eligible for COBRA continuation coverage. 
For a complete explanation of when COBRA continuation coverage Is available, what conditions apply 
and how to select it, see the section entitled COBRA Continuation Options): 
(1) The dale the Plan is terminated. 
(2) The date the covered Employee's Eligible Class Is eliminated. 
(3) The day the covered Employee ceases to be In one of the Eligible CIOBSOB, This includes 
death or termination of Active Employment of the covered Employee. (See the COBRA 
Continuation OpUons.) 
(4) The end of the period for which the required contribution has been paid if the charge for the 
next period is not paid when due. 
Continuation During Periods of Employer-Certified Disability, Leave of Absence or Layoff. A 
person may remain eligible for a limited time if Active, full-time work ceases due to disability, leave of 
absence or layoff. This continuance will end as follows: 
For disability leave only: the date the Employer ends the continuance. 
For leave of absence or layoff only: the date the Employer ends the continuance. 
While continued, coverage will be that which was in force on the last day worked as an Active Employee. 
However, if benefits reduce for others in the class, they will also reduce for the continued person. 
Continuation During Family and Medical Leave. Regardless of the established leave policies 
mentioned above, this Plan shall at all times comply with the Family and Medical Leave Acl of 1993 as 
promulgated In regulations issued by the Department of Labor. 
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The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires Employers of fifty (50) or more e m p l o y ^ to 
provide up to twelve (12) weeks of unpaid, Job-protected leave to "eligible" Employees for certain 
family and medical reasons. Employees are eligible if they have worked for the Employer for at 
east one (1) year and up to one thousand two hundred fifty (1,250) hours over the previous twelve 
(12) months. 
During any leave taken under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Employer will maintain coverage 
under this Plan on the same conditions as coverage would have been provided if the covered Employee 
had been continuously employed during the entire leave period. 
If Plan coverage terminates during the FMLA leave, coverage will be reinstated for the Employee and his 
or her covered Dependents if the Employee returns to work in accordance with the terms of the FMLA 
leave Coverage will be reinstated only if the person{s) had coverage under this Plan when the FMLA 
leave started, and will be reinstated to the same extent that it was In force when that coverage 
terminated. For example, Pre-Existing Conditions limitations and other Walling Periods will not be 
imposed unless they were In effect for the Employee and/or his or her Dependents when Plan coverage 
terminated. 
Rehiring a Terminated Employee. A terminated Employee who Is rehired will be treated as a new hire 
and be required to satisfy all Eligibility and Enrollment requirements, with the exception of an Employee 
returning to work directly from COBRA coverage. This Employee does not have to satisfy the 
employment Wailing Period or Pre-Existing Conditions provision. 
Employees on Military Leave. Employees going Into or returning from military service may elect to 
continue Plan coverage as mandated by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act under the following circumstances. These rights apply only to Employees and their Dependents 
covered under the Plan before leaving for military service. 
(1) The maximum period of coverage of a person under such an election shall be the lesser of: 
(a) The 18 month period beginning on the date on which the person's absence begins; or 
(b) The day after the date on which the person was required lo apply for or return to a 
position or employment and fails to do so. 
(2) A person who elects to continue health plan coverage may be required to pay up lo 102% of 
the full contribution under the Plan, except a person on active duty for 30 days or less cannot 
be required to pay more than the Employee's share, If any, for the coverage. 
(3) An exclusion or Walling Period may not be Imposed in connection with the reinstatement of 
coverage upon reemployment if one would not have been Imposed had coverage not been 
terminated because of service. However, an exclusion or Waiting Period may be irnposod for 
coverage of any Illness or Injury determined by the Secretary of Veterans Allalrs to havo 
been incurred in, or aggravated during, the performance of uniformed service. 
When Dependent Coverage Terminates. A Dependent's coverage will terminate on the earliest of these 
dates (except in certain circumstances, a covered Dependent may be eligible for COBRA continuation 
coverage. For a complete explanation of when COBRA continuation coverage Is available, what 
conditions apply and how to select it, see the section entitled COBRA Continuation Options): 
(1) The date the Plan or Dependent coverage under the Plan Is terminated. 
(2) ThB date that the Employee's coverage under the Plan terminates for any reason including 
death. (See the COBRA Continuation Options.) 
(3) The date a covered Spouse loses coverage due to loss of dependency status. (See the 
COBRA Continuation Options.) 
(4) On the first date that a Dependent child cesses to be a Dependent as defined by (he Plan. 
'(See the COBRA Continuation Options.) 
(5) The end of the period for which the required contribution has been paid if the charge for the 
next period {s not paid when due. 
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SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS 
Veri f icat ion of El ig ibi l i ty (417) 886-6886 or (800) 777-9087 
Call one of these numbers to verify eligibility for Plan benefits before the charge is incurred. 
PRECERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT: If any part of a Hospital stay Is not precertified per the 
instructions in the Cost Management Section, the benefit payment will be reduced by $300. The 
attending Physician does not have to obtain precertlfication from the Plan for prescribing a maternity 
length of stay that Is 48 hours or less for a vaginal delivery or 96 hours or less for a cesarean delivery. 
(The Hospital stay begins at the time of delivery or admission If the delivery occurred outside the 
Hospital.) The Covered Person Is still required to precertify the Hospital stay. If the slay is not 
precertified. the individual Is responsible for the amount indicated above. The individual will not be denied 
the Hospital stay granted under Federal taw. (Refer to the Cost Management Services Section for 
complete details.) 
Timely Fi l ing of Cla ims: Al l c la ims must be f i led wi th the Claims Supervisor by June 30 th of the 
current year for services rendered between Apr i l 1 ' * of the preceding Calendar Year and March 3 1 " 
of the current Calendar Year, if the Plan shou ld terminate, all c laims must be f i led wi th in 90 days 
of the Plan's terminat ion date. Benef i ts are based on the Plan's provisions at the time the charges 
were incurred. Claims f i led later than that date may be decl ined. (Refer to the section entit led 
"How to File a Claim".} 
MEDICAL BENEFITS 
To be considered an Eligible Benefit under this Plan, treatment, services and/or supplies must meet the 
following criteria: 
(1) Medically Necessary; 
(2) Ordered by a Physician; and 
(3) Not excluded under the Plan. 
Additionally, all benefits described in this Schedule are subject to the exclusions and limitations described 
more fully herein Including, but not limited to, the Plan Administrator's determination that: care and 
treatment is Medically Necessary; that charges are Usual and Reasonable; that services, supplies and 
care are not Experimental and/or Investigational. The meanings of these capitalized terms are in the 
Oefined Terms section of this document. 
The Plan contains a Participating Provider Organization, Primrose Healthcare Services, Inc., In Greene 
and Christian Counties of Missouri. The Network Providers are their naiwork of Hospitals, clinics, 
Physician* and other health care providers. Because these Network Providers havo agrood lo charge 
reduced fees to persons covered under the Plan, the Plan can afford lo reimburse a higher percentage of 
their fees. Therefore, when a Covered Person uses a Network Provider, that Covered Person will receive 
a higher payment from the Plan than when a Non-network Provider is used. It Is the Covered Person's 
choice as to which Provider to use. 
Additional information about this option, as well as a list of Network Providers is available from Ihe Human 
Resources office. 
Deduct ibles payable by Plan Part ic ipants 
Deductibles are dollar amounts that the Covered Person must pay befoie the Plan pays. 
A deductible is an amount of money that is paid once a Calendar Year per Covered Person and/or Family 
Unit. Each January 1st, a new deductible amount Is required. However, covered expenses incurred in, 
and applied toward the deductible in October. November and December will be applied to the deductible 
in the next Calendar Year as well as the current Calendar Year. Deductibles do not accrue toward the 
100% maximum out-of-pocket payment. 
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(MAXIMUM LIFETIME BENEFIT 
AMOUNT 
NETWORK PROVIDERS AND 
PROVIDERS OUTSIDE THE 
NETWORK AREA 
NON-NETWORK PROVIDERS - ] 
WITHIN THE NETWORK AREA 
$1,000,000 I 
Note: The maximums l isted below are the total for Network and Non-Network expenses. For 
example, if a maximum of 60 days Is l isted twice under a service, the Calendar Year maximum 
Is 60 days total wh ich may be spl i t between Network and Non-Network providers* 
DEDUCTIBLE, PER CALENDARI YEAR 1 
Per Covered Person 
.Per Family Unit 
$300 
$600 
$300 I 
$600 1 
The Calendar Year deductible is waived for the following Covered Charges: ] 
I - Inpatient Hospital Room & Board 
1 ..*_. Medical Emergency Care and Supplementary Accident Benefit 
COINSURANCE MAXIMUM , EXCLUDING DEDUCTIBLE, PER CALENDAR YEAR 
Per Covered Person $400 $800 
Per Family Unit $800 $1,600 
The Plan will pay the designated percentage of covered charges until out-of-pocket (deductible plus 
coinsurance) amounts are reached, at which time the Plan will pay 100% of the remainder of covered 
charges for the rest of the Calendar Year unless stated otherwise, 
The following charges do not apply toward the out-of-pocket maximum and are never paid at 100%. 
Deductible(s) 
Outpatient Mental Disorder charges 
Oulpalient Substance Abuse treatment charges 
Cost containment penalties 
[COVERED SERVICES { 
Ambulance Service 
Ambulance charges may be 
covered under the Medical 
Emergency Benefit (see 
below). 
Durable Medicat Equipment 
Home Health Care 
Hospice Care 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
100 visits Calendar Year maximum 
80% after deductible 
60% after deductible I 
60% after deductible 
60% after deductible 
100 visits Calendar Year maximum 
60% after deductible | 
Hospital Services I 
Room and Board 
Intensive Care Unit 
1 Well Newborn 
I Nursery/Physician Care 
80% after deductible (Deductible Is 
waived for R&B charges.) 
the semiprivate room rate 
80% after deductible (Deductible is 
waived for R&B charges.) 
Hospital's ICU Charge 
80%, after deductible (Deductible 
is waived for R&B charges.) 
60% after deductible (Deductible Is I 
waived for R&B charges.) I 
the semiprivate room rate 
60% after deductible (Deductible k 
waived for R&B charges.) I 
Hospital's JCU Charge 
60%> after deductible (Deductible is | 
waived for R&B charges.) | 
Medical Emergency Care and Supplementary Acc ident Charge Benefit 
Maximum benefit per accident first $200, payable at 100% deductible waived I 
Any amounts over this maximum will be covered at regular Plan benefits. 
Mental Disorders 
Inpatient 
I Outpatient 
80% after deductible 
20 days Calendar Year maximum 
|50% Bfter deductible 
(30 visits Calendar Year maximum 
60% after deductible 
20 days Calendar Year maximum , 
;50% after deductible 
30 visits Calendar Year maximum I 
i Note: The above outpatient charges for Mental Disorders wi l l not be counted in accumulat ing I 
J covered charges toward the 100% payment percentage of other charges, nor w i l l these charges 
be subject to the 100% payment. 
jOccupational Therapy |B0% after deductible J60% after_deductibl8 ] 
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Organ Transplants 
Transplant maximum 
I Donor maximum
 { 
NETWORK PROVIDERS AND I 
PROVIDERS OUTSIDE THE 
NETWORK AREA 
80% after deductible 
Part of Plan maximum 
Part of Plan maximum 
NON-NETWORK PROVIDERS 1 
WITHIN THE NETWORK AREA 
60% after deductible 
Part of Plan maximum 
Pari of Plan maximum } 
N o t t : Organ and t issue t ransplants are covered except those wh ich are classif ied as 1 
"Exper imental and/or Invest igat ional '* I 
Outpatient Private Duty 
Nursing 
80% after deductible I 
Physical Therapy |80% after deductible 
60% after deductible 1 
60% after deductible I 
1 Physician Services 1 
I Inpatient and office visits & 
I surgical services 
IPre-Admisslon Test ing 
[Pregnancy 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
60% after deductible | 
60% after deductible 
60% after deductible 
[ Note' One u l t rasound wi l l be cons idered an el igible expense for a normal pregnancy | 
No coverage for Pregnancy or any compl ica t ion of Pregnancy for a Dependent chi ld I 
Prosthet ics 
I Orthot ics 
(Second Surgical Op in ion , 
Voluntary 
Skil led Nursing Facil i ty 
(Speech Therapy 
(Spinal Manipulat ion/ 
1 Chiropract ic/ Acupunc tu re 
{Services 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
the facility s semipnvate room rate 
within 14 days of a 3 day slay 
70 days Calendar Year maximum 
80% after deductible 
80% after deductible 
$500 Calendar Year maximum 
60% after deductible 1 
60% after deductible 
60% after deductible 
60% after deductible 1 
the facility's semipnvate room rate 
within 14 days of a 3 day slay 
70 days Calendar Year maximum 
60% after deductible 
60% after deductible 
$500 Calendar Year maximum 
1 Note: Services per formed b y an M D or D O wi l l be covered under regular Plan benefits 1 
(Substance Abuse I 
I Inpatient 
1 Outpatient 
J Inpatient / Outpatient 
1 Combined 
1 Note: The above outpat ient 
1 covered charges toward the 
f be subject to the 100% payn 
|80% after deductible 
20 Days, $15,000 Calendar Year 
maximum 
50% after deductible 
$1,500 Calendar Year maximum 
$30 000 Lifetime maximum 
charges for Substance Abuso wl l 
100% payment percentage of otr 
l en t 
[60% after deductible I 
20 Days $15,000 Calendar Year 
maximum 
50% after deductible " i 
$1,500 Calendar Year maximum 
J $30,000 Lifetime maximum 
not be counted in accumulating 
ler charges, nor wi l l these charges 
iTMJ/Jaw Joint {Excluded (Excluded ! 
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MEDICAL EMERGENCY CARE AND 
SUPPLEMENTARY ACCIDENT CHARGE BENEFITS 
This benefit applies when a Medical Emergency or an accident charge is incurred (or care and (realment 
of a Covered Person's Injury and 
(1) the charge is for a service delivered within 90 days of the date of the accident or Medical 
Emergency, and 
(2) to the extent that the charge is not payable under any other benefits Under the Plan (other 
than Medical Benefits) 
BENEFIT PAYMENT 
Benefits will be paid as described In Ihe Schedule of Benefits for the Usual and Reasonable Charge 
incurred for the following 
(1) Physician services 
(2) Hospital care and treatment 
(3) Diagnostic x-rays and lab tests 
(4) Local professional ambulance service 
(5) Surgical dressings, splints and casts and other devices used In the reduction of fractures and 
dislocations 
(6) Nursing service 
(7) Anesthesia 
(8) Covered Prescription Drugs 
(9) Use of a Physician's office or cilnic operating room 
Note Spinal Manipulation}Chiropractic services are not Included under this benefit 
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MEDICAL BENEFITS 
Medical Benefits apply when covered charges are Incurred by a Covered Person for care of an Injury or 
Sickness and while the person Is covered for these benefits under the Plan 
DEDUCTIBLE 
Deductible Amoun t . This Is an amount of covered charges for which no benefits will be paid Before 
benefits can be paid In a Calendar Year a Covered Person must meet the deductible shown in the 
Schedule of Benefits 
This amount will not accrue toward the 100% maximum out of-pockel payment 
Deductible Three Month Carryover. Covered expenses Incurred in, and applied toward the deductible 
In October, November and December will be applied toward the deductible in the nexl Calendar Year 
Family Unit L imi t When the maximum amount shown In the Schedule of Benefits has been incurred by 
members of a Family Unit toward their Calendar Year deductibles, the deductibles of all members of that 
Family Unit will be considered satisfied for that year 
Deductible For A Common Accident This provision applies when two or more Covered Persons in a 
Family Unit are injured in the same accident 
These persons need not meet separate deductibles for treatment of Injuries Incurred in this accident, 
instead only one deductible for the Calendar Year in which the accident occurred will be required for 
them as a unit 
BENEFIT PAYMENT 
Each Calendar Year, benefits will be paid for the covered charges of a Covered Person that are In excess 
of the deductible Payment will be made at the rate shown under Reimbursement rate in the Schedule of 
Benefits No benefits will be paid in excess of the Maximum Benefit Amount or any listed limit of the Plan 
OUT-OF-POCKET LIMIT 
Covered Charges are payable at the percentages shown each Calendar Year until the out of pocket limit 
shown in the Schedule of Benefits is reached Then, Covered Charges incurred by a Covered Person will 
be payable at 100% (except for the charges excluded) for the rest of the Calendar Year 
When a Family Unit reaches the out of pocket limit Covered Charges for that Family Unit will be payable 
at 100% (except for the charges excluded) for the rest of the Calendar Year 
MAXIMUM BENEFIT AMOUNT 
The Maximum Benefit Amount is shown in the Schedule of Benefits It is the total arnounl of benefits that 
will be paid under the Plan for all covered charges incurred by a Covered Person 
COVERED CHARGES 
Covered charges are the Usual and Reasonable Charges that are Incurred for the following items of 
service and supply These charges are subject to the benefit limits, exclusions and other provisions of this 
Plan A charge is incurred on the date that the service or supply is performed or furnished 
(1) Hospi ta l Care The medical services and supplies furnished by a Hospital or Ambulatory 
Surgical Center or a Birthing Center Covered charges for room and board will be payable as 
shown in the Schedule of Benefits After 23 observation hours, a confinement will be 
considered an inpatient confinement 
Room charges made by a Hospital having onty private rooms will be paid at 80% of the 
average private room rate or the billed room rate, whichever Is lass 
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If the Hospital/Physician assigns the patient to a private room due to Medical Necessity, then 
the room charge will be paid at the hospjtal's private room rate The admitting Physician 
must provide documentation of the Medical Necessity that should be submitted to the claims 
Supervisor prior lo or along with the Hospital claim for prompt consideration of the billed 
charges 
Charges for an Intensive Care Unit stay are payable as described in the Schedule of 
Benefits 
(2) Coverage of Pregnancy The Usual and Reasonable Charges for the care and treatment of 
Pregnancy are covered the same as any other Sickness for a covered Employee or covered 
Spouse 
Group health plans generally may not, under Federal law restnct benefits for any hospital 
length of stay in connection with childbirth for the mother or newborn child to less than 48 
hours following a vaginal delivery, or less than 96 hours following a cesarean section 
However, Federal law generally does not prohibit the mother's or newborn's attending 
provider, after consulting with the mother from discharging the mother or her newborn earlier 
than 48 hours (or 96 hours as applicable) In any case, plans and Issuers may not under 
Federal law require that a provider obtain authorization from the plan or the issuer for 
prescribing a length of slay nol In excess of 48 hours (or 96 hours) The 48 or 96 hour 
Inpatient stay begins at the time the delivery occurs in the Hospital For deliveries occurring 
oulside of the Hospital the stay begins at the lime Ihe mother and/or newborn are admitted 
as an inpatient to a Hospital 
There Is no coverage of Pregnancy or complications of Pregnancy for a Dependent child 
(3) Skilled Nursing Facility Care The room and board and nursing c<ire furnished by a Skilled 
Nursing Facility will be payable If and when 
(a) the patient Is confined as a bed patient In the facility 
(b) the confinement starts within 14 days of a Hospital confinement of at least 3 days 
(c) the attending Physician certifies that the confinement is needed for further care of the 
condition that caused the Hospital confinement, and 
(d) the attending Physician completes a treatment plan which Includes a diagnosis, the 
proposed course of treatment and the projected date of discharge from the Skilled 
Nursing Facility 
Covered charges for a Covered Person's care In these facilities Is limited to the covered daily 
charge limit shown In the Schedule of Benefits 
(4) Physician Care The professional services of a Physician for surgical or medical services 
Charges for mult iple surgical procedures will be a covered expense subject to the following 
provisions 
(a) If bilateral or multiple surgical procedures are performed by one (1) surgeon, benefits 
will be determined based on the Usual and Reasonable Charge that is allowed for 
the primary procedures, 50% of the Usual and Reasonable Charge will be allowed for 
each additional procedure performed through the same incision, and 70% of the 
Usual and Reasonable Charge will be allowed for each additional procedure 
performed through a separate Incision Any procedure that would not be an Integral 
part of the primary procedure or is unrelated to the diagnosis will be considered 
"incidental" and no benefits will be provided for such procedures, 
(b) If multiple unrelated surgical procedures are performed by two (2) or more surgeons 
on separate operative fields, benefits will be based on the Usual and Reasonable 
Charge for each surgeon's primary procedure If two (2) or more surgeons perform a 
procedure that is normally performed by one (1) surgeon, benefits for all surgeons 
will not exceed the Usual and Reasonable Charge allowed for that procedure, and 
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(c) If an assistant surgaon is required, the assistant surgeon's covered charge will not 
exceed 20% of the surgeon's Usual and Reasonable allowance. 
(5) Private Duty Nursing Care. The private duty nursing care by a licensed nurse (R N., L P N , 
or L.V.N ). Covered charges for this service will be included to this extent: 
(a) inpatient Nursing Care. Charges are covered only when care is Medically 
Necessary or not Custodial in nature and the Hospital's intensive Care Unit is Tilled or 
the Hospital has no Intensive Care Unit. 
(b) Outpatient Nursing Care. Charges are covered only when care is Medically 
Necessary and not Custodial in nature The only charges covered for Outpatient 
nursing care are those shown below, under Home Health Care Services and 
Supplies. Outpatient private duty nursing care on a 24-hour-shlft basis Is not covered. 
(6) Home Health Care Services and Supplies. Charges for home health care services and 
supplies are covered only for care and treatment of an Injury or Sickness when Hospital or 
Skilled Nursing Facility confinement would otherwise be required. The diagnosis, care and 
treatment must be certified by the attending Physician and be contained In a Home Health 
Care Plan. 
Benefit payment for nursing, home health aide and therapy services is subject to the Home 
Health Care limit shown in the Schedule of Benefits. 
A home health care visit will be considered a periodic visit by either a nurse or therapist, as 
the case may be, or four hours of home health aide services. 
(7) Hospice Care Services and Supplies. Charges for hospice care services and supplies are 
covered only when the attending Physician has diagnosed the Covered Person's condition as 
being terminal, determined that the person Is not expected to live more than six months and 
placed the person under a Hospice Care Plan. 
Covered charges for Hospice Care Services and Supplies are payable as described In the 
Schedule of Benefits. 
(8) Other Medical Services and Supplies. These services and supplies not otherwise Included 
in the items above are covered as follows: 
(a) Local Medically Necessary professional land or air ambulance service A charge for 
this item will be a Covered Charge only if the service is to the nearest Hospital or 
Skilled Nursing Facility where necessary treatment can be provided unless the Plan 
Administrator finds a longer trip was Medically Necessary. 
(b) Anesthetic; oxygen; blood and blood derivatives that are not donated or replaced; 
intravenous injections and solutions. Administration of these items is included. 
(c) Blood sugar kits (glucometers) are a covered expense when Medically Necessary. 
(d) Cardiac rehabilitation as deemed Medically Necessary provided services are 
Initialed within 12 weeks after other treatment for the medical condition ends and 
services are rendered (a) under the supervision of a Physician; (b) in connection wilh 
a myocardial infarction, coronary occlusion or coronary bypass surgery; and (c) in a 
Medical Care Facility as defined by this Plan. 
(a) Radiation or chemotherapy and treatment with radioactive substances. The 
materials and services of technicians are included. 
(f) Initial contact lenses or glasses required following cataract surgery. 
(g) Rental of durabte medical or surgical equipment if deemed Medically Necessary. 
These Items may be bought rather than rented, with the cost not to exceed Ihe fan 
market value of the equipment at the time of purchase, but only If agreed to in 
advance by the Plan Administrator. Sales tax and shipping charges on covered 
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equipment are covered expenses. Shipping charges solely for the patient's 
convenience will not be covered. 
(h) Laboratory studies. 
(J) Treatment of Mental Disorders and Substance Abuse Covered charges for care, 
supplies and treatment of Mental Disorders and Subslance Abuse will be (imiled as 
follows: 
All treatment is subject to the benefit payment maximums shown in the Schedule of 
Benefits. 
Physician's visits are limited to one treatment per day. 
Psychiatrists (M.D.), psychologists (Ph.D.) or counselors (Ph.D.) may bill the Plan 
directly. Other licensed mental health practitioners must be under the direction of 
these professionals. 
Benefits are payable under this provision for Mental Disorders and Substance Abuse 
upon the diagnosis and recommendation of a Physician. Such effective treatment 
must meet all of the following tests. 
{I) The treatment facility, either Inpatient, outpatient or at a residential treatment 
center, is appropriate for the diagnosis, 
(fi) Treatment Is prescribed and supervised by a Physician. 
(Hi) Treatment includes a follow-up program, as appropriate, which is Physician 
directed and includes at ieast one therapy session a month; and 
(Iv) Treatment includes patient attendance, as appropriate, at meetings of 
organizations devoted to the therapeutic treatment of the illness. 
Treatment solely for detoxification or maintenance care js not considered effective 
treatment and Js not covered under this provision. "Detoxification" means care is 
aimed primarily at overcoming the after-effects of a specific drinking or drug episode 
and "maintenance care" means providing an environment free of alcohol or drugs. 
Evidence to document attendance/participation In the follow-up therapy and/or 
meeting sessions appropriate lo the treatment of the illness Is required. 
(j) Treatment of mouth, teeth and gums. 
(I) Care of mouth, teeth and gums. Charges for care of the mouth, teeth, gum 
and alveolar processes will be covered charges under Medical Benefits only 
if that care is for the following oral surgical procedures: 
(a) Excision of benign bony growths of the jaw and hard palate. 
(b) Excision of tumors and cysts of the jaws, cheeks, lips, tongue, roof 
and floor of the mouth. 
(c) External incision and drainage of cellulitis. 
(d) incision of sensory sinuses, salivary glands or ducts. 
(e) Removal of teeth for the medical management of a hazardous 
medical condition to include but not limited to the following: 
anticoagulation, valvular heart disease, hemophilia, preparation for 
cancer treatment in the neck/heBd region. 
(0 Hospital and anesthesia charges for Medically Necessary pedialric 
or adult denial procedures that require the use of anesthesia in a 
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Hospital setting For examples, refer lo the concurrent hazardous 
conditions staled above Physician's charges for the dental 
procedure are no! eligible under this Medical Plan 
(II) Injury to or care of mouth and g u m i Charges for repairs to the jaw cheeks, 
lips, tongue roof and floor of moulb, gums and alveolar processes due lo an 
Injury will be covered charges under Medical Benefits only If that care is for 
the following oral surgical procedures 
(a) Emergency surgical repair due to accldenlal Injury This repair must 
be made within 24 months from the dale of an accident Inttlal 
treatment must begin within 90 days of the Injury 
(b) DENTAL CARE FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURY TO NATURAL 7EETH 
IS HQ1 COVERED 
No charge will be covered under Medical Benefits for dental and oral surgical 
procedures involving orthodontic care of the teeth periodontal disease and preparing 
the mouth for the fitting of or continued use of dentures 
Occupat ional therapy by a licensed occupational therapist Therapy must be 
ordered by a Physician, result from an Injury or Sickness and Improve a body 
function Covered expenses do not Include recreational programs, maintenance 
therapy or supplies used In occupational therapy The therapy must be expected to 
produce a significant Improvement of the Covered Person's condition within a two (2) 
month period The need for the therapy, the care and the regimen established must 
be documented in writing for each two (2) month period 
Organ t ransplant limits Charges otherwise covered under the Plan that are incurred 
for the care and treatment due to an organ or tissue transplant are subject lo these 
limits 
The transplant must be performed to replace an organ or tissue 
The maximum benefit for all transplant procedures performed during a Covered 
Person's lifetime is shown In the Schedule of Benefits 
Benefit payments for donor charges are included under the Organ Transplant 
Maximum Benefit Limit shown in the Schedule of Benefits 
Poppr charges 
(I) Charges for obtaining organs or tissue from a covered or non covered donor 
are covered charges under the Plan when the recipient is a Covered Person 
When the donor has medical coverage his or her plan will pay first The 
benefits under this Plan will be reduced by those payable under the donor s 
plan The donor's expenses wilt be applied to the benefits of the covered 
recipient unless the donor Is also covered under this Plan In which case Ihe 
benefits will be applied to the covered donor's benefit maximum 
Oonor charges include those for 
(a) evaluating the organ or tissue (only for the actual donor) 
(b) removing the organ or tissue from the donor 
(c) transporting the organ from within the United States and Canada to 
the place where the transplant is to take place 
(II) Jf the organ donor is a Covered Persop and the recipient is not, then this Plan 
will always pay secondary to anv other coverage This Plan will cover donor 
charges for 
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(a) evaluating Ihe organ or tissue (only for the actual donor), 
(b) removing the organ or tissue from the donor 
(c) fcle transportation charges will be considered 
(m) The initial purchase (of a single unit per body part), fitting and repair of orthot ic 
appl iances such as braces splints or other appliances which are required for 
support for an Injured or deformed part of the body as a result of a disabling 
congenital condition or an Injury or Sickness 
(n) Physical therapy by a licensed physical therapist The therapy musi be In accord 
with a Physician's exact orders as to type frequency and duration and to improve a 
body function The therapy must be expected to produce a significant improvement 
of the Covered Person s condition within a two (2) month period The need for the 
therapy, the care and the regimen established must be documented in writing for 
each two (2) month period 
(o) Prescr ipt ion Drugs (as defined) Birth control pills are not covered by the Plsn 
except if deemed Medically Necessary 
(p) The initial purchase, fitting and repair of fitted prosthet ic devices which replace 
body parts (Refer to Plan Exclusions for further Information ) 
(q) Reconstruct ive Surgery Correction of abnormal congenital conditions, repair of 
damage from an accident and reconstructive mammoplastlea will be considered 
covered charges 
This mammoplasty coverage wiH Include reimbursement for 
(J) reconstruction of the breast on which a mastectomy has been performed 
(II) surgery and reconstruction of the other breast to produce a symmetrical 
appearance, and 
(III) coverage of prostheses and physical complications during all stages of 
mastectomy, Including lymphedemas, 
In a manner determined In consultation with Ihe attending Physician and (he patient 
(r) Speech therapy by a licensed speech therapist Therapy must be ordered by a 
Physician and follow either (i) surgery for correction of a congenital condition of the 
oral cavity, throat or nasal complex of B person, (il) an Injury, or (ill) a Sickness thai is 
other than a learning or Mental Disorder 
(s) Spinal Manlpulat lon/Chlropract lc/Acupuncture services by a licensed M D . D O 
or D C Acupuncture performed by a Chiropractor licensed by the State for this 
service fs a covered expense under the maximums as stated by the Spinal 
Manipulation/Chiropractic/Acupuncture Services category In ihe Schedule of 
Benefits If services are performed by an M D orDO, covered expenses are 
considered regular Plan benefits 
(t) Sterilization procedures 
(u) Surgical dressings, splints, casts and other devices used In the reduction of 
fractures and dislocations 
(v) Weight Management/Control Charges for weight loss programs that are 
administered and supervised by a Hospital or Physician's clinic to Ireaf a medical 
condition by a decrease in the patient's weight This program must not be a weight-
reduction program, but a program designed to treat health problems associated with 
hiah-nsk Morbid Obesity These health conditions may include hypertension, 
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, sleep apnea and degenerative joint disease The 
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participant must have demonstrated unsuccessful results in a weighi-loss program. 
Coverage is limited to Medically Necessary charges for treatment of Morbid Obesity. 
The weight management must be expected to produce a significant improvement of 
the Covered Person's condition within a two (2) month period. The need to continue 
the care and regimen established must be documented in writing by the Physician for 
each two (2) month period. 
(w) Coverage Df Well Newborn Nursery/Physician Care. 
Charges for Routine Nursery Care. Routine well newborn nursery care is room, 
board and other normal care for which a Hospital makes a charge. 
This coverage is only provided If a parent is a Covered Person who was covered 
under the Plan at the time of the birth and the newborn child is an eligible Dependent 
and is neither injured nor ill. 
The benefit Is limited to Usual and Reasonable Charges for nursery care for the 
newborn child while Hospital confined as a result of the child's birth. 
Charges for covered routine nursery care will be applied toward the Plan of the 
newborn child. 
Group health plans generally may not, under Federal law, restrict benefils for any 
hospital length of stay in connection with childbirth for the mother or newborn child to 
less than 48 hours following a vaginal delivery, or less than 96 hours following a 
cesarean section. However, Federal law generally does not prohibit the mother's or 
newborn's attending provider, after consulting with the mother, from discharging the 
molher or her newborn earlier than 48 hours (or 96 hours as applicable). In any case, 
plans and Issuers may not, under Federal law, require that a provider obtain1 
authorization from the plan or the issuer for prescribing a length of stay nol in excess 
of 48 hours (or 96 hours). The 48- or 96-hour inpatient stay begins at the time the 
delivery occurs In the Hospital. For deliveries occurring outside of the Hospital, the 
stay begins at the lime the mother and/or newborn are admitted as an inpatient to a 
Hospital. 
! 
Charges for Routine Physician Care. The benefit Is limited to the Usual and 
Reasonable Charges made by a Physician for the newborn child while Hospital 
confined as a result of the child's birth. 
Charges for covered routine Physician care will be applied toward the Plan of Ihe 
newborn child. 
(K) Diagnostic X-rays, electrocardiograms, electroencephalograms, 
pneumoencephalograms, basal metabolism tests, or similar well-established 
diagnostic tests generally approved by Physicians throughout the Uniled States. 
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PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS 
NOTE: The length of the Pre-Existing Conditions Limitation may be reduced or eliminated if an 
eligible person has Creditable Coverage from another health plan. 
An eligible person may request a certificate of Creditable Coverage from his or her prior pian and 
the Employer will assist any eligible person In obtaining a certificate of Creditable Coverage from 
a prior plan. 
If, after Creditable Coverage has been taken Into account, there will still be a Pre-Existing 
Conditions Limitation imposed on an Individual, that individual will be so notified. 
Covered charges incurred under Medical Benefits for Pre-Existing Conditions are not payable unless 
incurred 12 consecutive months, or 18 months if a Late Enrollee, after the person's Enrollment Date. This 
time may be offset if the person has Creditable Coverage from his or her previous plan. 
A Pre-Existing Condition Is a condition for which medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment was 
recommended or received within six months of the person's Enrollment Date under this Plan. Genetic 
Information and short-term episodic Illnesses such as colds, flu, sore throat, upset stomach, headache, 
ear ache, etc., will not be considered In regards to Pre-Existing Conditions. Treatment Includes receiving 
services and supplies, consultations, diagnostic tests or prescribed medicines, tn order to be taken Into 
account, the medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment must have been recommended by, or received 
from, a Physician. 
The Pre-Existing Condition does not apply to pregnancy, a newborn child or a child adopted by, placed 
for adoption with or placed under Legal Guardianship of the Employee. The child must be enrolled under 
this Plan within 30 days of the Special Enrollment event in order for the Pre-Existing Condition Provision 
to be waived. The child must be adopted, placed for adoption or Legal Guardianship before attaining age 
18, 
When reviewing Creditable Coverage, any time preceding the first 63-day period for which the Individual 
does not have coverage ("Significant Break fn Coverage") under a health plan will not be counted to 
reduce Ihe Pre-Existing Condition exclusion period. Watting Periods will not count as a break in 
coverage. This break in coverage rule applies to all Individuals Including a newborn, adopted, pre-
adopled child or a child placed under Legal Guardianship of the Employee. (Refer to the definition of 
Creditable Coverage.) 
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COST MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
PREADMISSION CERTIFICATION 
AUTHORIZATION IS NOT A GUARANTEE THAT ALL CHARGES ARE COVERED. 
Preadmission certification means the review and the authorization of all Hospital admissions. This 
program is designed to help ensure that all Covered Persons receive necessary and appropriate health 
care while avoiding unnecessary expenses when a Hospital confinement is proposed. 
The Covered Person or the Physician must call MPI Care at least 1 week prior to a scheduled 
hospitalization. 
MPI Care 
(417) B86-6B86 or (800) 777-9087 
A Plan may not, under federal law, require that a Physician or other health care provider obtain 
precertification from the Plan for prescribing a maternity length of stay of up to 48 hours for a vaginal 
delivery or 96 hours for a cesarean delivery. (The Hospital stay begins with the time of delivery or 
admission if the delivery occurred outside the Hospital.) However, to use certain providers or facililies, or 
to reduce the out-of-pocket costs, the povered Person Is still required to obtain precertification for the 
hospital slay. If the stay is not precertified, the individual Is responsible for Ihe amount Indicated on the 
Schedule of Benefits. The individual will not be denied the Hospital stay granted under Federal law. For 
more information on precertification, contact the Plan Administrator or Claims Supervisor. 
Any reduced reimbursement due to failure to follow cost management procedures will not accrue toward 
the 100% maximum out-of-pocket payment as Indicated In the Schedule of Benefits. 
In the event of an emergency hospitalization, the Covered Person or the Physician should notify MPI 
Care within 48 hours after a weekday admission or within 72 hours after an admission on a weekend or 
legal holiday. Emergency admission means an admission for a life-lhreatenlng medical condition or a 
condition for which the lack of immediate treatment would cause permanent disability. 
Failure to follow this procedure will reduce reimbursement received from the Plan. 
When the Covered Person or Physician notifies MPI Care of a scheduled hospitalization, the Utilization 
Review (UR) Coordinator will Ihen determine the length of stay based upon diagnosis, appropriateness of 
services and the Physician's plan of treatment. The UR Coordinator also assures that reasonable 
alternatives to inpatient care are considered, including outpatient treatment and preadmission testing 
Request for second surgical opinion may also be made at that time. 
For every approved admission, a target length of stay will be assigned by the UR Coordinator, based 
upon length of slay norms for the geographical region. A preadmission certification letter will be sent to 
notify the Covered Person, Hospital and attending Physician of the assigned length of stay. 
EXTENDED HOSPITAL STAYS 
Once a Hospital stay begins, whether it is a non-emergency or emergency, if the stay is expected to 
exceed the number of days precertified, the Covered Person or the Physician must contact MPI Care to 
request an extension of the length of stay. The part of the Hospital stay that exceeds the number of days 
precertified, is not precertified If no extension is requested or the request is denied. 
EFFECTS OF PREADMISSION CERTIFICATION ON BENEFITS 
Authorization is not a guarantee that all charges are covered, 
If any part of a Hospital stay is not precertified, no benefits will be paid per the penalty amount shown In 
the Schedule of Benefits. No part of the penalty will be applied towards the deductible amount shown in 
the Schedule of Benefits or the maximum out-of-pocket expense limitation. 
A non-emergency Hospital stay is not precertified if: 
Group Number 040191LC 20 Loren Cook Company 
(1) Precertification is not obtained prior to admission; 
(2) The precertification cannot be obtained after Inpatient treatment begins; or 
(3) The type of treatment, admitting Physician or the Hospital differs from the precertified 
treatment, Physician or Hospital 
CONCURRENT REVIEW 
The purpose of concurrent review is to continually evaluate the Covered Person's progress toward the 
treatment goal and the patient's ability to function in a non-acute environment and to facilitate timely 
discharge as appropriate. 
OTHER SERVICES SUBJECT TO PREAUTHORIZATION AND UTILIZATION REVIEW: 
(1) Skilled Nursing Facility stays 
(2) Home Health Care 
(3) Durable Medical Equipment 
(4) Physical, speech and occupational therapy 
(5) Cardiac rehabilitation therapy 
(6) Private Duty Nursing 
MEDICAL CASE MANAGEMENT 
The purpose of Medical case Management Is to Identify potentially high-dollar claims as a result of 
serious Illnesses, accidents or other circumstances and to coordinate the highest quality care in the most 
appropriate, cost-effective setting. The Interest of the Covered Person Is always primary In this program. 
The Govered Person receives the type of care required and the available benefits are used more 
effectively Large Case Management is more than a cost containment provision. It requires in-depth 
involvement between the Plan Administrator, the provider and the Covered Person. The Covered 
Person, family and the attending Physician must be In agreement for any form of alternative medical care 
The Medical Case Management firm may recommend coverage for services or equipment that is not 
normally provided to the Covered Person under the Plan. In these instances, exceptions may be made 
by the Plan Administrator to cover these services or equipment that are recommended 
Services provided by Medical Case Management are: 
Continued Hospital Stay Review. The Covered Person may be hospitalized longer than Medically 
Necessary. Substantial savings can be achieved by reviewing the Covered Person's condition and 
treatment based an established medical criteria. Inappropriate treatment may be Identified and 
discontinued. 
Discharge Planning. Careful advance planning can ease the Covered Person's transfer from an acute- • 
care facility to a less costly and more suitable facility such as a nursing home, rehabilitation center or the 
Covered Person's own home. It ensures that the benefits or early discharge are not outweighed by the 
need for a return to the Hospital at a later date for corrective and more costly treatment: 
Home Health Care Coordinat ion. With the right home environment and some professional coordination, 
many services traditionally performed on an inpatient basis may be handled in the Covered Person's 
home. Home health care involves coordination of required medical treatment and evaluation of the 
appropriate required level of care by the Medical Case Management firm. Patient/family counseling 
would be considered a covered expense In connection with these services, where applicable. 
The fol lowing types of c laim si tuat ions may have the potent ial for Medical Case Management; 
(1) • Severe trauma (head Injuries, extensive burns, spinal cord Injuries, multiple fractures, etc.); 
(2) 'Coma (any cause); 
(3) Neonatal (prematurity, birth Injuries, congenital deformities, profound retardation, etc.); or 
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(4) Any da im where it appears that there will be extensive inpatient and/or oulpatient charges, 
particularly for a long duration. 
Note: Medical Case Management Is a vo luntary service. There are no reduct ions of benefits or 
penalties If the patient and fami ly choose not to part ic ipate. 
Each treatment plan Is Indiv idual ly ta i lored to a speci f ic patient and should not be seen as 
appropriate or recommended fo r any other pat ient, even one wi th the same diagnosis. 
LARGE CASE MANAGEMENT 
When a catastrophic condition, such as a spinal cord Injury, a degenerative Sickness, neurological 
paralytic disease, cancer, AIDS or a premature birth occurs, a person may require long-term, perhaps 
lifetime care. After the person's condition is diagnosed and the person is stabilized in a Hospital, he or 
she might need extensive services or might be able to be moved into another type of care setting-even to 
his or her home. 
Sometimes, specialized care or adaptations to the home are required, but are not covered under the 
Plan. The Large Case Management program was initiated for those situations In which there would be a 
large cash ouUay for non-covered expenses for catastrophic conditions, it is a way In which these non-
covered expenses can be paid by the Plan. 
Large Case Management occurs in the following situations: 
(1) The catastrophic Injury or Sickness must have occurred while the patient was covered and 
the Injury or Sickness must have been covered under the Plan. 
(2) The patient has been Hospitalized and the attending Physician feels the condition is 
stabilized. 
(3) The patient must continue to require an acute level o care, but that care need not be in a 
Hospital. 
(4) Moving the patient to the new care setting musf entail expenditures that are not reimbursable 
under the Plan. 
(5) The Case Manager will coordinate and implement the Large Case Management program by 
providing guidance and information on available resources and suggesting the most 
appropriate treatment plan. 
(6) The Plan Administrator, attending Physician, patient and patient's family must all agree to the 
alternate treatment plan, ; 
(7) Once agreement has been reached, the Plan Administrator will direct the Plan to reimburse 
for expenses as stated in the treatment plan, even if these expenses normally would not be 
paid by the Plan. 
Note: Large Case Management is a vo luntary serv ice. There are no reduct ions of benefits or 
penalties If the patient a n d fami ly choose no t to part ic ipate. 
Each treatment plan is Indiv idual ly ta i lored to a speci f ic patient and should not be seen as 
appropriate or recommended for any other pat ient, even one wi th the same diagnosis. 
SECOND AND/OR THIRD OPINION PROGRAM 
Certain surgical procedures are performed either Inappropriately or unnecessarily. In some cases, 
surgery is only one of several treatment options. In other cases, surgery will not help the condition. 
In order to prevent unnecessary or potentially harmful surgical treatments, the second and/or third opinion 
program fulfills the dual purpose of protecting 4he health of tho Plan's Covorod Persons and protecting the 
financial integrity of the Plan. 
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scheduled In advance; that is, it Is not an emergency or of a life-threatening nature. Benefits will be 
payable as described In the Schedule of Benefits. 
The patient may choose any board-certified specialisl who Is not a partner of the attending Physician and 
who Is affiliated in the appropriate specialty. 
While any surgical treatment is allowed a second opinion, the following procedures are ones for which 
surgery is often performed when other treatments are available. 
Appendectomy 
Cataract surgery 
Cholecystectomy 
(gall bladder removal) 
Deviated septum 
(nose surgery) 
Hemorrhoidectomy 
Hernia surgery 
Hysterectomy 
Masleclomy surgery 
Prostate surgery 
Salpingo-oophoreclomy 
(removal of tubes/ovaries) 
Spinal surgery 
Surgery to knee, shoulder, 
elbow or toe 
Tonsillectomy and 
adenomectomy 
Tympanotomy (Inner ear) 
Varicose vein ligation 
Group Number 040191LC 23 Loren Cook Company 
App.Add.000427 
PLAN EXCLUSIONS 
For all Medical Benef i t * s h o w n In the Schedule of Benefits, a charge for the fo l lowing Is not 
covered 
(1) Abor t ion Services supplies, care or treatment In connection with an abortion unless Ihe life 
of the mother is endangered by the continued Pregnancy or the Pregnancy Is the result of 
rape or incest 
(2) Compl icat ions of n on-cove red treatments Care services or treatment required as a result 
of complications from a treatment not covered under the Plan, except complications from an 
abortion for a covered Employee or Spouse are not covered 
(3) Cosmet ic reasons Care and treatment provided for or In connection with cosmetic 
procedures Refer to the Medical Benefits Reconstructive Surgery section for information 
about covered expenses 
(4) Custodia l care Services or supplies provided mainly as a rest cure maintenance or 
Custodial Care 
(5) Dental Implants Dental Implants including any appliances and/or crowns and the surgical 
insertion or removal of Implants unless such care is specifically covered In Ihe Schedule of 
Benefits or Medical Benefits section of this Plan 
(6) Educat ional o r vocat iona l tes t ing Services for educational or vocational testing or training 
One Medically Necessary unit of educational training is allowed per Illness per lifetime 
(7) Excess charges The part of an expense for care and treatment of an Injury or Sickness that 
is in excess of the Usual and Reasonable Charge 
(8) Exercise p rograms Exercise programs for treatment of any condition except for 
Physician supervised cardiac rehabilitation occupational or physical therapy covered by this 
Plan, charges for enrollment in a health athletic or similar club or charges for athletic 
trainers 
(9) Exper imental or no t Medical ly Necessary Care and treatment that is either 
Expenmental/lnvestigational or not Medically Necessary 
(10) Eye care Radial keratotomy or other eye surgery to correct near sightedness Also routine 
eye examinations including refractions, lenses for the eyes and exams for their fitting This 
exclusion does not apply to aphakic patients and soft lenses or sclera shells Intended for use 
as corneal bandages 
(11) Foot care Treatment of weak strained flat unstable or unbalanced feet metatarsalgia or 
bunions (except open cutting operations) and treatment of corns, calluses or toenails (unless 
needed in treatment of a metabolic or peripheral vascular disease) Charges for the 
purchase of orthopedic shoes or devices for the support of flat feet will QOJ be considered a 
covered expense 
(12) Foreign travel Care, treatment or supplies out of Ihe U S if travel is for the sole purpose of 
obtaining medical services drugs or supplies 
(13) Government coverage Care treatment or supplies furnished by a program or agency 
funded by any government This does not apply to Medicaid or when otherwise prohibited by 
law 
(14) Hair loss Care and treatment for hair loss including wigs hair transplants or any drug that 
promises hafr growth whether or not prescribed by e Physician 
(15) Hearing aids and exams Charges for services or supplies In connection with hearing aids 
or exams for their fitting 
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(16) Hospital employees Professional services billed by a Physician or nurse who is an 
employee of a Hospilai or Skilled Nursing Facility ^nd paid by Ihe Hospital or facility for the 
service 
(17) Illegal acts Charges for services received as a result of Injury or Sickness caused by or 
contributed to by engaging in an illegal act or occupafion by committing or attempting to 
commit any crime criminal act assault or other felonious behavior or by participating in a not 
or public disturbance 
(18) Illegal Drugs Services supplies, care or treatment to a Covered Person for Injury or 
Sickness resulting from that Covered Person's voluntary taking of or being under the 
Influence of any controlled subslance, drug, hallucinogen or narcotic not administered on the 
advice of a Physician Expenses wilt be covered for Injured Covered Persons other than the 
person illegally using controlled substances and expenses will be covered for Subslance 
Abuse treatment as specified In this Plan 
(19) Infertil ity Care and treatment for infertility, artificial Insemination or in vitro fertilization 
(20) Lost or stolen appliances Charges incurred for tost or stolen appliances 
(21) No charge Care and treatment for which there would not have been a charge if no coverage 
had been in force 
(22) Non emergency Hospital admissions, Care and treatment billed by a Hospital for 
non Medical Emergency admissions on a Friday or a Saturday This does not apply If surgery 
is performed within 24 hours of admission 
(23) No obl igat ion to pay Charges Incurred for which the Plan has no legal obligation to pay 
(24) No Physician recommendat ion Care, treatment, services or supplies not recommended 
and approved by a Physician, or treatment, services or supplies when the Covered Person is 
not under the regular care of a Physician Regular care means ongoing medical supervision 
or treatment which Is appropriate care for the Injury or Sickness «-
(25) Not specif ied as covered Services treatments and supplies which are not specified as 
covered under this Plan 
(26) Obesity Care and treatment of obesity, weight loss or dietary conlrol Medically Necessary 
charges for health problems associated with high-risk Morbid Obestiy will be covered 
(27) Occupational Care and treatment of an Injury or Sickness that Is occupational (that is 
arises from work for wage or profit Including self-employment) for which the Covered Person 
is entitled to benefits under any Workers' Compensation or Occupational Disease Law or any 
such similar law 
(28) Orthot ics Replacement of orthotics will not be covered unless there is sufficient change in 
the Covered Person s physical condition to make Ihe onglnal device no longer functional 
(29) Personal comfor t items Personal comfort items or other equipment such as but not limited 
to air conditioners air purification units water purifiers, humidifiers electric heating units 
orthopedic or hypoallergenic pillows and mattresses, blood pressure instruments scales 
elastic bandages or stockings nonprescription drugs and medicines and first aid supplies 
and non hospital adjustable beds and exercise equipment 
(30) Plan design excludes Charges excluded by the Plan design as mentioned in this 
documenl 
(31) Pregnancy of daughter, Care and treatment of Pregnancy and Complications of Pregnancy 
for a dependent daughter only 
(32) Prosthetic devices Certain prosthetic devices are not covered under this Plan electrical 
convenience aids either anal or urethral, implants for cosmetic or psychological reasons, 
penile prostheses for psychogenic impotence, dental appliance remote conlrol devices 
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devices employing robotics; all mechanical organs, replacement of cataract lenses except 
when new cataract lenses are needed due to prescription change, and investigational or 
obsolete devices and supplies Replacement of prostheses will not be covered unless there Is 
sufficient change in the Covered Person s physical condition to make the original device no 
longer functional 
(33) Psycholog ica l tes t ing , psychoana lys is , counsel ing wi th relatives (except if counseling is 
with a covered parent on behalf of a minor child), or marital counsel ing, unless stated 
otherwise \n the Medical Benefits section 
(34) Relative g iv ing serv ices Professional services performed by a person who ordinarily 
resides in the Covered Person's home or Is related to the Covered Person as a Spouse, 
parent, child, brother or sister, whether the relationship is by blood or exists In law 
(35) Rout ine care Charges for routine or periodic examinations, screening examinations, 
evaluation procedures, preventive medical care, or treatment or services not directly related 
to the diagnosis or treatment of a specific Injury Sickness or pregnancy-related condition 
which is known or reasonably suspected, unless such care Is specifically covered In the 
Schedule of 8enefits The Plan also excludes non prescription drugs, vitamins and nutritional 
supplements unless necessary for the treatment of an Illness or as approved by the MPI 
Utilization Review Coordinator 
(37) Sex changes. Care, services or treatment for non congenital transsexualism, gender 
dysphoria or sexual reassignment or change This exclusion includes medications, Implants, 
hormone therapy, surgery, medical or psychiatric treatment 
(38) Sleep d isorders Care and treatment for sleep disorders unless deemed Medically 
Necessary 
(39) Smoking cessat ion Care and treatment for smoking cessation programs unless Medically 
Necessary due to a severe active lung Illness such as emphysema or asthma 
(40) Surgical ster i l izat ion reversal Care and treatment for reversal of surgical sterilization 
(41) Temporomandibu lar Jo in t SyndromeMaw Joint disorders. All diagnostic and treatment 
services related to the treatment of Jaw joint problems including temporomandibular joint 
(TMJ) syndrome 
(42) Travel or accommodat ions Charges for travel or accommodations, whether or not 
recommended by a Physician, except for ambulance charges as defined as a covered 
expense 
(43) Vis ion therapy Charges Incurred in connection with vision therapy or learning related vision 
therapy 
(44) War Any loss that is due to a declared or undeclared act of war 
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HOW TO SUBMIT A CLAIM 
Generally, when servjces are provided by a Network Provider, that provider will file the claim on your 
behalf to the Claims Supervisor The Covered Person and the provider will receive an Explanation of 
benefits from the Claims Supervisor with the payment information After benefits have been paid to the 
Network Provider, the provider will notify the Covered Person if any balance is due 
When a Covered Person has a claim to submit for payment for services by a provider who does not 
directly file the claim with the Claims Supervisor, the Covered Person must 
(1) Obtain a claim form from the Human Resources Office or the Plan Administrator 
(2) Complete the Employee portion of the form ALL QUESTIONS MUST BE ANSWERED 
(3) Have the Physician complete the provider's portion of the form if an itemized bill with the 
diagnosis is not available 
(4) For Plan reimbursements, attach bills for services rendered ALL BILLS MUST SHOW 
Name of Plan 
Employee's name 
Name of patient 
Name, address, telephone number of the provider of care 
Diagnosis 
Type of services rendered, with diagnosis and/or procedure codes 
Date of services 
Charges 
(5) Send the above to Ihe Claims Supervisor at this address 
Med-Pay, Inc 
PO Box 10909 
Springfield, Missouri 65808 
(417) 886 6886 or (800) 777-9087 
WHEN CLAIMS SHOULD BE FILED 
Claims must be filed with the Claims Supervisor within 90 days after the end of the Plan Year in which Ihe 
services were rendered {by June 30W1 of the current year for services rendered between April 1*' of the 
preceding Calendar Year and March 31* ' of the current Calendar year) However, If the Plan should 
terminate, all claims must be filed within 90 days of the Plan's termination date 
Claims filed later than that date will be declined unless It Is not reasonably possible to submit Ihe claim In 
Ihat lime (i e , If the person has Coordination of Benefits, if the person Is not legally capable of submitting 
Ihe claim, e tc ) 
Benefits are based on the Plan's provisions at the time the charges were incurred 
The Claims Supervisor will determine if enough information has been submitted to enable proper 
consideration of the claim If not, more information may be requested from the claimant The Plan 
reserves the right to have a Plan Participant seek a second medical opinion 
A request for Plan benefits will be considered a claim for Plan benefits, and it will be subject to a full and 
fair review If a claim Is wholly or partially denied, the Claims Supervisor will furnish the Plan Participant 
with a written notice of this denial This wrilten notice will be provided within 90 days after receipt of ihe 
claim The written notice will contain the following information 
(a) the specific reason or reasons for the denial, 
(b) specific reference to those Plan provisions on which the denial is based 
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(c) a description of any additional Information or material necessary to correct the claim 
and an explanation of why such material or Information Is necessary, and 
(d) appropriate information as to the steps to be taken if a Plan Participant wishes to 
submit the claim for review 
A Plan Participant will be notified within 90 days of receipt of the claim as to the acceptance or denial of a 
ciaim and if not notified within 90 days, the claim shall be deemed denied 
If special circumstances require an extension of time for processing the claim the Claims Supervisor shall 
send written notice of the extension to the Plan Participant The extension notice will indicate the special 
circumstances requiring the extension of lime and the date by which the Plan expects to render the final 
decision on the claim In no event will the extension exceed a period of 90 days from the end of the initial 
90 day period 
CLAIMS REVIEW PROCEDURE 
In cases where a claim for benefits payment Is denied In whole or m part, the Plan Participant may appeal 
the denial This appeal provision will allow the Plan Participant to 
(a) Request from the Plan Administrator a review of any ciaim for benefits Such request 
must Include the name of the Employee his or her Social Security number the 
name of the patient and the Group Identification Number, if any 
(b) File the request for review in writing, stating In clear and concise terms the reason or 
reasons for this disagreement with the handling of the claim 
The request for review must be directed to the Plan Administrator or Claims Supervisor within 60 days 
after the claim payment date or the date of the notification of denial of benefits 
A review of the denial will be made by the Plan Administrator and the Plan Administrator will provide the 
Plan Participant with a written response within 60 days of the date the Plan Administrator receives the 
Plan Participant s written request for review and if not notified, the Plan Participant may deem the claim 
denied If, because of extenuating circumstances, the Plan Administrator Is unable to complete the review 
process within 60 days, the Plan Administrator shall notify the Plan Participant of the delay within the 60 
day penod and shall provide a final wntten response to the request for review within 120 days of the dale 
the Plan Administrator received the Plan Participant's written request for review 
The Plan Administrators written response to the Plan Participant shall cite the specific Plan provlsion(s) 
upon which the denial is based 
A Plan Participant must exhaust the claims appeal procedure before filing a suil for benefits 
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COORDINATION OF BENEFITS 
Coordination of the benefit plans Coordination of benefits sets out rules for the order of payment of 
Covered Charges when two or more plans - Including Medicare - are paying When a Covered Person is 
covered by this Plan and another plan, or the Covered Person's Spouse is covered by this Plan and by 
another plan or the couples Covered children are covered under two or mom plans the plans will 
coordinate benefits when a claim is received 
The plan that pays first according to the rules will pay as if there were no other plan ln\alved The 
secondary and subsequent plans will pay the lesser of 
(1) the allowable amount minus applicable deductible and co insurance or 
(2) the allowable amount minus the primary insurance payment 
The total amount paid by all plans will not exceed 100% of the total allowable expenses 
Bonofit plan This provision wiil coordinate the medical benefits of a benefit plan fhe term benefit plun 
means this Plan or any one of the following plans, 
(1) Group or group type plans, Including franchise or blanket benefit plans 
(2) Blue Cross and Blue Shield group plans 
(3) Group practice and other group prepayment plans 
(4} Federal government plans or programs This includes Medicare 
(5) Other plans required or provided by law This does not Include Medicaid or any benefit plan 
like it that, by its terms, does not allow coordination 
(6) No Fault Auto Insurance, by whatever name it is called, when not prohibited by law 
Allowable charge For a charge to be allowable it must be a Usual and Reasonable Charge and at least 
part of It must be covered under this Plan 
In the case of HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) or other in network only plans This Plan will not 
consider any charges in excess of what an HMO or network provider has agreed to accept as paymenl in 
full Also when an HMO or network plan Is primary and the Covered Person does not use an HMO or 
network provider this Plan will not consider as an allowable charge any charge that would have been 
covered by the HMO or network plan bad the Covered Person used the services of an HMO or network 
provider 
In (he case of service type plans where services are provided as benefits the reasonable cash value of 
each service will be the allowable charge 
Automobile l imitations When medical payments are available under vehicle insurance the Plan shall 
pay excess benefits only without reimbursement for vehicle plan deductibles Thn Plan shall always be 
considered the secondary carrier regardless of the Individual s election under PIP (personal injury 
protection) coverage with the auto carrier 
Benefit plan payment order When two or more plans provide benefits for the same allowable charge 
benefit payment will follow these rules 
(1) Plans that do not have a coordination provision or one like it will pay first Plans with such a 
provision will be considered after those without one 
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(2) Plans with a coordination provision will pay their benefits up to the Allowable Charge: 
(a) The benefits of the plan which covers the person directly (that is, as an employee, 
member or subscriber) ("Plan A") are determined before those of the plan which 
covers the person as a dependent ("Plan B"). 
Special rule. If: (i) the person covered directly is a Medicare beneficiary, and (ii) 
Medicare is secondary lo Plan B, and (III) Medicare is primary to Plan A (for example, 
if the person Is retired), THEN Plan B will pay before Plan A. 
(b) The benefits of a benefit plan which covers a person as an Employee who is neither 
laid off nor retired are determined before those of a benefit plan which covers that 
person as a laid-off or Retired Employee, The benefits of a benefit plan which covers 
a person as a Dependent of an Employee who Is neither laid off nor retired are 
determined before those of a benefit plan which covers a person as a Dependent of a 
laid off or Retired Employee. If the other benefit plan does not have this rule, and if, 
as a result, the plans do not agree on the order of benefits, this rule does not apply 
(c) The benefits of a benefit plan which covers a person as an Employee who Is neither 
laid off nor retired or a Dependent of an Employee who is neither laid off nor retired 
are determined before those of a plan which covers the person as a COBRA 
beneficiary. 
(d) When a child Is covered as a Dependent and the parents are not separaled or 
divorced, these rules will apply: 
(I) The benefits of the benefit plan of the parent whose birthday falls earlier in a 
year are determined before those of the benefit plan of the parent whose 
birthday falls later In that year; 
(il) If both parents have the same birthday, the benefits of the benefit plan which 
has covered the patient for the longer time are determined before those of 
the benefit plan which covers the other parent. 
(©) When a child's parents are divorced or legally separated, these rules will apply: 
(I) This rule applies when the parent with custody of the child has not remarried. 
The benefit plan of the parent with custody will be considered before the 
benefit plan of the parent without custody. 
(II) This rule applies when the parent with custody of the child has remarried. 
The benefit plan of the parent with custody will be considered first. The 
benefit plan of the stepparent that covers the child as a Dependent will be 
considered next. The benefit plan of the parent without custody will be 
considered last. 
(HI) This rule will be In place of items (I) and (il) above when It applies. A court 
decree may state which parent Is financially responsible for medical and 
dental benefits of the child. In this case, the benefit plan of that parent will be 
considered before other plans that cover the child as a Dependent. 
(iv) If the specific terms of the court decree state that the parents shall share joint 
custody, without stating that one of the parents is responsible for the health 
care expenses of the child, the plans covering the child shall follow the order 
of benefit determination rules outlined above when a child Is covered as a 
Dependent and the parents are not separated or divorced. 
(f) If there is still a conflict after these rules have been applied, the benefit plan which 
has covered the patient for the longer time will be considered first. 
(3) Medicare will pay primary, secondary or last to the extent stated in federal law. When 
Medicare is to be the primary payer; this Plan will base its payment upon benefits that were 
paid by Medicare under Parts A and B. 
G'oup Number 040191LC 30 Loren Cook Company 
(4) If a Plan Participant is under a disability extension from a previous benefit plan, that benefit 
plan will pay first and this Plan will pay second. 
Claims determination per iod. Benefits will be coordinated on a Calendar Year basis. This is called the 
claims determination period. 
Right to receive or release necessary Informat ion. To make this provisjon work, this Plan may give or 
obtain needed information from another Insurer or any other organization or person. This Information may 
be given or obtained without the consent of or notice to any other person. A Covered Person will give this 
Plan the information it asks for about other plans and their payment of allowable charges. 
Facility of payment. This Plan may repay other plans for benefits paid that the Plan Administrator 
determines it should have paid. That repayment will count as a valid payment under this Plan. 
Right of recovery. This Plan may pay benefits that should be paid by another benefit pian. In this case 
this Plan may recover the amount paid from the other benefit plan or the Covered Person. That 
repayment will count as a valid payment under the other benefit plan 
Further, this Plan may pay benefits that are later found to be greater than the allowable chaige In this 
case, this Plan may recover the amount of the overpayment from the source to which It was paid 
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THIRD PARTY RECOVERY PROVISION 
RIGHT OF SUBROGATION AND REFUND 
When this prov is ion appl ies. The Covered Person may incur medical or dental charges due to injuries 
which may be caused by the act or omission of a third party. In such circumstances, the Covered Person 
may have a claim against that third party, or insurer, for payment of the medical or denial charges. While 
the Covered Person may receive payment of such claims pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the Covered 
Person shall be required to refund to the Plan all medical or dental expenses paid if the Covered Person 
recovers from any other party. 
As a condi t ion of par t ic ipat ing in and receiv ing benefits under this Plan, the Covered Person 
agrees: 
(1) To recognize the Plan's right to subrogation and reimbursement The Covered Person will be 
required to execute an Agreement provided by the Benefit Administrator acknowledging Ihe 
Plan's right of recovery, agreeing to repay any claims paid by the Plan, 'pledging amounts 
recovered by the Covered Person from the Ihird party as security for repayment of any claims 
paid by the Plan, and to the extent provided below, assigning the Covered Person's cause of 
action or other right of recovery to the Plan. The Covered Person will do nothing to prejudice 
these rights of the Plan. 
These rights provide the Plan with a priority over all proceeds to the Covered Person relative 
to the Injury Sickness, whether by judgment, settlement, arbitration award or otherwise and 
shall not be limited by any other characterization of the nature or purpose of the amounts 
recovered or by the identity of the party from which recovery is obtained. The priority is over 
any claim, including medical, non-medical or dental charges, attorney fees, or other costs and 
expenses associated with the enforcement of the Plan's rights under this subrogation benefit. 
(2) To automatically assign to the Plan his or her rights against any third party or insurer when 
this provision applies. The Covered Person shall cooperate fully with the Plan in asserting 
claims against a responsible third party and such cooperation shall include, where requested, 
providing information as the Benefit Administrator may request, filing of suit by the Covered 
Person against a responsible third party and the giving of testimony In any action filed by the 
Plan. 
If a Covered Person fails or refuses to cooperate In connection with the assertion of claims 
against a responsible third party, Ihe Plan Administrator may deny payment of claims and 
treat prior paid claims (related lo the accident/injury) as overpayments recoverable by offset 
against future Plan benefit or by other action of the Plan Administrator. 
If the Covered Person falls to take action against a responsible third party to recover 
damages within one year or within 30 days of a request by the Plan, the Plan shall be 
deemed to have acquired, by assignment or subrogation, a portion of the Covered Person's 
claim equat to its prior payments. The Plan may thereafter commence proceedings directly 
against any responsible third party. The Plan shall not be deemed to waive its rights to 
commence action against a third party if It fails to act after the expiration of one year nor shall 
the Plan's failure to act be deemed a waiver or discharge of the lien described In item 4 
below. 
(3) To notify the Benefit Administrator in writing by copy of the complaint or other pleading of the 
commencement of any action by the Covered Person to recover damages from a third party. 
(4) To notify the Benefit Administrator of any recovery and to repay to the Plan the benefits paid 
on his or her behalf out of the recovery made from the third party or insurer. The Covered 
Person recognizes that the Plan shall have a Hen against the proceeds of any recovery by the 
Covered Person and against future benefils due under the plan in Ihe amount of any claims 
paid. 
(5) That the plan will not pay or be responsible, without Its written consent, for any fees or costs 
associated with a Covered Person pursuing a claim against any third party, insurer, or 
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coverage, including attorneys' fees, tn other words, the amounts of any recovery due lo the 
Plan will not be reduced by costs or attorneys' fees without the Plan's written consent. 
(6) That if a repayment agreement is requested lo be signed, the provisions of this subrogation 
section remain In effect regardless of whether It Is actually signed. 
RIGHT OF RECOVERY 
If payments are made under the Plan that should not have been made, the Plan may recover that 
incorrect payment. The Plan may recover this payment from the person to whom it was made or from any 
other appropriate party. If such incorrect payment is made to a Participant, the Plan may deduct it when 
making future payments directly to the Participant. 
Recovery f rom another plan under whJch the Covered Person is covered. This right of refund also 
applies when a Covered Person recovers under an uninsured or underinsured motorist plan, 
homeowner's plan, renter's plan, medical malpractice plan or any liability or insurance plan. 
Defined terms: "Recovery" means monies paid to the Covered Person by way of judgment, settlement, 
or otherwise lo compensate for ail losses caused by the Injuries or Sickness whether or not said losses' 
reflect medical or dental charges covered by the Plan, and regardless of how any recovery is 
characterized in any settlement, judgment, or pleading, or any other document. 
"Subrogation" means the Plan's right to pursue the Covered Person's claims for medical or dental 
charges or any other reimbursable charge against the other person. 
"Refund" means repayment to the Plan for medical or dental benefits that it has paid toward care and 
treatment of the Injury or Sickness. 
"Reimbursement" means that the Plan has a right to be paid a recovery received by the participant or to 
the extent not contrary to law, to offset all or any part of the Plan's recovery against any amount the Plan 
or the Employer owes to the Covered Person or owes as benefits for the Covered Person. 
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COBRA CONTINUATION OPTIONS 
A federal law, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), requires that most 
employers sponsoring a group health plan ("Plan") offer Employees and their families covered under (heir 
health plan the opportunity for a temporary extension of health coverage (called "COBRA continuation 
coverage") in certain instances where coverage under the Plan would otherwise end. This notice is 
intended to inform Plan Participants and beneficiaries, in summary fashion, of the rights and obligations 
under the continuation coverage provisions of COBRA, as amended and reflected in final and proposed 
regulations published by the Department of the Treasury. This notice is Intended to reflect the law and 
does not grant or take away any rights under the law. Complete Instructions on COBRA, as well as 
election forms and other information, will be provided by the Plan Administrator to Plan Participants who 
become Qualified Beneficiaries under COBRA. 
What Is COBRA cont inuat ion coverage? COBRA continuation coverage Is group health insurance 
coverage that an employer must offer to certain Plan Participants and their eligible family members 
(called "Qualified Beneficiaries") at group rates for up to a statutory-mandated maximum period of time or 
until they become ineligible for COBRA continuation coverage, whichever occurs first, Tho righl to 
COBRA continuation coverage is triggered by the occurrence of one of certain enumerated events that 
result In the loss of coverage under the terms of the employer's Plan (the "Qualifying Event"). The 
coverage must be identical to the Plan coverage that the Qualified Beneficiary had immediately before the 
Qualifying Event, or if the coverage has been changed, the coverage must be identical to the coverage 
provided to similarly situated active employees who have not experienced a Qualifying Event (in other 
words, similarly situated non-COBRA beneficiaries). 
Who is a Qual i f ied Benef ic iary? In general, a Qualified Beneficiary is: 
(I) Any individual who, on the day before a Qualifying Event, is covered under a Plan by virtue of 
being on that day either a covered Employee, the Spouse of a covered Employee, or a 
Dependent child of a covered Employee. If, however, an individual is denied or not offered 
coverage under the Plan under circumstances In which the denial or failure to offer 
constitutes a violation of applicable law, then the individual will be considered to have had the 
Plan coverage and will be considered a Qualified Beneficiary if that individual experiences a 
Qualifying Event. 
(Ii) Any child who is born to or placed for adoption with a covered Employee during a period of 
COBRA continuation coverage. If, however, an individual is denied or not offered coverage 
under the Plan under circumstances in which the denial or failure to offer constitutes a 
violation of applicable law, then-the Individual will be considered to have had the Plan 
coverage and will be considered a Qualified Beneficiary If that individual experiences a 
Qualifying Event. 
(Hi) A covered Employee who retired on or before the date of substantial elimination of Plan 
coverage which is the result of a bankruptcy proceeding under Title 11 of the U.S. Code with 
respect-to the Employer, as is the Spouse, surviving Spouse or Dependent child of such a 
covered Employee if, on the day before the bankruptcy Qualifying Event, the Spouse, 
surviving Spouse or Dependent child was a beneficiary under the Plan. 
The term "covered Employee" includes not only common-law employees (whether part-time or full-time) 
but also any Individual who is provided coverage under the Pl8n due to his or her performance of services 
for the employer sponsoring the Plan (e.g., self-employed individuals, Independent contractor, or 
corporate director). 
An individual is not a Qualified Beneficiary if the individual's status as a covered Employee is attributable 
to a period in which the individual was a nonresident alien who received from the individual's Employer no 
earned income that constituted income from sources within the United States. If, on account of the 
preceding reason, an individual is not a qualified beneficiary, Ihen a Spouse or Dependent child of the 
individual is not considered a Qualified Beneficiary by virtue of the relationship to the individual. 
Each Qualified Beneficiary (including a child who Is born to or placed for adoption with a covered 
Employee during a period of COBRA continuation coverage) must be offered (he opportunity to make an 
independent election to receive COBRA continuation coverage. 
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What Is a Quali fying Event? A Qualifying Event is any of the following if the Plan provides that the Plan 
participant would lose coverage (i.e., cease to be covered under the same terms and conditions as in 
effect immediately before the Qualifying Event) in the absence of COBRA continuation coverage: 
(I) The death of a covered Employee. 
(ii) The termination (other than by reason of the Employee's gross misconduct), or reduction of 
hours, of a covered Employee's employment. 
(Hi) The divorce or legal separation of a covered Employee from the Employee's Spouse. 
(iv) A covered Employee's enrollment in the Medicare program. 
(v) A Dependent child's ceasing to satisfy the Plan's requirements for a Dependent child (e.g., 
attainment of the maximum age for dependency under the Plan). 
(vi) A proceeding in bankruptcy under Title 11 of the U.S. Code with respect to an Employer from 
whoso employment a covered Employoe retired at any time. 
If the Qualifying Event causes the covered Employee, or the Spouse or a Dependent child of the covered 
Employee, to cease to be covered under the Plan under the same terms and conditions as In effect 
immediately before the Qualifying Event (or in the CBSB of the bankruptcy of the Employer, any substanlial 
elimination of coverage under the Plan occurring within 12 months before or after the date the bankruptcy 
proceeding commences), the persons losing such coverage become Qualified Beneficiaries under 
COBRA If all the other conditions of the COBRA law are also meL 
The taking of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 {"FMLA") does not constitute a 
Qualifying Event. A Qualifying Event occurs, however, if an Employee does not return to employment at 
the end of the FMLA leave and all other COBRA continuation coverage conditions are present. If a 
Qualifying Event occurs, it occurs on the last day of FMLA leave and the applicable maximum coverage 
period Is measured from this date (unless coverage is lost at a later dale and the Plan provides for the 
extension of the required periods, In which case the maximum coverage date is measured from the dale 
svhen the coverage Is lost.) Note that the covered Employee and family members will be entitled to 
QOBRA continuation coverage even if they failed to pay the employee portion of premiums for coverage 
under the Plan during the FMLA leave. 
What Is the election per iod and how long must It last? An election period Is tho time period within 
which the Qualified Beneficiary can elect COBRA continuation coverage under the Employer's Plan. A 
Plan can condition availability of COBRA continuation coverage upon the timely election of such 
coverage. An election of COBRA continuation coverage is a timely election if it Is made during the 
election period. The election period must begin not later than the date the Qualified Beneficiary would 
lose coverage on account of the Qualifying Event and must not end before the date that Is 60 days after 
the later of the date the Qualified Beneficiary would lose coverage on account of the Qualifying Evenl or 
the date notice Is provided to the Qualified Beneficiary of her or his right to elect COBRA continuation 
coverage. 
Is a covered Employee or Qualif ied Beneficiary responsible for In forming the Plan Administ rator 
of the occurrence of a Qual i fy ing Event? In general, the Employer or Plan Administrator must 
delermine when a Qualifying Event has occurred. However, each covered Employee or Qualified 
Beneficiary Is responsible for notifying the Plan Administrator of the occurrence of a Qualifying Event that 
is: 
(I) A Dependent child's ceasing to be a Dependent child under the generally applicable 
requirements of the Plan. 
(ii) The divorce or legal separation of the covered Employee. 
The Plan Is not required to offer (he Qualified Beneficiary an opportunity to elect COBRA continuation 
coverage if the notice is not provided to the Plan Administrator within 60 days after the later of: the date of 
the Qualifying Event, or the date the Qualified Beneficiary would lose coverage on account of the 
Qualifying Event. 
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Is a waiver before the end of the elect ion period effective to end a qualif ied beneficiary s election 
r ights? If during the election period a Qualified Beneficiary waives COBRA continuation coverage the 
waiver can be revoked at any time before the end of the election period Revocation of the waiver Is an 
election of COBRA continuation coverage However If a waiver Is later revoked coverage need not be 
provided retroactively (that is from the date of the loss of coverage until the waiver Is revoked) Waivers 
and revocations of waivers are considered made on IhB date they are sent to the Employer or Plan 
Administralor as applicable 
When may a Qual i f ied Benef ic iary 's COBRA cont inuat ion coverage be terminated? During the 
election period a Qualified Beneficiary may waive COBRA continuation coverage Except for an 
interruption of coverage in connection with a waiver COBRA continuation coverage that has been elected 
for a Qualified Beneficiary must extend for at least the period beginning on the date of the Qualifying 
Event and ending not before the earliest of the following dates 
(I) The laat day of the applicable maximum coverage period 
(II) The first day for which Timely Payment is not made to the Plan with respect to the Qualified 
Beneficiary 
(ill) The date upon which the Employer ceases to provide any group health plan (Including 
successor plans) to any Employee 
(Iv) The date after the date of the election that the Qualified Beneficiary first becomes covered 
under any other Plan that does not contain any exclusion or limitation with respect to any 
pre existing condition other than such an exclusion or limitation that does not apply to or Is 
satisfied by the Qualified Beneficiary 
(v) The date after the date of the election that the Qualified Beneficiary first enrolls In the 
Medicare program (either part A or part B whichever occurs earlier) 
(vi) In the case of a Qualified Beneficiary entitled to a disability extension the later of 
(a) (1) 29 months after the date of the Qualifying Event or (II) the first day of Ihe month 
thai Is mare than 30 days after the date of a final determination under Title II or XVI of 
the Social Security Act that the disabled Qualified Beneficiary whose disability 
resulted in the Qualified Beneficiary s entitlement to the disability extension is no 
longer disabled, whichever is earlier or 
(b) the end of the maximum coverage period that applies lo the Qualified Beneficiary 
without regard to the disability extension 
The Plan can terminate for cause the coverage of a Qualified Beneficiary on the same basis that the Plan 
terminates for cause the coverage of similarly situated non COBRA beneficiaries for example for the 
submission of a fraudulent claim 
In Ihe case of an individual who is not a Qualified Beneficiary and who is receiving coverage under the 
Plan solely because of the Individual s relationship to a Qualified Beneficiary If the Plan s obligation lo 
make COBRA continuation coverage available to the Qualified Beneficiary ceases the Plan is not 
obligated to make coverage avaiiabte to the individual who is nol a Qualified Beneficiary 
What Is the max imum coverage per iods for COBRA cont inuat ion coverage? The maximum 
coverage periods are based on the type of the Qualifying Event and the status of the Qualified 
Beneficiary as shown below 
(1) In the case of a Qualifying Event that is a termination of employment or reduction of hours of 
employment the maximum coverage period ends 18 months after the Qualifying Even! if 
there is not a disability extension and 29 months after the Qualifying Event if there is a 
disability extension 
(ii) In the case of a covered Employee s enrollment in the Medicare program before experiencing 
a Qualifying Event that is a termination of employment or reduction of hours of employment 
Ihe maximum coverage period for Qualified Beneficiaries other than the covered Employee 
ends on the later of 
(a) 36 months after the dale the covered Employee becomes enrolled in Ihe Medicare 
program or 
(b) 18 months (or 29 months if there is a disability extension) after the date of the 
covered Employee s termination of employment or reduction of hours of employment 
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(HI) In the case of a bankruptcy Qualifying Event the maximum coverage period for a Qualified 
Beneficiary who is the retired covered Employee ends on the dale of the retired covered 
Employee s death The maximum coverage period for a Qualified Beneficiary who Is the 
Spouse surviving Spouse or Dependent child of the retired covered Employee ends on Ihe 
earlier of the date of the Qualified Beneficiary s death or the date lhat is 36 months after the 
death of the retired covered Employee 
(Iv) In the case of a Qualified Beneficiary who Is a child born to or placed for adoplion with a 
cohered Employee during a period oi COBRA continuation coverage, the maximum coverage 
period is the maximum coverage period applicable to the Qualifying Event giving rise lo the 
period of COBRA continuation coverage during which the child was born or placed for 
adoption 
(v) in Ihe case of any other Qualifying Event than that described above the maximum coverage 
period ends 36 months after Ihe Qualifying Event 
Under what c i rcumstances can the max imum coverage per iod be expanded? If a Qualifying Evenl 
that gives rise to an 18 month or 29 month maximum coverage period is followed within that 18 or 29 
month period by a second Qualifying Event that gives rise lo a 36 months maximum coverage period 
the original period Is expanded to 36 months but only for Individuals who are Qualified Beneficiaries at 
the time of both Qualifying Events in no circumstance can Ihe COBRA maximum coverage period be 
expanded to more than 36 months after the date of the first Qualifying Evenl 
How does a Qualif ied Beneficiary become entit led to a disabi l i ty extension? A disability extension 
will be granted if an individual (whether or not the covered Employee) who is a Qualified Beneficiary in 
connection with Ihe Qualifying Event that is a termination or reduction of hours of a covered Employee s 
employment is determined under Title II or XVI o( the Social Security Act to have been disabled al any 
time during the first 60 days of COBRA continuation coverage To qualify for the disability extension Hie 
Qualified Beneficiary must also provide the Plan Administrator with notice of the disability determination 
on a date that is both within 60 days after the date of the determination and before the end of the original 
18 month maximum coverage 
Can a Plan require payment for COBRA cont inuat ion coverage? Yes For any period of COBRA 
continuation coverage a Plan can require the payment of an amount that does not exceed 102°0 of the 
applicable premium except the Plan may require the payment of an amount that does not exceed 150% 
of the applicable premium for any period of COBRA continuation coverage covering a disabled qualified 
beneficiary lhat would not be required to be made available in the absence of a disability extension A 
group health plan can terminate a qualified beneficiary s COBRA continuation coverage as of the first day 
of any period for which timely payment Is not made to the Plan with respect to that qualified beneficiary 
Must the Plan allow payment for COBRA cont inuat ion coverage to be made in month ly 
Installments? Yes The Plan Is also permitted to allow for payment at other Intervals 
What Is Timely Payment for payment for COBRA cont inuat ion coverage? Timely Payment means 
payment lhat Is made to the Plan by the date that Is 30 days after the first day of that period Payment 
lhal is made to the Plan by a later dale Is also considered Timely Payment if either Under the terms of Ihe 
Plan covered Employees or Qualified Beneficiaries are allowed until lhat later dato lo pay for their 
coverage for the period or under the terms of an arrangement between the Employer and the entity that 
provides Plan benefits on the Employers behalf Ihe Employer is allowed until lhal later dale lo pay fo 
coverage of similarly situation non COBRA beneficiar es for Ihe period 
Notwithstanding the above paragraph a Plan cannot require payment for any period of COBRA 
conlmuation coverage for a Qualified Beneficiary earlier than 45 days after the date on which the electron 
of COBRA continuation coverage is made for that Qualified Beneficiary Payment is cons dered made on 
the date on which It is sent to the Plan 
Must a qualif ied beneficiary be given the right to enrol l In a convers ion health plan at the ond of 
tho maximum coverage period for COBRA cont inuat ion coverage? If a Qualified Beneficiary s 
COBRA continuation coverage under a group health plan ends as a result of the expiration of the 
applicable maximum coverage period the Plan must during the 180 day period that ends on lhat 
expiration date provide the Qualified Beneficiary with the option of enrolling under a conversion health 
plan if such an opDon is otherwise generally available to similarly situated non COBRA beneficiaries 
under the Plan If such a conversion option is nol otherwise generally available tl need not be made 
available to Qualified Beneficiaries 
Group Number 040191 LC 37 Loren Cook Company 
App.Add.000434 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PLAN ADMINISTRATION 
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR. Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan is the benefit plan of Loren 
Gook Company, the Plan Administrator, also called the Plan Sponsor. U Is to be administered by the Plan 
Administrator in accordance with the provisions of ERISA. An individual may be appointed by Loren Cook 
Company to be Plan Administrator and serve at the convenience of the Employer. If the Plan 
Administrator resigns, dies or is otherwise removed from the position, Loren Cook Company shall appoint 
a new Plan Administrator as soon as reasonably possible. 
The Plan Administrator shall administer this Plan in accordance with its terms and establish its policies, 
interpretations, practices, and procedures. It is the express intent of this Plan that the Plan Administrator 
shall have maximum legal discretionary authority to construe and interpret the terms and provisions of the 
Plan, to make determinations regarding issues which relate to eligibility for benefits, to decide disputes 
which may arise relative to a Plan Participant's rights, and !o decide questions of Plan interpretation and 
those of fact relating to the Plan. The decisions of the Plan Administrator will be final and binding on ail 
interested parties. 
Service of legal process may be made upon the Plan Administrator. 
DUTIES OF THE PLAN ADMINISTRATOR. 
(1) To administer the Plan in accordance with its terms. 
(2) To interpret the Plan, including the right to remedy possible ambiguities, Inconsistencies or 
omissions. 
(3) To decide disputes which may arise relative to a Plan Participant's rights. 
(A) To prescribe procedures for filing a claim for benefits and to review claim denials. 
(5) To keep and maintain the Plan documents and all other records pertaining to the Plan. 
(6) To appoint a Claims Supervisor to pay claims. 
(7) To perform all necessary reporting as required by ERISA. 
(8) To establish and communicate procedures to determine whether a medical child support 
order is qualified under ERISA Sec. 609. 
(9) To delegate to any person or entity such powers, duties and responsibilities as it deems 
appropriate. 
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR COMPENSATION. The Plan Administrator serves wi thout compensation; 
however, all expenses for plan administration, Including compensation for hired services, will be paid by 
the Plan. 
FIDUCIARY. A fiduciary exercises discretionary authority or control over management of the Plan or the 
disposition of its assets, renders Investment advice to the Plan or has discretionary authority or 
responsibility in the administration of the Plan. 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES. A fiduciary must carry out his or her duties and responsibilities for the purpose of 
providing benefits to the Employees and their Dependent(s), and defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the Plan. These are duties which must be carried out: 
(1) with care, skill, prudence and diligence under the given circumstances that a prudent person, 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters, would use In a similar situation; 
(2) by diversifying the investments of the Plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless 
under the circumstances it Is clearly prudent not to do so; and 
(3) in accordance with the Plan documents to the extent that they agree with ERISA. 
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THE NAMED FIDUCIARY. A "named fiduciary* is the one named In the Plan. A named fiduciary can 
appoint others to carry out fiduciary responsibilities (other than as a trustee) under the Plan. These other 
persons become fiduciaries themselves and are responsible for their acts under the Plan. To the extent 
that the named fiduciary allocates Its responsibility to other persons, the named fiduciary shall not be 
liable for any act or omission of such person unless either. 
(1) the named fiduciary has violated Its stated duties under ERISA in appointing the fiduciary, 
establishing the procedures to appoint the fiduciary or continuing either the appointment or 
the procedures; or 
(2) the named fiduciary breached its fiduciary responsibility under Section 405(a) of ERISA. 
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR IS NOT A FIDUCIARY. A Claims Supervisor Is not a fiduciary under the Plan by 
virtue of paying claims in accordance with the Plan's rules as established by the Plan Administrator. 
FUNDING THE PLAN AND PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
The cost of the Plan is funded as follows: 
For Employee and Dependent Coverage: Funding Is derived solely from the funds of the Employer. 
The level of any Employee contributions will be set by the Plan Administrator. These Employee 
contributions will be used in funding the cost of the Plan as soon as practicable after they have been 
received from the Employee or withheld from the Employee's pay through payroll deduction 
Benefits are paid directly from the Plan through the Claims Supervisor. 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
If this Plan is established under a Trust agreement, that agreement is made a part of the Plan. A copy of 
the appropriate agreement is available for examination by Employees and their Dependents) al the office 
of the Plan Adminislrator during normal business hours. Also, upon written request, the following items 
will be furnished to an Employee or Dependent. 
(1) A copy of the Trust agreement. 
(2) A complete list of employers and employee organizations sponsoring the Plan. 
Service of legal process may be made upon a Plan trustee. 
PLAN IS NOT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
The Plan is not to be construed as a contract for or of employment. 
CLERICAL ERROR 
Any clerical error by the Plan Administrator or an agent of the Plan Administrator In keeping pertinent 
records or a delay in making any changes will not Invalidate coverage otherwise validly in force or 
continue coverage validly terminated. An equitable adjustment of contributions will be made when the 
error or delay is discovered. 
If, due to a clerical error, an overpayment occurs in a Plan reimbursement amount, the Plan retains a 
contractual right to the overpayment. The person or Institution receiving the overpayment will be required 
to return the incorrect amount of money. In the case of a Plan Participant, if it is requested, the amount of 
overpaymenl will be deducted from future benefits payable. 
AMENDING AND TERMINATING THE PLAN 
If the Plan is terminated, the rights of the Plan Participants are limited to expenses incurred before 
termination. 
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The Employer Intends to maintain this Plan indefinitely, however H reserves the right, at any time, to 
amend, suspend or terminate the Plan in whole or in part This Includes amending the benefits under the 
Plan or the Trust agreement (ff any) 
MATERIAL MODIFICATIONS 
Material Modifications to the Plan will be provided to all Covered Persons within sixty (60) days following 
the effective date of the change 
CERTAIN EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER ERISA 
Plan Participants in this Plan are entitled to certain rights and protections under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) ERISA specifies that all Plan Participants shall be entitled to 
Examine, without charge at the Plan Administrator's office all Plan documents and 
copies of all documents filed by the Plan with the U S Department of Labor such as 
detailed annual reports and Plan descriptions 
Obtain copies of all Plan documents and other Plan information upon written request to 
the Plan Administrator The Plan Administrator may make a reasonable charge for the 
copies 
In addition to creating rights for Plan Participants ERISA Imposes obligations upon Ihe Individuals who 
are responsible for the operation of the Plan The individuals who operate the Plan called fiduciaries of 
the Plan have a duty to do so prudently and in the Interest of the Plan Participants and their beneficiaries 
No one including the Employer or any other person, may fire a Plan Participant or otherwise discriminate 
against a Plan Participant in any way to prevent the Plan Participant from obtaining benefits under the 
Plan or from exercising his or her rights under ERISA 
If a Plan Participant s claim for a benefit is denied In whole or In part, the Plan Participant must receive a 
written explanation of the reason for the denial The Plan Participant has the right to have the Plan review 
and reconsider the claim Under ERISA there are steps that the Plan Participant can take to enforce the 
above rights For instance if the Plan Participant requests materials from the Plan and does not receive 
them within 30 days, that person may file suit In federal court In such a case, the court may require the 
Plan Administrator to provide the materials and to pay the Plan Participant up to $110 a day until he or 
she receives the materials, unless the materials were not sent because of reasons beyond the control of 
the Plan Administrator if the Plan Participant has a claim for benefits which is denied or Ignored, in whole 
or in part that participant may file suit In state or federal court 
If it should happen lhat the Plan fiduciaries misuse the Plan's money or if a Plan Participant Is 
discriminated against for asserting his or her rights he or she mey seek assistance from the U S 
Department of Labor or may file suit In a federal court The court will decide who should pay court costs 
and legal fees If the Plan Participant is successful, the court may order »he person sued to pay these 
costs and fees If the Plan Participant loses the court may order him or her to pay these costs and fees 
for example if it finds lha claim or suit to be frivolous 
If the Plan Participant has any questions about the Plan, he or she should contact the Plan Administrator 
If the Plan Participant has any questions about this statement or his or her rights under ERISA or the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HlPAA), lhat Plan Participant should contact either 
the nearest area office of the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U S Department of Labor 
listed in the telephone directory or the Division of Technical Assistance and Inquires, Pension and 
Welfare Benefits Administration at 200 Constitution Avenue, N W , Washington, DC 20210 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration 
815 Olive Street Room 338 
St Louis, Missouri 63101 
(314)539 2691 
1100 Main, Suite 1200 
Kansas City Missouri 64105 
(816)426 5131 
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DEFINED TERMS 
The following terms have special meanings and when used in this Plan will be capitalized 
Active Employee is an Employee who Is on the regular payroll of the Employer and who is scheduled lo 
perform the duties of his or her job with the Employer on a full time basis 
Ambulatory Surgical Center is a licensed facility that is used mainly for performing outpatient surgery 
has a staff of Physicians has continuous Physician and nursing care by registered nurses (R N s) and 
does nol provide for overnight stays 
Birthing Center means any freestanding health facility place, professiona1 office or institution which is 
not a Hospital or In a Hospital, where births occur in a home like atmosphere This facility must be 
licensed and operated In accordance with the laws pertaining to Birthing Centers in the jurisdiction where 
Ihe facility is located 
The Birthing Center must provide facilities for obstetrical delivery and short term recovery after delivery 
provide care under the full time supervision of a Physician and either a registered nurse (R N ) or a 
licensed nurse-midwife, and have a written agreement with a Hospital in the same locality lor immediate 
acceptance of patients who develop complications or require pre or post delivery confinement 
Calendar Year means January 1st through December 31st of the same year 
COBRA means the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 as amended 
Company means Loren Cook Company 
Cosmetic Surgery means medically unnecessary surgical procedures, usually but not limited to, plastic 
surgery directed toward preserving beauty or correcting scars, burns or disfigurements 
Covered Person Is an Employee or Dependent who Is covered under this Plan 
Creditable Coverage shall have lhat definition contained In ERISA Section 701 (c) Under this provision, 
Creditable Coverage generally includes periods of coverage under an individual or group health plan 
(Including Medicare, Medicaid, governmental and church plans) that are not followed by a Significant 
Break In Coverage Creditable Coverage does not Include coverage for liability, dental, vision specified 
disease and/or other supplemental-type benefits The term "Significant Break In Coverage" means a 
period of 83 days or more withoul Creditable Coverage Periods of no coverage during an HMO affiliation 
period or Waiting Period shall not be taken into account for purposes of determining whether a Significant 
Break in Coverage has occurred 
Custodial Care Is care (Including room and board needed to provide that care) that Is given principally for 
personal hygiene or for assistance in daily activities and can, according to generally accepted medical 
standards, be performed by persons who have no medical training Examoles of Custodial Care are help 
in walking and getting out of bed, assistance in bathing dressing feeding or supervision over medication 
which could normally be self-admlnlstered 
Durable Medical Equipment means equipment which (a) can withstand repeated use, (b) is primarily 
and customarily used to serve a medical purpose (c) generally Is not useful to a person in the absence of 
an Illness or Injury and (d) Is appropriate for use In the home 
Employee means a person who Is an Active, regular Employee of the Employer, regularly scheduled to 
work for the Employer in an Employee/Employer relationship 
Employer Is Loren Cook Company 
Enrollment Date is the first day of coverage or, if there Is a Waiting Period, the first day of the Waiting 
Period 
ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 as amended 
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Experimental and/or Invest igat ional means services, supplies, care and irealmenl which does not 
constitute accepted medical practice properly within the range of appropriate medical practice under the 
standards of the case and by the standards of a reasonably substantial, qualified, responsible, relevant 
segment of the medical community or government oversight agencies at the time services were rendered. 
The Plan Administrator must make an independent evaluation of the experimental/nonexperimenlal-
standings of specific technologies. The Plan Administrator shall be guided by a reasonable interpretation 
of Plan provisions. The decisions shall be made in good faith and rendered following a detailed factual 
background investigation of the claim and the proposed treatment. The decision of the Plan Administrator 
will be final and binding on (he Plan. The Plan Administrator will be guided by the following principles. 
(1) If the drug or device cannot be lawfully marketed without approval of the U S Food and Drug 
Administration and approval for marketing has nol been given al the time the drug or device 
is furnished; or 
(2) if the drug, device, medical treatment or procedure, or the patient informed consent documenl 
utilized with the drug, device, treairnenl or procedure, was reviewed and approved by Ihe 
treating facility's Institutional Review Board or other body serving a similar function, or If 
federal law requires such review or approval; or 
(3) if reliable evidence shows that the drug, device, medical treatment or procedure is the subject 
of on-going phase I or phase II clinical trials, Is the research, experimental, study, or is 
otherwise under study to determine its maximum tolerated dose, its toxicity, its safety, its 
efficacy or its efficacy as compared with a siandard means of treatment or diagnosis; or 
(4) if reliable evidence shows that the prevailing opinion among experts regarding the drug, 
device, medical treatment or procedure is that further studies or clinical trials are necessary 
to determine its maximum tolerated dose, Its toxicity, its safety, its efficacy or its efficacy as 
compared with a standard means of treatment or diagnosis. 
Drugs are considered Experimental if they are not commercially available for purchase and/or they are 
nol approved by the Food and Drug Administration for general use. 
Family Unit is the covered Employee and the family members who are covered as Dependents under the 
Plan. | 
Genetic Informat ion means information about genes, gene products and Inherited characteristics that 
may derive from an individual or a family member. This includes information regarding carrier stalus and 
information derived from laboratory tests that identify mutations in specific genes or chromosomes, 
physical medical examinations, family histories and direct analysis of genes or chromosomes. 
Home Health Care Agency is an organization that meets all of these tests: its main function is to provide 
Home Health Care Services and Supplies: it is federally certified as a Home Health Care Agency; and it Is 
licensed by the state in which it is located, if licensing is required. 
Home Health Care Plan must meet these tests: It must be a formal written plan made by the patient's 
attending Physician which is reviewed at least every 30 days; it must state the diagnosis; It must certify 
that the Home Health Care is in place of Hospital confinement; and it must specify the type and extent of 
Home Health Care required for the treatment of the patient. 
Home Health Care Services and Suppl ies include: part-time or intermittent nursing care by or under the 
supervision of a registered nurse (R.N.); part-time or Intermittent home health aide services provided 
through a Home Health Care Agency (this does not include general housekeeping services); physical, 
occupational and speech therapy; medical supplies, and laboratory services by or on behalf of the 
Hospital. 
Hospice Agency Is an organization where its main function Is to provide Hospice Care Services and 
Supplies and it is licensed by the state in which It is located, if licensing is required. 
Hospice Care Plan is a plan of terminal patient care that is established and conducted by a Hospice 
Agency and supervised by a Physician. 
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The definition of "Hospital" shall be expanded to include the following: 
A facility operating legally as a psychiatric Hospital or residential treatment facility for menial 
health and licensed as such by the state in which Ihe facility operates. 
A facility operating primarily for the treatment of Substance Abuse If It meets these tests-
maintains permanent and full-time facilities for bed care and full-time confinement of at least 
15 resident patients; has a Physician in regular attendance; continuously provides 24-hour a 
day nursing service by a registered nurse (R.N.); has a full-time psychiatrist or psychologist 
on he staff; and is primarily engaged In providing diagnostic and therapeutic services and 
facilities for treatment of Substance Abuse. 
Illness means a bodily disorder, disease, physical sickness or Mental Disorder. Illness includes 
Pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage or Complications of Pregnancy. 
Injury means an accidental physical Injury to Ihe body caused by unexpected external means. 
Intensive Care Unit is defined as a separate, clearly designated service area which is maintained within 
a Hospital solely for the care and treatment of patients who are critically ill. This also includes what is 
referred to as a "coronary care unit" or an "acute care unit." It has: facilities for special nursinq care not 
available in regular rooms and wards of the Hospital; special life saving equipment which is immediately 
available at all times; at least two beds for the accommodation of the critically ill; and at least one 
registered nurse (R.N.) in continuous and constant attendance 24 hours a day. 
Late Enrolls© means a Plan Participant who enrolis under the Plan other than during the first 30-dav 
period in which the individual is eligible lo enroll under the Plan or during a SpeclaJ Enrollment Period. 
Logal Guardian means a person recognized by a court of law as having the duty of taking care of the 
person and managing the property and rights of a minor child. 
Lifetime is a word that appears In this Plan In reference to benefit maximums and limitations Lifetime is 
understood lo mean while covered under this Plan. Under no circumstances does Lifetime mean during 
the lifetime of the Covered Person. * 
^nltTlCarQ F i c " r? m S a n S 8 H o s P | l a l ' a f a c i , i | y t h a l l r e a t s one or more specific ailments or any type of Skilled Nursing Facility. 7 7 K 
Medical Emergency means a sudden onset of a condition with acute symptoms requiring immediate 
medical care and includes such conditions as heart attacks, cardiovascular accidents, poisonmqs loss of 
consciousness or respiration, convulsions or other such acute medical conditions. 
In addition, Medical Emergency includes a mental health or chemical dependency condition when the 
S 2 / « £ t r e a t m e n t c o u , d reasonably be expected to result in the patient harming himself or herself 
ana/or omer persons. 
Medically Necessary care and treatment is recommended or approved by a Physician; is consistent with 
the palient s cond.tion or accepled standards of good medical practice; is medically proven to be effective 
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treatment of the condition; is not performed mainly for the convenience of the patient or provider of 
medical services; Is not conducted for research purposes; and is the most appropriate level of services 
which can be safely provided to the patient. 
All of these criteria must be met; merely because a Physician recommends or approves certain care does 
not mean that It Is Medically Necessary. 
The Plan Administrator has the discretionary authority to decide whether care or treatment is Medically 
Necessary, 
Medicare is the Health Insurance For The Aged and Disabled program under Title XVU1 of the Social 
Security Act, as amended. 
Mental Disorder means any disease or condition, regardless of whether the cause is organic, that Is 
classified as a Mental Disorder in the current edition of International Classification of Diseases, published 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services or Is listed in the current edition of Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association. 
Morbid Obesity is a diagnosed condition In which the body weight exceeds the medically recommended 
weight by either 100 pounds or more over normal weight (by insurance underwriting standards) for at 
least five (5) years for a person of the same height, age and mobility as the Covered Person, despite 
documented unsuccessful attempts to reduce weight under a Physician-monitored diet and exercise 
program. 
Network Providers are providers within the Primrose Healthcare Services, Inc., network of Hospitals, 
clinics. Physicians and other health care providers who have agreed contractually to provide services at 
prices better than those provided by non-network providers. Benefit payments to Network Providers are 
paid at a higher percentage. (Refer to the Schedule of Benefits). 
No-Fault Auto Insurance is the basic reparations provision of a law providing for payments without 
determining fault in connection with automobile accidents. 
Nonresident ial Treatment Facil i ty is a facility'that can provide medical and other services for the 
treatment of Substance Abuse to Individuals who do not require inpatient status and are free from acute 
physical and mental complications. The facility must maintain an organized program of treatment that 
may be limited to less than 12 hours per day and not be available 7 days a week. The facility must be 
certified by the Department of Mental Health for treatment of Mental Disorder or Substance Abuse. 
Outpatient Care Is treatment including services, supplies and medicines provided and used at a Hospital 
under the direction of a Physician to a person not admitted as a registered bed patient; or services 
rendered In a PhynWAnn'n office, laborotory or X-my facility, en Ambulnlory Surgical Conlor, or iho 
patient's home. 
Physician means a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.), Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.), Doctor of Dental Surgery 
(D.D.S.), Doctor of Podiatry (D.P.M.). Doctor of Chiropractic (D.C.). Audiologist, Certified Nurse 
Anesthetist, Licensed Professional Counselor, Licensed Professional Physical Therapist, Midwife, 
Occupational Therapist, Optometrist (O.D.), Physiotherapist, Psychiatrist, Psychologist (Ph.D.), Speech 
Language Pathologist and any other practitioner of the healing arts who is licensed and regulated by a 
state or federal agency and is acting within the scope of his or her license. 
Plan means Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan, which is a benefits plan for certain 
employees and stockholders of Loren Cook Company and Is described in this document. * 
Plan Part icipant is any Employee or Dependent who is covered under this Plan. 
Plan Year is the 12-month period beginning on either the effective date of the Plan or on the day 
following ihe end of the first Plan Year which Is a short Plan Year. 
A Pre-Exist ing Condi t ion is a condition for which medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment was 
recommended or received within six months of the person's Enrollment Date under this Plan. Genetic 
Information and short-term episodic Illnesses such as colds, flu, sore throat, upset stomach, headache, 
ear ache, etc., will not be considered in regards to Pre-Existing Conditions. Treatment includes receiving 
services and supplies, consultations, diagnostic tests or prescribed medicines. In order to be taken into 
Group Number 040191LC 44 Loren Cook Company 
account, the medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment must have been recommended by, or received 
from, a Physician. 
The Pre-Existing Condition does not apply to pregnancy, a newborn child or a child adopted by, placed 
for adoption with or placed under Legal Guardianship of the Employee. The child must be enrolled under 
this Plan within 30 days of the Special Enrollment event in order for the Pre-Existing Condition Provision 
to be waived. The child must be adopted, placed for adoption or Legal Guardianship before attaining age 
18. 
When reviewing Creditable Coverage, any time preceding the first 63-day period for which ihe Individual 
does not have coverage ("Significant Break In Coverage") under a health plan will not be counted to 
reduce the Pre-Existing Condition exclusion period. Wailing Periods will not count as a break in 
coverage. This break in coverage rule applies to all Individuals including a newborn, adopted, pre-
adopted child or a child placed under Legal Guardianship of the Employee. (Refer to the definition of 
Creditable Coverage.) 
Pregnancy is childbirth and conditions associated with Pregnancy, including complications. 
Prescription Drug means any of the following: a Food and Drug Administration-approved drug or 
medicine which, under federal law, is required to bear the legend: "Caution: federal law prohibits 
dispensing without prescription"; Injectable Insulin; hypodermic needles or syringes, but only when 
dispensed upon a written prescription of a licensed Physician. Such drug must be Medically Necessary in 
the treatment of a Sickness or Injury. Birth control pills are not a covered expense under this Plan except 
if deemed Medically Necessary. 
Residential Treatment Facil i ty Is a facility that can provide medical and other services for the treatment 
of Substance Abuse to patients on an Inpatient basis who are free from acute physical and mental 
complications. The facility must operate on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a week under an organized program. 
The facility must be certified by the Department of Mental Health for treatment of Mental Disorder or 
Substance Abuse. 
Sickness is: 
For all persons but a covered Dependent daughter. Illness, disease or Pregnancy. 
For a covered Dependent daughter: Illness or disease, not Including Pregnancy or Its complications. 
Skilled Nursing Facil i ty is a facility that fully meets all of these tests: 
(1) II is licensed to provide professional nursing services on an inpatient basis to persons 
oouvuloaclng l ium Injuiy or Sickness. Tho autvlco nuiyl bo IUIKIOUKI by n funMoiqd nuisu 
(R N.) or by a licensed practical nurse (L.P.N.) under Ihe direction of a registered nurse. 
Services to help restore patients to self-care in essential daily living activities must be 
provided. 
(2) Its services are provided for compensation and under the full-time supervision of a Physician. 
(3) It provides 24 hour per day nursing services by licensed nurses, under the direction of a 
full-time registered nurse. 
(4) It maintains a complete medical record on each patient. 
(5) It has an effective utilization review plan. 
(6) It Is not, other than incidentally, a place for rest, the aged, drug addicls, alcoholics, mental 
retardates, Custodial or educational care or care of Mental Disorders. 
(7) It is approved and licensed by Medicare. 
This term also applies to charges incurred in a facifity referring to itself as an extended care facility, sub-
acute unit, rehabilitation hospital or any other similar nomenclature. 
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Spinal Manipulat ion/Chiropract ic Care means skeletal adjustments, manipulation or other treatment in 
connection with the detection and correction by manual or mechanical means of structural imbalance or 
subluxation In the human body. Such treatment la done by a physician to remove nerve Interference 
resulting from, or related to, distortion, misalignment or subluxation of, or In, the vertebral column, 
Substance Abuso is regular excessive compulsive drinking of alcohol and/or physical habitual 
dependence on drugs. This does not include dependence on tobacco and ordinary caffeine-containing 
drinks. 
Temporomandibular Jo in (TMJ) syndrome and jaw joint disorders include conditions of structures 
Unking the jaw bone and skull and the complex of muscles, nerves and other tissues related to the 
temporomandibular joint. 
Total Disabi l i ty {Totally Disabled) means: In the case of an Active Employee, the complete inability to 
perform any and every duty of his or her occupation or of a similar occupation for which the person is 
reasonably capable due to education and training, as a result of Injury or Sickness. 
In the case of a Dependent Child, the complete Inability as a result of Injury or Sickness to perform the 
normal activities of a person of like age and sex in good health, 
Usual and Reasonable Charge is a charge which is not higher than the usual charge made by IhB 
provider of the care or supply and does not exceed the usual charge made by most providers of like 
service in Uie same area. This test will consider the nature and severity of the condition being treated. It 
will also consider medical complications or unusual circumstances that require more time, skill or 
experience. 
The Plan will reimburse the actual charge billed if It Is less than the Usual and Reasonable Charge. 
The Plan Administrator has the discretionary authority to decide whether a charge Is Usual and 
Reasonable. 
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GENERAL PLAN INFORMATION 
TYPE OF ADMINISTRATION 
The Plan is a self-funded health and disability plan and the administration is provided through a third 
party Clafms Administrator. The funding for the benefits is derived from the funds of the Employer and 
contributions made by covered Employees, If any, as required by the Plan. The Company Insures claims 
for specific and/or aggregate "Stop-Loss" ciaim reimbursement through a re-Insurance contract. 
PLAN NAME 
Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
PLAN NUMBER: 501 
GROUP NUMBER: 040191LC 
TAX ID NUMBER: 34-0673236 
PLAN EFFECTIVE DATE: April 1, 1991 
PLAN YEAR ENDS: March 31st 
EMPLOYER INFORMATION 
Loren Cook Company 
2015 East Dale Street 
Springfield, Missouri 65803 
(417)869-6474 
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR & TRUSTEE(S) 
Executive Vice President/Secretary 
Loren Cook Company 
2015 East Dale Street 
Springfield, Missouri 65803 
(417)869-6474 
NAMED FIDUCIARY & AGENT FOR SERVICE OF LEOAL PROCESS 
Loren Cook Company 
2015 East Dale Street 
Springfield, Missouri 65803 
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR 
Med-Pay. Inc. 
PO Box 10909 
Springfield, Missouri 65808 
(417) 886-6886 or (800) 777-9087 
Group Number 040191LC 47 Loren Cook Company 
App.Add.000439 
BY THIS AGREEMENT, Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan is hereby adopted as shown. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument is executed for Loren Cook Company on or as of Ihe day and 
year first below written 
By y^Uju^ {/ 
Loren Cook Company , 
Date April 1. 2000 
Date April 1. 2000 
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Brian S.King, #4610 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAID, individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAE), 
f/k/a ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA 
US HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN 
PRODUCTS NEW YORK MEDICAL 
BENEFITS PLAN and 
LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendants/ 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT LOREN COOK 
COMPANY HEALTH CARE BENEFIT 
PLAN'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
The Plaintiffs Robert and Sue Quaid ("the Quaids"), through their undersigned counsel, 
submit this Memorandum in Opposition to the Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan's 
("the Loren Cook Plan") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH GENUINE ISSUES EXIST 
The Quaids do not dispute the information contained in the Loren Cook Plan's Statement 
of Material Facts, except to the extent that some of those facts are of limited relevance to the 
matter at hand and at times do not provide a complete picture of the document or testimony being 
excerpted. As to the issues before the Court regarding liability between the parties, the facts are 
essentially undisputed. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE QUAIDS ARE NOT RELYING ON UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
STATUTES AS PART OF THEIR CLAIM 
The Loren Cook Plan starts by arguing that any reliance by the Quaids on Utah state 
insurance code and its provisions regarding coverage for adopted children are not applicable to 
this case. For purposes of this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Quaids agree. In their 
own cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Quaids do not rely on the provisions of the 
Utah state insurance code to establish the Loren Cook Plan's liability for Skylar Quaid's 
("Skylar") medical expenses. 
II THE LOREN COOK PLAN IS RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE PRIMARY 
COVERAGE FOR SKYLAR'S MEDICAL EXPENSES BECAUSE NO 
COVERAGE WAS AVAILABLE FOR SKYLAR UNDER THE AETNA PLAN 
The remaining argument from the Loren Cook Plan is that its plan document has a 
"coordination of benefits" ("COB") provision that requires the Loren Cook Plan to provide 
secondary coverage to the Aetna Plan in this case and that the Loren Cook Plan has no obligation 
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to pay anything for Skylar's medical expenses. The Quaids agree that Loren Cook's COB clause 
clearly states that if Skylar has primary coverage through the Aetna HMO and chooses not to use 
that HMO for the medical services available to him, then medical expenses incurred from 
providers outside the HMO will not be eligible for coverage. The problem for the Loren Cook 
Plan is that there simply was no coverage under the Aetna Plan once Skylar's birth parents 
relinquished their rights and obligations in November of 1999 and Skylar was placed for 
adoption with the Quaids. 
The Loren Cook Plan argues on p. 16 of its Memorandum that "there is no dispute that 
Skylar Quaid was eligible for twelve additional months of additional benefits" under the Aetna 
Plan. However, this is not undisputed. It is a key dispute in the case. 
Skylar was not eligible for any additional benefits under the Aetna Plan once he was 
placed for adoption for two separate and independent reasons. First, he was not a "covered 
dependent" under the terms of the Aetna Plan and was therefore not entitled to any coverage 
under that Plan. This argument is outlined in greater detail on pp. 14-16 of the Quaids' own 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated June 3, 2005. The 
Quaids will not repeat that argument here, other than to state that the Aetna Plan specifically and 
explicitly states that only "subscribers" or "covered dependents" of the Aetna Plan, as these 
terms are defined, are entitled to coverage under that HMO. At the time Skylar's birth parents 
placed him for adoption on November 19, 1999, the relationship between Skylar and his birth 
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parents was severed. Skylar ceased to be a dependent of his birth parents under the Aetna Plan at 
that time. This is made clear by the fact that there was no legal obligation on the part of Skylar's 
birth parents or Skylar himself to pay for any of Skylar's medical services once he was placed for 
adoption. The Aetna Plan specifically excludes from coverage any expenses incurred by Skylar 
or his birth parents for which he or they are "not legally obligated to pay in the absence of this 
coverage." Aetna Plan, Exhibit A, attached to the Quaids' Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 21. These terms of the Aetna Plan make clear that Skylar had 
no coverage whatsoever under the Aetna Plan after November 19, 1999. 
The second and independent reason that Skylar had no right to benefits under the Aetna 
Plan was because neither his birth parents nor the Quaids ever paid any premium to obtain the 
twelve month extension of benefits supposedly available under the Aetna Plan. The terms of the 
Aetna Plan are explicit and unambiguous in stating that in order to obtain the twelve month 
"extension of benefits," premium must be paid for that coverage. Aetna Plan, p. 28. The Aetna 
Plan specifically states that the fact Skylar was disabled does not waive the obligation to pay 
premium for the twelve month extension of benefits period. 
Because there was no coverage in place for Skylar under the Aetna Plan, the Loren Cook 
Plan's argument that it was secondary to Aetna is untenable. 
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Ill REGARDLESS OF THE POTENTIAL FOR COVERAGE UNDER THE AETNA 
PLAN, UNDER THE FEDERAL COBRA STATUTE, THE LOREN COOK PLAN 
IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE PRIMARY COVERAGE FOR SKYLAR'S 
MEDICAL EXPENSES 
The COBRA statute incorporated into the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 ("ERISA") is found at 29 U.S.C. §1169(c). The terms of that statute require that the Loren 
Cook Plan provide primary coverage for Skylar's medical care under the facts of this case. 
29 U.S.C. § 1169(c) states: 
Group health plan coverage of dependent children in cases of 
adoption. 
(1) Coverage effective upon placement for adoption. In any 
case in which a group health plan provides coverage for 
dependent children of participants or beneficiaries, such 
plan shall provide benefits to dependent children placed 
with participants or beneficiaries for adoption under the 
same terms and conditions as apply in the case of 
dependent children who are natural children of participants 
or beneficiaries under the Loren Cook Plan, irrespective of Q 
whether the adoption has become final. 
(2) Restrictions based on preexisting conditions at time of yS 
placement for adoption prohibited. A group health plau*>^ 
may not restrict coverage under the Loren Cook Plan oTany 
dependent child adopted by a participant or beneficiary, or 
placed with a participant or beneficiary for adoption, solely 
on the basis of a preexisting condition of such child at the 
time that such child would otherwise b\ 
coverage under the Loren Cook Plan, if tihe~ adoption or 
placement for adoption occurs while the participant or 
beneficiary is eligible for coverage under the Loren Cook 
Plan. 
VP^f 
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(3) Definitions. For purposes ot this subsection -
(A) Child. The term "child" means, in connection 
with any adoption, or placement for adoption, of the 
child, an individual who has not attained age 18 as 
of the date of such adoption or placement for 
adoption. 
(B) Placement for adoption. The term "placement", 
or being "placed", for adoption, in connection with 
any placement for adoption of a child with any 
person, means the assumption and retention by such 
person of a legal obligation for total or partial 
support of such child in anticipation of adoption of 
such child. The child's placement with such person 
terminates upon the termination of such legal 
obligation. 
To the extent the Loren Cook Plan contains language that allows it to look to insurance 
that was in place under the adopted child's birth parents' coverage, 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) overrides 
and nullifies that language. So long as Skylar's siblings in his adopted family are not entitled to 
coverage under the Aetna Plan to the same degree as Skylar supposedly had, the Loren Cook 
Plan is not in a position to impose restrictions or limitations on its coverage of Skylar. 
The hypothetical Loren Cook Plan poses on p. 18 of its Memorandum actually clarifies 
this point - in the Quaids' favor. The Loren Cook Plan's hypothetical states: "Further assume 
that at the time of his birth, Mrs. Quaid was employed by a company that provided HMO 
coverage for the Quaid family, including all of the children natural or adopted." In fact, the 
Aetna Plan was in place only for Skylar and did not include coverage for any of the other Quaid 
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children. As such, the hypothetical does not reflect the facts of this case. The Loren Cook Plan 
simply cannot say that it is attempting to treat Skylar's medical expenses the same as medical 
expenses that would have arisen at Primary Children's Medical Center for one of Skylar's 
adoptive siblings. 
The critical assumption, both in 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) and in the Loren Cook Plan 
hypothetical, is that all children of the Quaids are on equal footing and are treated the same by 
the Loren Cook Plan. However, the interpretation of 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) argued by the Loren 
Cook Plan specifically places Skylar and his medical expenses on a different and more limited 
basis than if one of Skylar's adoptive siblings was being treated at PCMC at the same time for 
the same condition as Skylar. That discrepancy between coverages is precisely what Congress 
was seeking to eliminate when it passed 29 U.S.C. §1169(c). 
Unfortunately, the legislative history associated with 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) is sparse. The 
Quaids' counsel have found nothing that sheds additional light on the language of the statute, 
Congressional purpose behind that language, or any case law that has interpreted the language at 
issue in this case since this provision of COBRA, as implemented in ERISA, was enacted. 
However, the language of the statute itself is straightforward and under the facts of this case 
should be applied to resolve the legal issue before the Court and in the Quaids' favor. 
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IV THE LOREN COOK PLAN'S INTERPRETATION OF 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) 
VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY 
As outlined at pp. 20-22 of the Quaids' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, public policy considerations require that the Loren Cook Plan's 
arguments be denied. The adverse economic affect on families such as the Quaids, who are 
willing to adopt children with disabilities, could be significant if the Court rules in favor of the 
Loren Cook Plan. Nothing would prevent every self-funded plan in the country from utilizing 
the loophole the Loren Cook Plan urges this Court to adopt as a way of limiting their liability for 
paying medical expenses of disabled adopted children. The COBRA statute should be 
interpreted in a way that protects these vulnerable disabled individuals and their adoptive parents 
from large medical expenses for which the adoptive parents may be personally responsible but 
have no coverage. 
Finally, the taxpayers of Utah should not be left with paying the bill for Skylar's care. 
The attempt of the Loren Cook Plan to shift these costs to the taxpayer should not be allowed in 
this case. 
DATED this day of June, 2005. 
By: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the preceding document has been delivered 
via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gary L. Johnson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
DATED this day of June, 2005. 
App. 
GARY L. JOHNSON-[4353] 
MARTHA KNUDSON [8512] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAE), individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAE), f/k/a 
ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA US 
HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN PRODUCTS 
NEW YORK MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN 
and LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Defendant Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan (hereinafter "Loren 
Cook Plan"), by and through its counsel of record, Gary L. Johnson and Martha Knudson of 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, respectfully submit the following Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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COJO^ESTEDJSSUESXMBLEACI 
The Loren Cook Plan responds to plaintiffs' statement of undisputed material 
facts as follows: 
1. Admits. 
2. Admits. 
3. Admits. 
4. Admits. 
5. Admits. 
6. Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph. Paragraph 6 states: 
The Aetna Plan also excludes payment for expenses incurred by a 
Member which he or she "is not legally obligated to pay in the 
absence of this coverage." Aetna Plan, Exhibit A, p. 21. 
This is an incomplete recitation of the language in the Aetna Plan and on that basis, it is disputed. 
The language referred to above comes from the Exclusions section of the Aetna Plan. This 
section begins by stating: "The following are not Covered Benefits except as described in the 
Covered Benefits section of this Certificate or by a rider attached to this Certificate:. . . Services 
for which a Member is not legally obligated to pay in the absence of this coverage." 
7. Admits. 
8. Admits. 
A n n Arlr l 0 0 0 4 5 1 
-9, The Loren Cook Plan contests ihe second-sentence of this paragraph, 
Paragraph 9 states: 
Sue flew to New York and completed the paperwork necessary to 
adopt Skylar on November 14, 1999. Quaid Depo., pp. 15:23 -
16:6. The Cohens, Skylar's birth parents, terminated all their 
parental rights at this time. Quaid Depo., p. 17:10 - 20. 
No admissible evidence is submitted in support of this assertion. Sue Quaid's subjective belief 
about this legal conclusion is not admissible evidence and no documentation with respect to the 
termination of parental rights was submitted to this Court, in an admissible form or otherwise. 
10. Admits. 
11. The Loren Cook plan contests the last sentence of this paragraph. 
Paragraph 11 states: 
Sue contacted the Loren Cook Company ("Loren Cook"), her 
husband's employer, while she was in New York. The Loren Cook 
Plan provided health benefits for the Quaids and their dependant 
children. A copy of the Loren Cook Plan is attached as Exhibit C. 
The Loren Cook Plan told Sue that as of the date that Skylar was 
placed with the Quaids for adoption, November 14, 1999, the Plan 
would provide coverage for him. Quaid Depo., pp. 25:11 - 26:19. 
The Med-Pay (the third party administrator for the Loren Cook Plan) Case Management Notes 
for Skylar Quaid indicate that on December 3, 1999, Med-Pay received a call not from Sue 
Quaid, but from "Sandi w-tlc adoption agency." It was the individual from the adoption agency 
who informed Med-Pay that the Quaids were adopting another special needs child who was in a 
New York state hospital. Sandi was specifically advised by Med-Pay that it was unable to take 
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any actionavith-respecUGUh^^ 
Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.) 
Bob Quaid did not fill out and submit an enrollment change form to add Skylar Quaid to his 
coverage until December 3, 1999. (Robert Quaid deposition, p. 7,11. 14-25.) Further, Sue Quaid 
was told by Med-Pay on December 9,1999, that coverage was not the issue, but rather that the 
coordination of benefits and primary payor issue with Aetna needed to be decided. (See, Exhibit 
19 supra.) 
12. Admits. 
13. The Loren Cook Plan disputes the second sentence in this paragraph. 
Paragraph 13 states: 
The Aetna Plan paid the expenses of transferring Skylar from 
Schneiders to PCMC and informed Sue that no additional coverage 
for Skylar was available. The reason Aetna gave Sue for its 
position was that no benefits were available for medical care unless 
it was provided through HMO providers contracted with Aetna in 
the New York Metropolitan area. Quaid Depo., pp. 31:20 - 32:6. 
Susan Quaid was specifically asked the following question and gave the following answer: 
Q. Did Aetna tell you at that time that once they took Skylar and 
transported him outside their network to Utah, that they would no 
longer pay for any of his medical care? 
A. They didn't' use the word network. All they did is say, you 
know, the transport was the end of their coverage. 
(Sue Quaid deposition, p. 31,11. 20-25, p. 32,1. 1.) 
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14, AdmitSL 
15. Admits. 
16. Admits. 
17. Admits. 
18. Admits. 
19. Admits. 
20. The Loren Cook Plan admits only the first sentence of this paragraph and 
contests the remainder of the Paragraph. Paragraph 20 states: 
After Skylar's transfer and admission to PCMC, bills for his 
medical care were submitted by his various health care providers to 
the Loren Cook Plan. The claims were denied "pending for 
explanation of benefits from Atnea [sic]." A copy of a 
representative Explanation of Benefits ("EOB") from the Loren 
Cook Plan is attached as Exhibit E. 
The Loren Cook Plan contests the remainder of paragraph 20 because there is no foundation for 
the document attached as Exhibit E and there is no testimony concerning whether this document 
is representative of the explanation of benefits that were sent out. 
21. The Loren Cook Plan disputes this Paragraph. Paragraph 21 states: 
When the claims were submitted to the Aetna Plan, EOBs were 
issued denying the claims, stating: "Member was not effective at 
the time of the service. Member is responsible for these charges." 
A copy of a representative EOB from the Aetna Plan is attached as 
Exhibit F. 
App.Add.000454 
Thereis no-foundation provided forihe document attached .asJBxhibii E. There is-no 
foundational testimony that the document attached as Exhibit F is "a representative EOB" 
concerning Skylar Quaid and the document is not admissible. 
22. Admits. 
23. Admits. 
24. Admits. 
25. The Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph. Paragraph 25 states: 
The Aetna Plan changed its position in a letter dated July 24, 2000, 
in which it stated that Skylar would have been eligible for 
continued coverage under the Aetna Plan had he remained in New 
York and utilized the services of the HMO in-network providers. 
Exhibit G, Bates stamped p. AH000024; Aetna letter dated 
November 10, 2000, Bates stamped pp. 000089-90. 
The putative position changed by Aetna is set forth in Paragraph No. 24 of plaintiffs' Statement 
of Facts. There, plaintiffs assert that Aetna "was unequivocal in stating that Skylar's coverage 
under the Aetna Plan ended with the transfer of coverage." That assertion, however, is not 
inconsistent with the position set forth in Aetna's letter date July 24, 2000. Aetna has 
maintained, and James Brown has testified, that the Aetna Plan does not provide coverage for 
medical expenses incurred out-of-network. Further, it is Aetna's position, and James Brown 
testified that Aetna would have extended benefits to Skylar Quaid for an additional 12 months 
had the Quaids elected to utilize the services of the Aetna Plan in-network providers. The 
Quaids chose to bring Skylar to Utah, however, thus providing Aetna with an excuse to not pay 
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for any medical ^ ervices,-even4hough James Brown testified thathad-the Quaids returned Skylar 
to the Aetna network within the following 12 months, coverage would have been provided to 
him. See, James Brown deposition, p. 33,11. 9-25, p. 34,11. 1-5. 
26. The Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph. Paragraph 26 states: 
HCC wrote on September 6, 2001, to Gregory Hawkins 
("Hawkins"), the Quaids' attorney and supported Med-Pay's 
position that there was coverage available for Skylar from both the 
Loren Cook Plan and the Aetna Plan and that, given the Loren 
Cook Plan's COB language, the Aetna Plan was the primary payor. 
Exhibit G, Bates stamped pp. 000102 - 103. 
The Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph because there is no foundation for this document, 
and even if foundation were provided, it is hearsay and inadmissible. 
27. The Loren Cook Plan disputes this Paragraph. Paragraph 27 states: 
HCC's position was not always so firm. On February 22, 2001, in 
a memo from Suzi Johnson ("Johnson") at HCC to Godown at 
Med-Pay, HCC stated: 
Leslie [Leslie Shuntay [sic] HCC Benefits corporate 
attorney out of Houston] advised she believed that once the 
child left the facility covered by the birth parent that the 
adoptive parents' coverage would take over. As it would 
be deemed as placement of the child. 
I believe we do have liability. 
Godown Depo., p. 49:5-18; Exhibit G, Bates stamped p. LC00045. 
App.Add.000456 
TheXoren Coot Elan contests paragraph 27 becauseit is anincomplete statement_and, therefore, 
is misleading. Specifically, Ms. Godown was asked the following question and gave the 
following answer with respect to the portion of the e-mail quoted above: 
Q. . . . Okay. Now, tell me what you recall, if 
anything, about this e-mail that you received from 
Suzi Johnson. This is the e-mail that says, "Leslie" 
and then in brackets says Leslie Shuntay HCC 
Benefits corporate attorney out of Houston," end of 
bracket - quoted by she believed that once the child 
left the facility covered by the birth parent, that the 
adoptive parents' coverage would take over. As it 
would be deemed as placement of the child, I 
believe we do have liability. Suzie." Tell me what 
you recall about that. 
A. Leslie was brought in as a - to give an opinion, and 
that was her response to the initial request for 
information. She didn't have all the information in 
front of her. 
Q. Do you recall that Leslie later changed her opinion 
about this? 
A. Yes, we asked her to re - to actually look at all the 
paperwork, including the - what Aetna's status was 
as an HMO and their plan language. 
Godown deposition, p. 49,11. 5-23 (emphasis added). 
28. The Loren Cook Company disputes this paragraph. Paragraph 28 states: 
In addition, the Loren Cook Plan informed its stop loss carrier of 
the potential for ultimate payment of Skylar's expenses. In an e-
mail dated March 2, 2001, from Johnson to Godown, Johnson 
informed her: 
8 
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Dojnngxjiir^ony^r^ation^^dyisedj^e-ha^e-set 
reserves on this case pending the outcome. This 
will ensure if liability is not determined by the 
expiration date of the contract and legally we are 
found to have liability, we have record of 
notification and also have set the reserves to advise 
carrier and reinsurers of the potential. 
Godown Depo. pp. 50:14-51:10; Exhibit G, Bates stamped p. 
MP000012. 
Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph because it is incomplete and, therefore, misleading. 
Ms. Godown, at page 50 of her deposition, clarified that this communication referred to the fact 
that while the Loren Cook Plan "didn't feel that there was liability, because the potential may be 
there for those claims incurred in 1999 - 2000, that we were able to negotiate with them [HCC], 
that even though the claims may not get paid within the plan year, that they would still make 
allowance for reimbursement to the Plan should it be subsequently determined that the Plan had 
primary liability for the claims." Godown deposition, p. 50,11. 20 - 25, p. 51,11. 1 - 2. 
29. Admits. 
30. Admits. 
31. The Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph. Paragraph 31 states: 
In addition, Mr. Brown testified that the 12-month extension of 
benefits from the Aetna Plan was not dependent on premiums 
being paid for that extension of benefits. Brown Depo., pp. 36:11 
- 14. However, this was erroneous. In fact, the unambiguous 
language of the Aetna Plan did require payment of premium to 
obtain any extension of benefits. See, % 6, above. The Quaids 
never paid any premium to Aetna for coverage under the Aetna 
Plan after Skylar came to Utah. 
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TheXoren-Cook Plan contests-this paragraph-because.itisincomplete_and_does_aot_set ihrthMr. 
Brown's testimony accurately concerning this issue. Mr. Brown's testimony sets forth clearly 
Aetna's position that no additional premium would have had to have been paid on behalf of 
Skylar Quaid in order for Aetna to have extended him 12 months of additional benefits: 
Q. Do you know whether premium was paid for 
Zachary Cohen, thereafter Skylar Quaid, after the 
date that he moved from New York? 
A. I do not know for sure, but I do know that the 
Hoffman Products as the employer, who is the 
premium payer to Aetna, would not have been 
charged a premium for the child after the child was 
no longer a covered dependent. 
Assuming that there was a separate premium, in any 
event. By that I mean it could have a situation 
where having paid a premium for the spouse, there 
might not be any extra premium for children. 
Q. I understand. But it may have been the situation 
that in order to obtain additional - in order to access 
these benefits. This extension of benefits that we 
have been talking about on page 28. The Quaid 
family would have had to tender to Aetna additional 
premium for Skylar Quaid? 
MR. LUND: Objection to the form. Speculation, foundation. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. That is not correct. 
Q. Tell me how I am misunderstanding your last 
response then. Because I thought you indicated that 
10 
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ther£jnayib£La^siti^ 
paid to Aetna by the Cohen family, the birth parents, 
would have not changed even after Zachary left the 
family. But that it may have been true that once 
Zachary left the family, and became Skylar Quaid, 
there would have to be additional premium paid for 
him on his behalf. Is that not right? 
A. Let me clarify. There is no additional premium 
charge for an extension of benefits. To further 
clarify, it would contrast a continuation of coverage. 
As for example, under COBRA, if someone lost 
their job and was seeking to continue coverage 
where there is a charge. 
Here, we are not talking a continuation of coverage, 
we are talking about an extension of benefits. And 
there is no separate premium for an extension of 
benefits. 
Q. Okay. Are there situations then - tell me what the 
meaning of this last phrase is in that sentence that I 
read on page 28. It seems to contemplate that there 
are going to be requirements or that there are at least 
may be requirements in connection with an 
extension of benefits for payment of premium. If 
not additional premium, at least continual premium 
for an individual on extension of benefits; is that 
accurate? 
A. I see the language that you are referring to. I am not 
clear on what it refers to, because I am aware that 
there is no premium charged for an extension of 
benefits. 
Q. So are you saying that based on your experience, 
this language is superfluous? 
11 
THE WITNESS: Let me take a moment_to readit. 
MR. KING: 
THE WITNESS: 
Sure. 
In order to read this in context, I believe that the 
referenced premium there could well be a reference 
to premium for continuation of coverage that is 
referred to earlier in the sentence, with respect to 
which there is a premium charged. 
The benefits that are provided under an extension of 
benefits, are limited to services related to the total 
disability. If a person in this circumstance wanted 
to assure continuation of coverage, that is, 
continuation of all the benefits that are provided 
under the Contract while he or she was a covered 
Member, they could elect a continuation of 
coverage. And for that, there is a premium. 
James Brown deposition, p. 37,11. 3 - 25, p. 38, p. 39, p. 40,11. 1-14 (emphasis added). 
32. The Loren Cook Plan disputes this paragraph. Paragraph 32 states: 
After Skylar's birth parents, the Cohens, relinquished their parental 
rights and Skylar was placed for adoption with the Quaids on 
November 14, 1999, the Cohens were not legally obligated to pay 
for any medical care provided to Skylar. Quaid Depo., 16:23 -
17:24. 
The Loren Cook Plan disputes the statements in this paragraph because they are legal conclusions 
and Mrs. Quaid, although a nice person, is not competent to render legal judgments that are the 
province of this Court. The documents which Mrs. Quaid purports to interpret are not evidence 
in the record and this testimony is not admissible. 
12 
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33. The Loren Cook-Plan_disputes the lastxlause in this paragraph. JParagraph-
33 states: 
The Loren Cook Plan has continued to maintain, to the date of this 
Memorandum, that the Aetna Plan is the primary payor for 
Skylar's care and, based on the COB exclusion in the Loren Cook 
Plan for HMO participants, that the Loren Cook Plan is not 
responsible to pay any of Skylar's charges. 
The Loren Cook Plan does not assert that it is not responsible to pay any of Skylar's charges. In 
late spring of 2000, the Loren Cook Company closed its facility in Utah and the employees were 
laid off. Mr. Quaid, however, elected continuation coverage under the Loren Cook Plan. 
Because the Loren Cook Plan understood that the HMO coverage under the Aetna Plan would 
only have been in effect for 12 months after the transfer of Skylar Quaid to Utah, by the start of 
January of 2001, the Loren Cook Company had an obligation to provide coverage for Skylar and 
did so. Steve Burney, the Vice-President of the Loren Cook Company and the Plan 
Administrator, testified about these events: 
Q. Alright, so he [Bob Quaid] elected continuation 
coverage. At some point in time, did the Loren 
Cook Company, under the continuation of coverage 
for the Quaids, pick up coverage for Skylar Quaid? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how much money the Loren Cook 
Company Health Plan has paid out, approximately, 
in health care costs for Skylar Quaid since coverage 
was picked up for Skylar. 
13 
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A LJknow it's in excess of $ 100,000. I don't have a 
specific number. 
Steve Burney deposition, p. 48,11. 10 - 20. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AETNA PLAN PROVIDED COVERAGE TO SKYLAR QUAID 
FOR 12 MONTHS AFTER TRANSFER AND THE LOREN COOK PLAN 
COB ESCAPE CLAUSE IS ENFORCEABLE 
James Brown has been employed by Aetna U.S. Healthcare for over 20 years and is 
currently the Regional General Counsel for the Northeast Region. He has held that position since 
approximately 1994, and before that he held a similar position in what was known as Aetna's Health 
Law Unit (James Brown deposition, p. 8.) 
James Brown makes clear in his deposition three important, facts. First, Skylar Quaid 
would have been entitled to 12 months of extended benefits even though his parents put him up for 
adoption because of the terms in the Aetna Plan that extend benefits to those who are disabled. 
Second, neither the Cohens nor the Quaids would have been charged any additional premium by 
Aetna for the extension of that extra 12 months of benefits to Skylar Quaid. Third, the benefits to 
Skylar Quaid would have been available to him during the entire 12-month period after transfer had 
the Quaids simply decided to bring Skylar back to the Aetna network healthcare providers for 
treatment. 
App.Add.000463 
Those factual predicates clearly^setihe-stage for the application of the JLorenCook 
Plan Coordination of Benefits provision (hereinafter referred to as the "COB escape clause"). 
The Loren Cook Plan has found only one case applying a COB escape clause similar 
to the one used in the Loren Cook Plan. That case is Jones v. Statewide Aluminum, Inc., 246 F. 
Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Ind. 2003). In this case, Tom Ray Jones, who died of leukemia, was covered 
by two ERISA qualified health plans: (1) Statewide Aluminum and (2) Partners - an HMO. Jones 
widow sued both plans under a variety of legal theories. Partners cross-claimed against Statewide 
for a declaratory judgment invalidating a COB escape clause in Statewide's plan that absolved it of 
a duty to pay a plan member's healthcare costs if the member was also covered by, and had received 
treatment through, an HMO. Statewide moved for summary judgment on Partners' cross-claim. 
The District Court granted the motion. Partners asked the Court to invalidate the COB 
escape clause through federal common law, because the enforcement of such clauses engenders 
negative policy results. The Court carefully examines the case law that Partners advanced in support 
of its position and rejected those arguments. Partners relied on McGurl v. Trucking Employees of 
New Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 124 F.3d 471 (3rd Cir. 1997) and Northeast Dept ILGWUHealth 
& Welfare Fund v. Teamster Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1985), both 
of which fashioned federal common law to void escape clauses in ERISA qualified plans. The logic 
in both cases was essentially that trustees are bound by a fiduciary duty and that they violated this 
fiduciary duty by choosing to install a COB escape clause. 
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IheJUnited_S:tate^ arguments. The„Court.pointexLout 
that plan administrators are not acting as ERISA fiduciaries when they make design decisions and 
that Congress did not intend for the Courts to create common law dictating the substance of ERISA 
plans. Thus, the Court reasoned that the COB escape clause relating to other available HMO 
coverage was enforceable. 246 F. Supp. 2d 1028 - 29. 
Plaintiffs in this case are asking this Court to do what Congress has not authorized 
courts to do: engage in substantive rewriting of this plan. Plaintiffs assert that a provision of 
COBRA, that was incorporated into ERISA at 29 U.S.C. § 1169(c), somehow empowers the Court 
to engage in this rewriting process. The Federal District Court, however, in Jones v. Statewide 
Aluminum, discussed this very issue. Partners (the HMO) had argued that while Congress may 
originally have intended for plan administrators to have virtually unfettered discretion to fill in the 
substance of their plan, more recent legislation indicated that some substantive regulation is 
desirable, and they pointed to the fact that since Congress has enacted ERISA, it had passed the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) and the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HPAA), each of which restrict the content of ERISA qualified 
plans. The District Court engaged in the following analysis: 
The Court is not persuaded. Courts derive the power to fill in 
statutory blanks through federal common law from Congress. 
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. ofWassau, 508 U.S. 286, 
291 (1993), and Congress has not clearly authorized the courts to 
make federal common law regarding the substantive composition of 
ERISA plans. See, e.g. Hickey v. A.E. Staley, 995 F.2d at 1393. The 
16 
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morejD^iitjsmctmen^ 
support to overcome the general rule, with a few congressionally-
created exception, of plan design freedom. Neither King v. Nat'I 
Human Res. Comm % 218 F. 3d 719 (7th Cir. 2000) nor Ames v. Am, 
Natl Can, 170 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 1999) - both decided after 
^A enactment of COBRA and HEPAA - mentions either enactment as 
^
 n i x evidence of changing congressional intent towards substantive 
M ^ ft <$iW regulation. See, King, 218 F.3d at 723 (citing prior case law for the 
ca^>
s
^^ 'r~z*? we^"established conclusion that design decisions fall outside the 
rt^J^ /^Ar^^^ purview of an administrator's fiduciary duty); Ames, 170 F.3d at 757 
t ^ l t C <&»***) ( s a m e)-
246 F. Supp.2datl029-30. 
The argument relating to 29 U.S.C. §1169 is, in any event, a red herring. The COB 
escape clause in the Loren Cook Plan applies to all plan participants and dependants, whether they 
are natural born children, adopted children, adults, incapacitated, whatever. It is a status-free clause 
that applies across the board to anyone who is otherwise covered under the Loren Cook Plan (which 
Skylar Quaid was), but who also was eligible for benefits under an HMO and chose not to utilize 
those benefits. 
Finally, the Court needs to understand the very narrow range of consequences that 
arise from this particular case. Plaintiffs assert that there are broad policy considerations relating to 
the adoption of children at issue here. However, the facts of this case are so narrow (i.e., a case 
where a family adopts a special needs child, from out of state, where the child is already a covered 
dependant under an HMO plan, and the adopting parents are no longer participants under the plan 
with the COB escape clause), they are not likely to be repeated again. 
17 
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CQJVJCLUSION 
The language in the COB provision in the Loren Cook Plan is clear and unambiguous 
and provides that the Plan will not treat as covered expenses medical bills that could have been 
submitted to the Aetna Plan had the Quaids chosen to utilize that HMO medical provider. Plan 
terms are to be given their plain meaning and application. Neither ERISA nor federal common law 
empower this court to rewrite the terms of the Plan in light of the unambiguous representations from 
Aetna management that Skylar Quaid was entitled to an additional 12 months of benefits after his 
transfer from New York to Utah. 
The Loren Cook Plan is entitled to summary judgment that its payment obligations 
did not arise until December 23 of 2000. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of June, 2005. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
GARY L. I0HNSOI 
MARTHA KNUDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
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CERTIFICATE OE SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^ ° My of June, 2005, to the following: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
G \EDSI\DOCS\16118\0001\FV2153 WPD 
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Brian S.King, #4610 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAID, individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAID, 
file/a ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA 
US HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN 
PRODUCTS NEW YORK MEDICAL 
BENEFITS PLAN and 
LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendants/ 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Plaintiffs Robert and Sue Quaid ("the Quaids"), through their undersigned counsel, 
submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and in 
response to the Memorandum in Opposition to that Motion filed by the Defendant Loren Cook 
An» Arirl 000469 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan ("the Loren Cook Plan"). This Reply Memorandum is filed 
pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Almost all of the "Contested Issues of Fact" identified by the Loren Cook Plan on pp. 2 
through 14 of its Opposition Memo dispute the characterization or completeness of the Quaids' 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. The only exception to this is the Loren Cook Plan's 
dispute as to If 33 of the Quaids' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. In response to that 
paragraph, the Loren Cook Plan correctly points out that it has not denied responsibility to pay 
any of Skylar's charges and that, in fact, the Loren Cook Plan has paid a substantial amount of 
those charges in its status as a secondary payor behind the Aetna Plan. 
However, for this particular corrected statement from the Loren Cook Plan, and all others 
that it disputes on the basis of incompleteness or characterization of the facts, the Loren Cook 
Plan Opposition Memo does not create genuine issues of material fact that preclude a Court 
ruling in the Quaids' favor on the legal issues presented in this case. In fact, the Loren Cook 
Plan does not claim that its "Contested Issues of Fact" are sufficient to delay or defeat summary 
judgment in this matter at this time. 
Both parties agree that the gist of the underlying facts relating to the legal issues in this 
matter are undisputed and that the Court is in a position to render judgment as a matter of law on 
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those legal issues without the need for presentation of evidence that will require a trial in this 
matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE AETNA PLAN DID NOT PROVIDE ANY COVERAGE FOR SKYLAR 
AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE LOREN COOK PLAN IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR PRIMARY COVERAGE OF SKYLAR'S MEDICAL EXPENSES 
The Loren Cook Plan relies heavily on the opinions of James Brown, Aetna's regional 
general counsel for the northeast region, to establish its arguments. However, the Loren Cook 
Plan overstates Mr. Brown's beliefs. On p. 14 of its Opposition Memo, the Loren Cook Plan 
argues that, "James Brown makes clear in his deposition three important facts" (emphasis added) 
In reality, the three points that the Loren Cook Plan goes on to specifically identify from Mr. 
Brown's deposition are not facts at all. They are Mr. Brown's legal conclusions. As it turns out, 
each of them are in error. But more fundamentally, these legal conclusions are within this 
Court's province to decide, not Mr. Brown's. 
The three legal conclusions that Mr. Brown and the Loren Cook Plan rely on to establish 
that Aetna had some coverage obligations for Skylar are, first, that Skylar was entitled to twelve 
months of extended benefits under the Aetna Plan; second, that there was no requirement for 
premium to be paid for that twelve-month coverage even if it had been available; and third, that 
the benefits would have been available if "the Quaids simply decided to bring Skylar back to the 
Aetna network health care providers for treatment." Loren Cook Plan Opposition Memo, p. 14. 
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As established in the Quaids' opening Memorandum and Opposition Memo to the Loren 
Cook Plan's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Skylar was not entitled to any additional 
benefits under the Aetna Plan. He was not a "covered dependent" under the terms of the Aetna 
Plan once his birth parents placed him for adoption. Consequently, after that date, he was not 
entitled to any coverage from Aetna. In addition, because his birth parents had no legal 
obligation to pay for any of Skylar's medical expenses once they placed him for adoption, Aetna 
had no obligation to pay for medical treatment. This exclusion to coverage under the Aetna Plan 
is unambiguous. Finally, Skylar had no coverage under the Aetna Plan because neither his birth 
parents or the Quaids ever paid any premium to obtain that twelve-month extension of benefits. 
The Aetna Plan is explicit in stating that such a premium payment was required to obtain the 
twelve-month "extension of benefits." 
Mr. Brown's opinion or belief that the extension of benefits would have been in place for 
Skylar had he simply received treatment in the New York area through Aetna's HMO network, is 
not sufficient to alter or waive the explicit terms of the Aetna Plan. The Supreme Court has 
made clear that the administration of ERISA plans is "built around reliance on the face of written 
plan documents." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schooneiongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 115, S.Ct. 1223, 131 
L.Ed.2d 94 (1994). ERISA's fiduciary duties require that individuals or entities with 
discretionary control over the disposition or management of ERISA plan funds have a fiduciary 
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obligation to discharge their duties "in accordance with the documents and instruments 
governing the [ERISA] plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
In connection with these fiduciary obligations, the Tenth Circuit holds that individuals 
carrying out fiduciary duties under ERISA plans must act in strict compliance with the terms of 
the ERISA plan, at least to the extent that those terms are unambiguous. Allison v. BankOne-
Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1235 (10th Cir. 2002). As stated by the Tenth Circuit in Allison, the 
failure to carry out duties under the unambiguous terms of ERISA plan documents implicates, ". . 
much more than mere formalities b u t . . . [goes] to the very substance of the protections 
afforded by ERISA." Allison. 289 F.3d at 1238. 
In short, the Loren Cook Plan is simply not in any position to ask this Court, relying on 
James Brown's deposition testimony, to ignore the explicit and unambiguous terms and 
requirements of the Aetna Plan. The language of that insurance policy is fatal to any argument 
by the Loren Cook Plan that Skylar had any coverage under the Aetna Plan after November 19, 
1999, when his birth parents placed him for adoption with the Quaids. 
II THE REQUIREMENTS OF 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) OVERRIDE THE COB 
LANGUAGE OF THE LOREN COOK PLAN 
The Loren Cook Plan argues that the "COB escape clause" in the Loren Cook Plan 
trumps the requirement found at 29 U.S.C, § 1169(c) that Skylar be covered by the Loren Cook 
Plan to the same degree as the Quaids' other children. However, this is simply wrong. Contrary 
to the Loren Cook Plan's argument, the Quaids are not asking this Court to engage in 
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"substantive rewriting" of the Loren Cook Plan. The Quaids are simply asking the Court to 
recognize that when Congress enacted 29 U.S.C. § 1169(c), it dictated the substance of ERISA 
plans5 coverage with regard to adopted children. The idea that some aspects of ERISA dictate 
the substantive terms of ERISA plans is not a radical notion. Indeed, in several other particulars 
within ERISA, COBRA and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
("HIPAA"), Congressional mandates restrict the freedom of ERISA plan sponsors in how they 
design their ERISA plans. 
For example, Congress specifically and directly prohibits ERISA sponsors and fiduciaries 
from inserting language in ERISA plans which purport to "relieve a fiduciary from responsibility 
or liability for any responsibility, obligation or duty.. ." under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §1110. As 
another example, when it enacted HIPAA, Congress specifically restricted the nature of 
preexisting condition exclusions that health insurers and health benefit plans subject to ERISA 
may employ by limiting the scope of preexisting condition clauses and time frames over which 
they may extend. 29 U.S.C. §1181(a). 29 U.S.C. § 1169(c) is no different indirectly expressing 
Congress's intention to dictate the substance of ERISA plans with regard to preexisting 
conditions at the time a dependent child is placed for adoption. 
The case on which the Loren Cook Plan relies in its Opposition Memo, Jones v. 
Statewide Aluminum, Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 1018 (N.D. Ind. 2003), is distinguishable. A copy of 
Jones is attached as Exhibit A. Jones did not involve or implicate a situation where there was an 
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express attempt by the ERISA plan to contradict the express requirements of ERISA, COBRA or 
HIPAA regarding the substantive coverage requirements found in federal statute. It simply 
involved the interpretation and coordination of two separate ERISA plans' terms. The Quaids do 
not dispute that in the absence of Congressional mandate found at 29 U.S.C. §1169(c), the Loren 
Cook Plan would be free under ERISA to design its plan in a manner so as to include, as the 
Loren Cook Plan has, a "COB escape clause." The problem for the Loren Cook Plan is that the 
COB escape clause it seeks to utilize in this case runs directly counter to explicit coverage 
mandates found under COBRA. 
Indeed, Jones expressly states that it is simply filling in a "statutory blank" through use of 
federal common law. Jones, 246 F.Supp. 2d at 1029. The court acknowledged that there were "a 
few Congressionally-created exceptions" to ERISA's general rule that employers are free to 
design their ERISA plans in whatever fashion they please. Jones, 246 F.Supp.2d at 1030. 
Unfortunately for the Loren Cook Plan, this case is one of the exceptions to the general rule of 
ERISA plan design freedom. 
The explicit terms of 29 U.S.C. §1169(c) cannot be ignored. Skylar Quaid is entitled to 
the same degree of coverage the Quaids' other children had from the Loren Cook Plan. Because 
those children did not have any coverage through Aetna, the Loren Cook Plan cannot look to any 
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coverage from the Aetna Plan for Skylar. The Loren Cook Plan must provide primary coverage 
in this case. 
DATED this ^_ day of June, 2005. 
By: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the preceding document has been delivered 
via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gary L. Johnson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
DATED this 30 day of June, 2005. 
D 
0 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
App.Add.000477 
LEXSEE 246 F.SUPP.2D 1018 
BRENDA LEE JONES, Individual, and as the Personal Representative for The 
Estate of TOM RAY JONES, Plaintiffs, vs. STATE WIDE ALUMINUM, INC., 
PARTNERS NATIONAL HEALTH PLANS of INDIANA, INC., NORTH 
AMERICA ADMINISTRATORS, L.P., Defendants. 
No.3:02-CV-228-RM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
INDIANA, SOUTH BEND DIVISION 
246 F. Supp. 2d 1018; 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2962; 30 Employee Benefits Cas. 
(BNA) 1039 
February 20,2003, Decided 
DISPOSITION: [**1] Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment against State Wide DENIED and her suit 
against State Wide DISMISSED, Partners' motion for 
judgment on the pleadings on Count I of its cross-claim 
DENIED, State Wide's motion for summary judgment on 
Count I of Partners' cross-claim GRANTED, plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment against Partners 
GRANTED and plaintiffs motion for oral argument and 
joint motion to defer ruling DENIED as moot. 
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[*1021] MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
Doctors diagnosed Tom Ray Jones with leukemia on 
March 4, 2001. This sad discovery touched off a legal 
dispute over who would fund Mr. Jones's fight against the 
disease (a fight he lost on August 6, 2002). Mr. Jones was 
covered by two ERISA qualified health plans, State Wide, 
nl and Partners, an HMO, each of which decided the other 
was obligated to [**3] pay. At the heart of the dispute is 
an escape clause in State Wide's plan that absolves it of 
the duty to pay a plan member's health care costs if that 
person is also covered by, and receives treatment through, 
an HMO. Partners and Mrs. Jones n2 say federal common 
law has banished this clause from the ERISA world. State 
Wide takes a different view. Before the court resolves this 
dispute, it faces the issue of exhaustion — whether the 
plaintiff needed to exhaust her internal plan remedies 
before bringing suit against State Wide, and if so, whether 
she did so. n3 For the reasons stated below, the court finds 
that the exhaustion requirement applied and was 
unfulfilled and that the court should not create federal 
common law to stamp out the escape clause. 
nl When the court refers to the State Wide 
plan, it refers to two defendants, State Wide 
Aluminum and North America Administrators. 
n2 Mrs. Jones is Mr. Jones' widow. For 
clarity's sake, the court often mentions Mrs. Jones, 
rather than Mrs. Jones and Mr. Jones, when 
referencing the plaintiffs' actions. 
n3 Partners waived the exhaustion defense by 
not raising it. McCoy v. Board of Trustees of the 
Laborers' International Union, Local No. 222 
Pension Plan, 188 F. Supp.2d 461, 467-468 (D. 
NJ. 2002) (finding that exhaustion under ERISA 
is an affirmative defense). 
[**4] 
Facts 
Mr. and Mrs. Jones applied to both State Wide and 
Partners for reimbursement for their mounting medical 
bills. State Wide paid these bills initially, but decided on 
further review that the escape clause applied to Mr. 
Jones's situation. Beginning on May 31, 2001, State Wide 
ceased paying Mr. Jones new medical bills and began 
contacting those it had already paid in search of refunds. 
State Wide's change of heart prompted the Joneses to 
[*1022] reapply to Partners. At the outset, Partners 
warmly received this new application and started paying 
Mr. Jones's bills. Like State Wide before it, though, 
Partners had a change of heart and stopped paying Mr. 
Jones's bills. 
Partners became convinced for two reasons that State 
Wide owed Mr. Jones for these bills. First, both plans had 
a coordination of benefits clause—language in a health 
care plan that addresses coordination of coverage with 
another plan when both plans cover the same person—that 
called on the employer's plan to be the primary payor in 
the case of dual coverage. That was State Wide. Second, 
Partners thought that the escape clause, which otherwise 
would trump the choice of benefits clauses, was illegal 
and unenforceable [**5] ab initio. The escape clause 
reads, "if you and/ or your eligible dependents while 
covered under this plan [sic] are also covered under an 
HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) provided by 
another employer and receive treatment through the HMO 
provider, no benefits will be payable for such treatment 
under this Plan." State Wide Plan at 26 (attached as 
exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment). 
Mrs. Jones sued both plans under a variety of legal 
theories n4 and moved for summary judgment against 
both plans. She bases her summary judgment motion 
against State Wide on the unenforceability of the escape 
clause and waiver; she says that by paying some of Mr. 
Jones's bills before deciding that the escape clause applied, 
State Wide had waived its right to deny Mr. Jones 
coverage. Her summary judgment against Partners simply 
asks the court to declare that Partners owes her coverage 
regardless of the court's ruling on the escape clause 
because Partners has a secondary coverage clause 
indicating that it will pay the excess amount not covered 
by the other plan in the event of dual coverage. That is, if 
the escape clause is enforceable, Partners is on the hook as 
the [**6] primary payor, and if the clause is not 
enforceable, Partners' responsibility is simply that of a 
secondary payor. 
n4 Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C § 1331 
(providing statutory federal question jurisdiction) 
as her cause of action arises under 29 U.S.C. § 
7752(a)(1)(B) (granting plan participants the right 
to sue for benefits due under their plans). 
State Wide and Partners did not sit idly. Partners 
lodged a cross claim against State Wide for a declaratory 
judgment invalidating the escape clause, and later sought 
judgment on the pleadings on its cross claim. State Wide 
responded with a summary judgment motion against 
Partners on the declaratory judgment cross-claim. Also 
pending are a motion for oral argument and a motion 
urging the court to consider Partners' motion for judgment 
on the pleadings only after all of the other motions were 
fully briefed. 
Exhaustion 
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Although much turns on the court's view of the 
escape clause, the c ourt b egins with Mrs. Jones's [ **7J 
summary judgment motion against State Wide first 
because that motion raises the issue of exhaustion. 
Summary judgment for Mrs. Jones would be proper if "the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding whether a genuine 
issue of material fact exists, the court construes all facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws 
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 at 251, 91 [*1023] L. 
Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct 2505 (1986). No genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a rational trier of act could not 
find for the nonmoving party even when the record as a 
whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Ritchie v. Glidden Company, 242 F.3d 
713, 720 (7th Cir. 2001). "Neither the mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute between the parties, nor the 
existence of some metaphysical doubt as to material facts 
is sufficient to defeat such a [summary [**8] judgment] 
motion." Holtz v. JJ.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 
F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
State Wide responds to Mrs. Jones's summary 
judgment motion with the defense of internal exhaustion. 
n5 Though ERISA does not expressly require internal 
exhaustion, a body of federal common law has grown up 
in its shadow requiring just that Zhou v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co. of America, 295 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(referring to internal exhaustion as a prerequisite for filing 
suit under ERISA); Gallegos v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, 
210 F.3d 803, 807-808 (7th Cir. 2000) (remarking that 
this requirement is not in the text of the statute). Requiring 
exhaustion reduces the number of frivolous claims, 
promotes nonadversarial dispute resolution, decreases the 
cost and time required for claim settlement, and creates a 
better record in the event judicial review is necessary. 
Gallegos v. Mt. Sinai, 210 F.3d at 808 (listing benefits). 
District courts, however, must exercise discretion when 
applying the exhaustion requirement and they may waive 
it under certain circumstances. Id [**9] (remarking that 
district courts have the discretion to require, or not, 
exhaustion depending on the existence of exceptions, e.g., 
unavailability or futility). A defendant bears the burden of 
proving internal exhaustion by a preponderance of the 
evidence because it is an affirmative defense. McCoy v. 
Board of Trustees of the Laborersf International Union, 
Local No. 222 Pension Plan, 188 F. Supp.2d 461, 
467-468 (D. N.J. 2002) (finding that exhaustion under 
ERISA is an affirmative defense); Bowden v. United 
States, 323 U.S. App. B.C. 164, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (explaining in a different context that 
exhaustion is an affirmative defense and the therefore the 
defendant bears the burden of proving it). 
n5 Mrs. Jones claims in a footnote in her reply 
brief in support of her motion for summary 
judgment that State Wide waived the 
administrative exhaustion argument because it did 
not include it in its response to her motion for 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs Reply in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (against 
State Wide) at 4 n.l. That is incorrect. State Wide 
incorporated it by reference to its response to 
Partner's motion on the pleadings which included 
the administrative exhaustion argument. Brief of 
State Wide in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 1 n. 1. 
[**10] 
Mrs. Jones responds that exhaustion was unnecessary 
for a variety of reasons: Mr. Jones was in an emergency 
situation; the plan suggests that appeals are permissive 
rather than mandatory; it would have been futile; and the 
plan did not issue a denial sufficient to trigger an 
administrative remedy. Alternatively, she says she 
exhausted her internal plan remedies through her 
representative, Partners' President Bruce Greenberg. 
One federal court of appeals has recognized an 
exigency exception to the internal exhaustion requirement 
"in cases of rapid, life-threatening illnesses, patients 
seeking treatment are not required to exhaust contractual 
or administrative procedures before coming to federal 
court." Henderson v. Bodine, 70 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 
1995). Two factors counsel the court against following 
Henderson. First, [*1024] the Henderson decision 
provides no support for this exception and it stands as the 
only circuit court opinion recognizing such an exception. 
Second, while speed seems to have been the reason the 
Henderson court decided as it did, litigation is not 
necessarily a shorter path to payment than internal 
exhaustion. If the internal remedies [**11] suffice, resort 
to them will often be faster than federal courts with 
crowded dockets and time consuming procedural 
protections. State Wide Plan at 48 (attached as exhibit A 
to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) 
(promising to send a written response to a participant's 
appeal within 60 days); U.S. District Courts-Median Time 
Interval From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases, Report 
from the Administrative Office of the Courts n6 (visited 
January 24, 2003) (listing the average time for the 
disposition of a case in the Northern District of Indiana as 
8.2 months) 
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5mar02.pdf> 
The gist of Mrs. Jones's second argument is that the 
Plan's permissive language does not inform the average 
person that she must file an internal appeal so as not to 
lose the right to file suit in federal court. Gallegos v. Mt. 
Sinai, 210 F.3d at 810 ("We interpret an ERISA plan 
summary with its plain meaning as understood by an 
average person.") In Gallegos, the court found that 
"estoppel may be applied to preclude the assertion of 
failure [**12] to exhaust administrative remedies as a 
defense where the failure results from the claimant's 
reliance on written misrepresentations by the insurer or 
plan administrator." Id. Further, the court found that the 
plan had provided written misrepresentations to Ms. 
Gallegos, the plan participant, because it did not convey 
the interdependence of the administrative review 
mechanism and filing suit in federal court; rather than 
highlight this crucial link, the plan merely spoke about 
internal review in permissive language as a co-equal 
option to filing suit. Id at 811. Misrepresentation alone, 
however, does not suspend exhaustion; the participant 
also must reasonably rely on these misrepresentations to 
her detriment. Gallegos, 210 F.3d at 811 (emphasizing 
this requirement). Ms. Gallegos lost because she didn't 
allege that she would have appealed in a timely fashion 
had she known about the exhaustion requirement. 
Mrs. Jones can meet neither of Gallegos' prongs. The 
State Wide plan, unlike the plan in Gallegos, tells the 
participant that the ability to file suit depends on the 
exhaustion of internal review: "legal action to recover any 
lost benefits [**13] under this Plan may not be brought... 
until the Plan's appeal procedure ... has been exhausted." 
State Wide Plan at 29 (attached as exhibit A to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). Further, like Ms. 
Gallegos, Mrs. Jones does not allege that she reasonably 
relied on the plan to her detriment (i.e., that she would 
have filed a timely appeal if not for the plan's allegedly 
permissive language). 
Mrs. Jones's third argument posits futility. To prove 
that an appeal would be futile, Mrs. Jones must show "that 
it is certain that [the] claim will be denied on appeal, not 
merely that [she] doubts that an appeal will result in a 
different decision." Zhou v. Guardian Life, 295 F.3d at 
680. She argues that "if the president of a major health 
insurance company [Parmer's Bruce Greenberg] could not 
get NAA [the administrator of State Wide's plan] to 
change its decision, an average employee could not have 
hoped to do better." Plaintiffs' Response to State Wide's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12. So conclusory a 
statement does not trigger the futility [*1025] exception: 
"when a party has proffered no facts indicating that the 
review procedure that [she] initiated [**14] will not work, 
the futility exception does not apply." Zhou, 295 F.3d at 
680. 
Finally, Mrs. Jones argues that State Wide did not 
issue a denial sufficiently specific to trigger 
administrative exhaustion. ERISA itself provides little 
guidance as to the necessary substantive content of a 
denial letter; ERISA simply requires that the specific 
reasons be set forth in a manner comprehensible by the 
plan participant. 29 U.S.C. § /7JJ(l)(histructing the plan 
to "provide adequate notice in writing ... setting forth the 
specific reasons for [the] denial," and "written in a manner 
caluculated to be understood by the participant"). Most of 
the substantive requirements come from regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. Those regulations 
insist that each denial not only provide the specific reason 
for the denial, but also that it cite the pertinent plan 
provision, describe any information that the participant 
could provide to help perfect her claim and why it is 
helpful, and explain how to initiate review of a claim. 29 
C.F.R. § 2560.503-10 (listing these requirements). A 
plan need only substantially comply [**15] with these 
regulations, it need not dot every "i" and cross every "t" if 
the omission does not compromise the fairness of the 
process. Halpin v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 
690 (7th Or. 1992) (noting that substantial compliance is 
sufficient). 
State Wide provided Mr. Jones with a denial that 
substantially complied with these regulations. The notice 
easily cleared the first two of the Secretary's hurdles by 
giving a specific reason for the denial ("COVERED 
UNDER HMO PLAN") and referring Mr. Jones to page 
26 of his plan. Explanation of Benefits, May 31, 2001 
(attached as exhibit A to State Wide's Brief in Support of 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Judgment on the 
Pleadings). Nothing in the notice spelled out to Mr. Jones 
how he could perfect his claim (the Secretary's third must), 
but this appears to be a harmless omission since there was 
no procedural defect that could be cured. As to alerting Mr. 
Jones to the possibility of review, the notice stated quite 
visibly at the bottom that the participant may appeal the 
decision by "filing a written request for review." Id. While 
this notice is not the picture of clarity, it informs the 
participant of all [**16] the information that the statute 
and the Secretary deem necessary to ensure the fair 
administration of an ERISA qualified plan, at least in 
regards to denying a participant's claim. 
Mrs. Jones further argues that she exhausted her 
internal remedies. She points to letters from Mr. 
Greenberg as examples of written requests for review in 
accord with the claims and appeals procedure laid out in 
page 48 of the plan. State Wide Plan at 48 (attached as 
exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment) (laying out the procedure for internal review); 
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Letters from Mr. Greenberg, President of Partners, to Mr. 
Daniel Dugan, President of North American 
Administrators, Ms. Patsy Grooms, Vice President of 
North American Administrators, and Ms. Johnson (Feb. 
14, 2002; March 8, 2002; Feb. 8, 2002) (attached as 
exhibits A,C, and D, to plaintiffs' response to States 
Wide's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
Mrs. Jones's appeals, if they were appeals, n7 were 
untimely. Mr. Greenberg [*1026] wrote his first letter on 
February 8, about eight months after the only claim denial 
letter before the court. Explanation of Benefits, May 31, 
2001 (attached as exhibit A to State Wide's Brief in 
Support of Summary [**17] Judgment and in Opposition 
to Judgment on the Pleadings). This gap stretches far 
beyond the sixty-day window the plan provides. State 
Wide Plan at 48 (attached as exhibit A to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) (giving the plan 
participant 60 days to register her appeal); 29 CF.R. § 
2560.503-1 (g)(3) (allowing time limits on ERISA appeals 
of 60 days). 
n7 To be appeals, the content of the letters 
must be "reasonably calculated to alert the 
employer to the nature o f the c laim and request 
administrative review." Powell v. AT & T 
Communs., Inc., 938 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1991). 
Given Mr. Greenberg's position as President of 
Partners, State Wide might have questioned 
whether these letters represented an appeal from 
an agent of Mr. Jones or the posturing of a rival 
unwilling to pay a claim. The court need not 
resolve this issue, since any appeal was untimely. 
No reasonable jury could disagree with State Wide 
that Mrs. Jones did not exhaust her internal [**18] 
remedies. The court may dismiss her claim with prejudice 
or without prejudice. Lindemann v, Mobil Oil 
Corporation, 79 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming 
a district court's decision granting summary judgment 
against a party for failing to exhaust rather than imposing 
a stay and allowing the plaintiff to exhaust her internal 
remedies); Powell v. AT &T Communications, Inc., 938 
F.2d 823, 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1991). (upholding district 
court's grant of summary judgment). n8 In a case such as 
this, in which the law and the plan itself both served to put 
the claimant on notice that exhaustion of internal 
remedies was required, D'Amico v. CBS, 297 F.3d 287 at 
293 (finding no fault in dismissal with prejudice because 
plaintiff could have expected it based on existing law); 
State Wide Plan at 29 (attached as exhibit A to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) (explaining the 
interdependence of internal exhaustion and filing a suit), 
and recognizing that even the letters from Mr. Greenberg 
did not begin until months after the time for internal 
appeal had elapsed, dismissal with prejudice is 
appropriate. 
n8 Although the Seventh Circuit is not alone 
in allowing dismissal with prejudice for failure to 
exhaust internal remedies, see, e.g., D'Amico v. 
CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 293 (3rd Cir. 2002) 
(upholding a district court's decision to dismiss 
with prejudice because the plaintiffs were aware 
of that possibility), not every circuit agrees. 
Ravencraft v. Unum Life Insurance Company of 
America, 212 F.3d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(vacating the district court's judgment and 
remanding with instructions to dismiss the case 
without prejudice so that the plaintiff may attempt 
to exhaust her internal remedies); Makar v. Health 
Care Corporation of the Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 
80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989) (same). 
[**19] 
The Escape Clause 
Partners' declaratory judgment counterclaim against 
State Wide asks the court to invalidate the escape clause 
through federal common law because, in Partners' view, 
the enforcement of such clauses would engender negative 
policy results. Partners' declaratory judgment action raises 
some knotty jurisdictional issues that require discussion 
because a federal court must satisfy itself of its own 
jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 
574, 583, 143 L. Ed. 2d 760, 119 S. Ct. 
1563(1 PPPX"Article III generally requires a federal court 
to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction before it considers the 
merits of a case."). n9 
n9 Further, consideration of the jurisdictional 
analysis is appropriate in light of Winstead v. J. C. 
Penney. 933 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1991). In 
Winstead v. J.C. Penney, the court decided a 
jurisdictional issue, like this one, arising out of a 
suit between two interlocking ERISA plans. Id. 
Unlike this case, the plan initiating the action 
brought the case in the name of its trustees. Id at 
579. Though this fact was ultimately 
determinative, the court surveyed more generally 
the jurisdictional conundra raised in suits between 
two plans. Id at 578-581. The court analyzed the 
possibility that Congress intended that federal 
common law claims between two plans should be 
litigable only in state court. Id at 578. Because of 
ERISA's broad preemption clause, this would be a 
plaintiffs sole recourse if federal jurisdiction did 
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not exist 29 USC § 1144(a) (dictating that the 
statute, "shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan") The court deemed that 
scenario nonsensical "it makes more sense that 
[such] actions either are not litigable at all or, 
better, that they too are litigable in federal court" 
Id In other words, either there must be jurisdiction 
or the court should not recognize any claim at all 
Usmg this interpretive framework, the court took 
one of the litigants to task for claiming that a 
federal court could not exercise original 
jurisdiction, but could exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction, over such a claim Id at 580 Under 
the Wmstead court's view of congressional intent, 
supplemental jurisdiction only extends to claims, 
and if there is no original jurisdiction, then there is 
no claim Id In light of this opinion, the court 
found a simple mvocation of supplemental 
jurisdiction wanting 
[**20] [*1027] 
Jurisdiction in this case must arise, if at all, under 28 
US C § 1331 Diversity jurisdiction is not available 
because ERISA's broad preemption provision eliminates 
the possibility that a plaintiff could sue under state law 
29 USC § 1144(d)(dict2itmg that the statute, "shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan") Nor can 
jurisdiction for a suit between two plans be found in the 
text of ERISA Winstead v JC Penney 933 F2d 576, 
581 (7th Cir 1991) That leaves § 1331 In dicta, the 
Wmstead court wrote, "given ERISA's broad preemption 
provision, virtually every suit relating to an ERISA plan 
can be said to arise under federal law, and hence to be 
withm the jurisdiction of the federal courts by virtue of 
section § 1331 " 933 F 2d at 579 Something relates to an 
employee benefit plan "if it has connection with or 
reference to such a plan" Shaw v Delta Airlines, Inc, 463 
US 85, 96-97, 77 L Ed 2d 490, 103 S Ct 2890(1983) 
This suit, about the enforceability of an escape clause, is 
connected to [**21] a plan, so the court has jurisdiction 
under § 1331 
Partners filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
When issuing a judgment on the pleadmgs, a court may 
only consider the complaint, the answer, and any written 
instruments attached as exhibits Northern Indiana Gun 
& Outdoor Shows v City of South Bend, 163 F 3d 449, 
452 (7th Cir 1998) (determining the extent of the term 
"pleadings") In this case, however, the court has 
considered arguments presented in other motions m 
addition to the pleadmgs, thereby converting the motion 
for a judgment on the pleadmgs to a motion for summary 
judgment Church v General Motors Corp , 74 F 3d 795, 
798 (7th Cir 1996) (reciting the proposition that the 
consideration of matters outside the pleadings converts a 
motion for judgment on the pleadmgs to a summary 
judgment motion) 
A court normally gives notice to the non-movant 
when it converts a motion for judgment on the pleadmgs 
to one for summary judgment Green v Benden, 281F 3d 
661, 665 (7th Cir 2002) In this case, though, Mrs Jones 
moved for summary judgment on the escape clause issue 
using the same arguments that Partners used [**22] m its 
motion for judgment on the pleadmgs See State Wide 
Aluminum's Brief m Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 5 n 4 ("Plaintiffs' argument on 
these points [regardmg the escape clause] is a reiteration 
of the arguments raised m Partners' Brief in Support of Its 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadmgs ") State Wide's 
only response to Mrs Jones's argument was to incorporate 
its arguments [*1028] from its brief m response to 
Partners's motion for judgment on the pleadings Id 
("Defendants request that their Brief in Response to 
Partners' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadmgs be 
incorporated mto this brief and considered by the Court as 
if those arguments were fully set forth herem ") Smce 
State Wide decided to use the same arguments and 
evidence to respond to a motion for judgment on the 
pleadmgs and a motion for summary judgment, a pause to 
allow supplementation with summary judgment materials 
would amount to nothing more than superfluous delay, 
State Wide already has had that opportunity Because 
State Wide is not prejudiced by the court converting 
Partners's motion without notice, the court treats Partners' 
motion for judgment on the pleadmgs as one [**23] for 
summary judgment 
The resultmg cross-motions for summary judgment 
focus on a pure question of law—the enforceability of the 
escape clause—which turns on federal common law, or the 
"federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced 
by traditional methods of interpretation to federal 
statutory or constitutional commands " RICHARD H 
FALLON ET AL, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal 
Courts and The Federal System 756 (4th ed 1996) 
Broadly speaking, there are two lands of federal common 
law that which is designed to protect uniquely federal 
mterests (eg, the federal common law developed to 
protect federal mterests m international relations), and 
that which is created to carry out congressional intent (e g, 
the federal common law created to fill m the gaps of 
various statutes) ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Federal 
Jurisdiction 336 (1994) The federal common law 
surrounding ERISA is of the latter sort Congress 
expected the courts to develop a "federal common law of 
rights and obligations under ERISA plans " Pilot Life Ins 
v Dedeaux, 481 US 41, 56, 95 L Ed 2d 39, 107 S Ct 
1549 (1987) This federal common law is limited to that 
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necessary [**24] to effectuate the purposes of ERISA 
United McGill Corp v Stinnett, 154 F 3d 168, 171 (4th 
Cir 1998) (reminding courts that this law making 
authority is limited to filling m or otherwise effectuating 
the statutory pattern), Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction 
Workers Pension Fund v Brown, 897 F2d 275, 281 (7th 
Cir 1990) (stating, "in making [federal common law] 
rules, we must of course look to the statute itself for 
guidance) 
Partners relies heavily on McGurl v Trucking 
Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc, 124 F 3d 
471 (3rd Cir 1997), and Northeast Dept ILGWU Health 
and Welfare Fund v Teamsters Local Union No 229 
Welfare Fund, 764 F 2d 147 (3rd Cir 1985), for the 
proposition that the court should make federal common 
law to invalidate the escape clause Both cases fashioned 
common law to void escape clauses m ERISA qualified 
plans, McGurl, 124 F 3d at 476-477, Northeast ILGWU 
Fund, 764 F 2d at 159, 164 The cases also share the same 
logic (the earlier case lays it out and the latter simply 
follows it), which goes as follows Northeast ILGWU 
Fund, 764 F 2d at 159-164 [**25] (building the 
argument), McGurl, 124 F 3d 476-477 (adopting 
Northeast's argument) Trustees are bound by a fiduciary 
duty to the plan participants, so then: actions are judged on 
whether they are arbitrary or capricious Northeast 
ILGWU Fund, 764 F 2d 162-163 The trustee installed the 
escape clause, and by choosmg to do, the trustee violated 
his fiduciary duty an important policy undergirdmg 
ERISA is that the coverage that participants actually 
receive should match their expectations, and escape 
clauses upset the alignment between a participant's 
expectations and the plan's coverage 764 F 2d at 1 63 
The decision [*1029] to include an escape clause, 
therefore, is an arbitrary and capricious one, so escape 
clauses are unenforceable as a matter of federal common 
law Id at 159, 164 
Partners supplements these cases' logic with two 
related, but distinct, policy arguments that would militate 
against enforcmg escape c lauses First, they s ay e scape 
clauses unsettle not only the expectation of plan 
participants, but also the expectations of other plans, so 
such escape clauses would shift the economic burden to 
escape clause-free f**26] ERISA plans that had not 
anticipated such a burden Other administrators, then, 
would incorporate escape clauses mto then plans, and 
plan participants would see the benefits of dual coverage 
turn into the curse of dual coverage 
Partners also sees a problem with HMO-specific 
escape clauses in Indiana plans State law regulates 
HMOs, Rush Prudential HMO Inc v Moran, 536 US 
355, 153L Ed 2d 375, 122S Ct 2151,2163(2002) 
(concluding, "HMOs are almost universally regulated as 
insurers under state law"), and Indiana law, Partners 
reports, forbids HMOs from incorporating escape clauses 
into their plans Indiana HMOs, then, could not avoid the 
economic burden that would befall them if other plans 
(governed by ERISA but not by Indiana law) proceeded 
with the rush to adopt escape clauses that Partners predicts 
This, Partners concludes, would disrupt the Indiana 
insurance market by burdening Indiana HMOs unfairly 
and unexpectedly, causmg HMO premiums to rise to 
cover the new risk and probable competitve disadvantage 
State Wide responds that the cases Partners cites 
incorrectly subject plan design decisions to fiduciary duty 
standards as the plan's settlor, State Wide claims the nght 
to delineate [**27] the plan's terms without the 
imposition of ERISA fiduciary standards In short, State 
Wide says that plan administrators are not fiduciaries 
when they make design decisions This assertion has a 
substantial foundation in case law See for example King 
v National Human Resource Committee, Inc, 218 F 3d 
719, 723 (7th Cir 2000) (reminding, "the defined 
functions of a fiduciary do not include plan design"), 
Ames v American National Can Company, 170 F 3d 751, 
757 (7th Cir 1999) (noting that ERISA fiduciaries do not 
wear then: fiduciary hats when they make design 
decisions) The corollary of this argument - mdeed, its 
foundation ~ is the notion that Congress did not intend for 
the courts to create common law dictating the substance of 
ERISA plans Hickey v AE Staley, 995 F 2d 1385, 1393 
(7th Cir 1993) ("Congress never intended ERISA to 
dictate the content of welfare benefit plans, much less for 
the federal courts to determine the content of such plans ") 
(emphasis in the original). 
Partners replies that while Congress may originally 
have mtended for plan administrators to have virtually 
unfettered discretion to fill [**28] m the substance of 
then plan, more recent legislation mdicates that some 
substantive regulation is desirable, since Congress 
enacted ERISA, it has passed the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA), each of whichs restrict the content of 
ERISA qualified plans 
The court is not persuaded Courts derive the power 
to fill in statutory blanks through federal common law 
from Congress, Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers 
Ins ofWausau, 508 US 286f 291, 124 L Ed 2d 194,113 
S Ct 2085 (1993), and Congress has not clearly 
authorized the courts to make federal common law 
regarding the substantive composition of ERISA plans 
See e g Hickey v AE Staley, 995 F2d at 1393 The 
more recent [*1030] enactments of COBRA and HIPAA 
provide too little support too overcome the general rule, 
with a few Congressionally-created exceptions, of plan 
design freedom Neither King v National Human 
Resource Committee, 218 F 3d 719 (7th Cir 2000), nor 
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Ames v. American National Can, 170 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 
1999) - both decided after enactment [**29] of COBRA 
and HIPAA — mentions either enactment as evidence of 
changing congressional intent toward substantive 
regulation. See King, 218 F.3d at 723 (citing prior case 
law for the well established conclusion that design 
decisions fall outside the purview of an administrator's 
fiduciary duty); Ames, 170 F.3d at 757 (same). 
For the above reasons, the court finds that the escape 
clause is enforceable, grants State Wide's motion for 
summary judgment, and denies Partners' cross-motion for 
summary judgment. Partners' predictions about the 
ramifications of today's decision may be accurate, but 
those are matters for legislation, not a new direction of 
federal common law. 
Primary Payor 
The last substantive motion left to decide is Mrs. 
Jones's motion for partial summary judgment against 
Partners. Mrs. Jones asks the court to decide that she is 
entitled to money from Partners whether Partners is the 
primary or secondary payor; Partners says it is only a 
secondarily liable. The court's decision on the 
enforceability of escape clause negates that response, 
something Partners openly concedes, "if the Escape 
Clause is valid and enforceable ... the Partners [**30] 
Plan would have primary coverage." Partners Brief in 
Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3. 
Since the court has decided that the escape clause was 
enforceable, Partners owes Mrs. Jones as the primary 
payor. 
The court denies as moot both the motion for oral 
argument and the motion to defer judgment on Partners' 
cross claim until all pending motions are fully briefed. 
Conclusion 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES 
the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against State 
Wide [Docket No. 90] and DISMISSES her suit against 
State Wide, DENIES Partners' motion for judgment on the 
pleadings on Count I of its cross-claim [Docket No. 74], 
GRANTS State Wide's motion for summary judgment on 
Count I of Partners' cross-claim [Docket No. 93], 
GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
against Partners [Docket No. 89], and DENIES as moot 
the plaintiffs motion for oral argument [Docket No. 91] 
and the joint motion to defer ruling [Docket No. 84]. 
SO ORDERED. 
ENTERED February 20, 2003 
Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge 
United States District Court 
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GARY L. JOHNSON [4353] 
MARTHA KNUDSON [8512] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAID, individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUATD, f/k/a 
ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA US 
HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN PRODUCTS 
NEW YORK MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN 
and LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT LOREN COOK 
COMPANY HEALTH CARE BENEFIT 
PLAN'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030901500 
Judse Ann Bovden 
The Loren Cook Company Health Care Benefit Plan (hereinafter "Loren Cook 
Plan"), by and through its counsel of record, Gaiy L. Johnson and Martha Knudson of Richards, 
Brandt, Miller & Nelson, respectfully submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT CANNOT, AS PLAINTIFF REQUESTS, REWRITE TERMS 
OF COORDINATION OF BENEFITS PROVISION 
The Plaintiffs (putatively Robert and Sue Quaid, but as recognized in the 
pleadings, Medicaid) acknowledge that this Court will decide the liability issues in this case 
under the umbrella of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. ERISA is, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, a 
"comprehensive and reticulated statute, the product of a decade of congressional study of the 
Nation's private employee benefits system." Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) 
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). ERISA is 
"an enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved innumerable disputes between 
powerful competing interests - not all in favor of potential plaintiffs." 508 U.S. at 262. 
Given the "evident care" with which ERISA was crafted, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally been "reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme" embodied in the statute. 
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985). Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly has declined invitation by plan participants and beneficiaries to extend 
benefits and remedies not specifically authorized by the statutory text. See, e.g., Mertens, supra, 
at 262 (rejecting claims that ERISA affords the cause of action against a non-fiduciary who 
knowingly participates in a fiduciary breach; Russell, supra, at 145-148 (declining invitation to 
2 
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create an implied private cause of action for extracontractual damages); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (holding that civil enforcement scheme codified at Section 
502(a) is not to be supplemented by state-law remedies). 
Plaintiffs' policy arguments appear to rest on the assumption that public policy 
requires the Court to negate the plain language in the Loren Cook Plan's Coordination of 
Benefits ("COB") that the Plan will not consider as an allowable charge any charge that would 
have been covered by the HMO or network plan available to a covered person had they used the 
services of a the HMO or network provider (hereinafter "COB Escape Clause"). The Court 
should reject these arguments for the following reasons. 
Under ERISA, a plan trustee is charged with "exclusive authority and discretion to 
manage and control the assets of the Plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1103. Under trust law, (which applies to 
interpretation of ERISA, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101-111 (1989)), the 
plan trustee has an obligation, among others, of maintaining the financial integrity of the Plan. 
Coordination of benefit provisions in health plans is a mechanism to allow the Plan to fill this 
obligation. 
Coordination of Benefit provisions have been around for almost as long as there 
have been healthcare plans and they are a popular method of cost containment employed by 
trustees of health benefit plans. See, e.g., Parker, Administration of Coordination of Benefits, in 
VII, TEXTBOOK FOR WELFARE, PENSION, TRUSTEES AND ADMINISTRATORS 16 
3 
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(1965), noting that there were a few published examples of savings of COBs ranging from 1 
percent to 9 percent. The basic function of a coordination of benefits is to apportion coverage 
when an employee has group medical insurance through one or more plans. BUSINESS 
INSURANCE March 12,1984, at 43, col. L The apportionment is carried out through the use of 
provisions similar to "other insurance" clauses, of which there are three types: pro rata, excess 
and escape (or no liability). The presence of an escape clause in a coordination of benefits 
provision in a medical benefit plan completely excludes the insured from coverage if he or she is 
covered by any other insurance policy. 
As is seen from the testimony of Margaret Godown,1 the COB escape clause in the 
Loren Cook Plan is "standard language" within self-funded plans. Indeed, nearly identical plan 
language in interpreted in the case of Jones v. Statewide Aluminum, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 1018 
(N.D. Ind. 2003), where the COB escape clause was upheld by the court. 
One of the cases distinguished by the District Court in Jones v. Statewide 
Aluminum was the Third Circuit decision in Northeast Dept ILGWUHealth & Welfare Fund v. 
Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit's 
particular mechanism for invahdating the COB escape clause in that case left open the possibility 
that an escape clause might be considered valid in a single-employer plan, such as the Loren 
Cook Plan. The Third Circuit there held that the incorporation of the escape clause reflected an 
1
 Loren Cook Plan's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ^ 19 at p. 9. 
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arbitrary and capricious conduct by the plan's trustees in violation of their fiduciary duties under 
ERISA. The Loren Cook Plan asserts that their plan design is a "settlor function" not subject to 
review, and that is the position adopted by the Court in Jones v. Statewide Aluminum. Indeed, 
the Third Circuit has also recognized explicitly this argument when it distinguished its Northeast 
Dept ILGWU decision in a later case, Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3rd Cir. 1991). The Third 
Circuit noted specifically in Nazay that Northeast concerned a multi-employer plan, not a single-
employer plan, as was involved in the case before it. The Loren Cook Company Plan is a single-
employer plan. 
Another fundamental reason the Court should reject plaintiffs' policy arguments 
about interpretation of the Loren Cook Plan, is premised on plaintiffs' mistaken reading of 29 
U.S.C. § 1169(c). This provision essentially requires group health plans to treat adopted children 
in the same fashion as natural born children (although plaintiffs in their Memorandum actually 
plug in the Loren Cook Plan into their recitation of 29 U.S.C. § 1169(c), defendant believes that 
is a scrivener's error and trusts the Court understood that the statute had not been amended 
specifically to address defendant in this case.) 
The Loren Cook Plan, in point of fact, takes into account 29 U.S.C. § 1169(c) in 
its actual plan language. On page 2 of the Plan, under the section "Eligible Classes of 
Dependents," a Dependent is defined as any one of the following persons: 
1. A covered Employee's Spouse and unmarried children from 
birth to the limiting age of 23 years. The Dependent 
5 
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Children must be primarily dependent upon the covered 
Employee for support and maintenance. When the child 
reaches the limiting age, coverage will end on the child's 
birthday. 
* * * 
The term "children" shall include natural children, 
step-children, adopted children or children placed 
with a covered Employee in anticipation of adoption. 
* * * 
The phrase "children placed with a covered Employee 
in anticipation of adoption" refers to a child whom the 
Employee intends to adopt, whether or not the 
adoption has become final , . . . . 
Loren Cook Plan, Exhibit 4 to Loren Cook Company's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary ludgment at p. 2. 
The Loren Cook Plan COB escape clause is not directed at adopted children, 
dependent children or any category of participant, beneficiary or dependent under the Loren Cook 
Plan. It is a status-free COB escape clause designed to minimize expense to the Plan and to marshal 
and husband plan assets to maximize benefits to all of the employees of the Loren Cook Plan. This 
health plan is funded entirely by the Loren Cook Company and not by any employee contributions,2 
and is presented as a benefit to Loren Cook Company employees. There is no provision in ERISA 
See, deposition of Steve Burney, p. 14,11. 5-15. 
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that provides authority to this Court to read out of the Loren Cook Plan the terms and conditions of 
the COB escape clause. 
POINT II 
BENEFITS WERE AVAILABLE FOR SKYLAR QUAID UNDER AETNA PLAN 
In defendant Loren Cook Plan's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, we examined in detail the testimony of James Brown, the Regional 
General Counsel for the Northeast Region for Aetna U.S. Healthcare. He acknowledged that it was 
Aetna's position - which had been stated in correspondence to a number of parties - that Skylar 
Quaid was eligible for an additional 12 months of benefits under the HMO plan.3 Contrary to the 
assertions made by plaintiffs in their Memorandum in Opposition to Loren Cook Company's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, Mr. Brown made Aetna's position unequivocally clear: "There is no 
additional premium charge for an extension of benefits." (Brown deposition p.38, 11. 16-18.) 
Plaintiffs attempt to cloud this issue by referencing certain language in the Aetna 
HMO Plan, in the extension of benefits section, which talks about payment of premium. Mr. Brown 
makes clear, however, that the referenced premium was for the continuation of coverage for all 
2 
There is some uncertainty as to exactly what the time frame would be for the additional 12 months of 
extended benefits under the Aetna HMO Plan In one part of his testimony (pp. 33-34), Mr Brown acknowledged 
that if Skylar Quaid had been brought back to Schneider's Children's Hospital, i e , within the Aetna network, one 
month after he had been at Primary Children's Hospital m Salt Lake City, Aetna would have paid for charges 
incurred at Schneider's facility for another 11 months. This answer needs to be read with Mr Brown's specific 
statement that the extension of benefits provided to individuals who have become totally disabled is for a 12-month 
period that begins to run when they cease being a covered dependent. (Brown deposition, p 44,11 10-19 ) 
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benefits under the Plan for which a member could elect. It did not refer specifically to the 
continuation coverage for disabled individuals. (Brown deposition pp. 39-40.) 
Finally, plaintiffs attempt to argue that an exclusion, never relied upon by Aetna in 
denying coverage, would be applicable under these facts and circumstances. The exclusion has to 
do with Aetna having no obligation to provide coverage for services for which a member is not 
legally obligated to pay in the absence of this coverage. Plaintiffs submit because Skylar's birth 
parents had signed away their parental rights they were no longer legally obligated to pay for Skylar's 
health care in the absence of the coverage. This is the kind of reasoning insurance companies are 
famous for and which, as Mr. Brown states in his deposition, Aetna had not considered. 
Mr. Brown had made clear earlier, in the course of his testimony that the extension 
of benefits to disabled individuals needed as a predicate the fact that they had been a covered 
dependent or subscriber prior to the time they became disabled. In other words, the "extension of 
benefits provided to individuals who before the extension period began, were a Member or a covered 
dependent." (Brown deposition, p. 44,11. 10-12.) Therefore, the exclusion plaintiffs offer up has 
no applicability to this fact situation. Skylar was a covered dependent and was disabled prior to his 
parents signing away his parental rights. The Plan had to provide 12 additional months of coverage 
past the point in time that he ceased to be a covered dependent of the Cohens. 
The discussion set forth above should reinforce to the Court the fundamental 
proposition that this is a unique set of factual circumstances likely not to replicated again. The 
8 
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information in the record before the Court indicates that the Quaids were aware - or had been made 
aware - that there was potential coverage for them under the Aetna Plan (at least Aetna asserts they 
had been told that) and they chose instead to bring the adopted child to Utah instead of leaving the 
child to receive medical care in New York. They had some question about coverage for Skylar under 
the Loren Cook Plan, or they would not have obtained Medicaid coverage for Skylar prior to 
bringing him to Utah. The Med-Pay Case Notes make it clear that the Loren Cook Plan never 
promised the Quaids - or Primary Children's Medical Center - that payments would be forthcoming 
for Skylar Quaid's treatment. 
It is important for the Court to note that, however, when the time period set forth 
under the COB escape clause had run, the Loren Cook Plan stepped forward and provided coverage 
under its Plan - for those services that found coverage under the Plan - and paid out more than 
$100,000 in medical bills for Skylar Quaid. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts and arguments set forth above, the Loren Cook Company Health 
Care Plan respectfully requests that the Court enter partial summary judgment in its favor finding 
that the Coordination of Benefits provision in the Loren Cook Plan is enforceable, that the Loren 
Cook Plan had no obligation to pay for any health care benefits for Skylar Quaid for 12 months from 
the point in time that he ceased having coverage under the Aetna Plan and that this Court deny 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
9 
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DATED this s ^ c day of June, 2005. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MARTHJ 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^ ""l4f"cTay of June, 2005, to the following: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY - SEPTEMBER 23, 2005 
2 JUDGE ANN BOYDEN PRESIDING 
3 THE COURT: We'll go on the record in the matter of 
4 Robert and, I believe, Susan Caid - was that the - Sue Caid. 
5 Is it Caid and Quaid? 
6 MR. KING: Quaid, I think is how you pronounce it, 
7 Judge. 
8 THE COURT: Quaid? Alright, thank you. Versus the 
9 insurance companies. In this morning's hearing is the Loren 
10 Cook plan. We have cross motions for a summary judgment from 
11 the two parties involved here. 
12 Mr. King, you are here for the Quaids, and is it 
13 Mr. Johnson? 
14 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, ma'am. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Johnson, it's good to 
16 see you. I've reviewed all of the documents and courtesy 
17 copies and everything else. I appreciate everyone's 
18 addressing it in the professional manner. 
19 Mr. King, it looks like you want to start this. 
20 MR. KING: Well, if that's okay. 
21 THE COURT: As the plaintiff, I think that's fair. 
22 As I looked at it, I thought well actually we do have cross 
23 motions here and so either party could, and I'm happy to see 
24 that decision made already. Mr. King, go ahead and begin. 
25 MR. KING: Your Honor, this is a very interesting 
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case and Gary and I have enjoyed working with each other and 
doing some discovery on it and briefing it and researching 
it. It involves, as you know from your view of the 
pleadings, a young man who was born in New York with 
significant medical problems. The Quaids here in Utah 
decided that they were interested in - and I don't remember 
off of the top of my head how this came to their attention. 
I think one of the adoption workers that they had worked with 
in the other cases made them aware of this child in New York, 
but Sue flew back to New York and checked out the situation 
with Skyler. At that time he was going by Zachary Cohen. 
She made it clear to the birth parents that she was 
interested in adopting this child. 
In November of 1999 the birth parents relinquished 
all rights as parents and basically severed the link with 
this child. Sue and Bob made arrangements for the child to 
be transferred out here to Primary Children's. He was in 
very poor condition back at Shriners Hospital. 
Mr. Johnson and I went to Shriners and actually 
approached some of the - one of the individuals there. It 
wasn't that the quality of care was poor there - this is a 
very good hospital in New York - but Sue felt strongly that 
this child needed the atmosphere, the surroundings of her 
adoptive - of his adoptive home. She, over a period of time, 
several days while in New York, made arrangements for the 
App.Add.000500 
child to be transported out to New - or out to Salt Lake to 
Primary Children's. 
Part of the deal, basically, that was struck with 
that is they would pay the costs of transporting Skyler to 
Utah and that would be the end of their involvement. They 
did say at one point later on, several months down the road, 
"Well, there is this 12 months extension of benefits that is 
available." 
That's really the problem that we've got in this 
case. The Quaid's - if we'd had a situation where Aetna did 
as we believe they should have done, namely, cut off any 
coverage for Skyler Quaid once his birth parents relinquished 
all rights to the parents of Skyler, Aetna should have then 
said, "We don't have any obligation whatsoever to provide any 
coverage to Skyler." 
They didn't, however. They indicated, "Well, this 
12 month extension of benefits is available." That's the 
hook on which the Loren Cook plan, under the language of the 
COB provision, says, "Then we're not primarily responsible 
for this child's medical expenses, at least not for the first 
12 months." The problem then becomes, and we think the 
central issue in the case is, is there any coverage available 
to Skyler Quaid under that Aetna policy? 
We, as we've outlined in the briefs, indicate that 
there are - there is no coverage for three separate reasons. 
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1 The first is once the Cohens, the birth parents in New York, 
2 relinquished all ability to act as birth parents, this child 
3 ceased to become a dependent - a covered dependent - under 
4 the terms of the Aetna policy. We think that's fairly self 
5 evident, I mean, there's just no relationship between 
6 Zachary, once he becomes Skyler Quaid, and the Cohen family, 
7 his birth parents. It's a severed - he's stranger to them, 
8 legally. He's a stranger, more importantly, for purposes of 
9 this lawsuit, to the Aetna plan once that happens. 
10 Second, there is an explicit requirement under the 
11 Aetna plan that for coverage to exist there must premium 
12 paid. No one disputes that there was no premium paid either 
13 by the Cohens or, of course, not by Skyler, being the minor 
14 child that he was, and the Quaids never paid any premium for 
15 coverage on Skyler once that severing of the relationship 
16 between Skyler and the birth parents took place. 
17 Third, the Aetna plan specifically says, NXWe're not 
18 going to cover medical expenses for which there's no legal 
19 obligation to pay in the absence of coverage.'' Once again, 
20 we're talking about the fact that once Aetna severed - or 
21 once the birth parents severed their relationship to the 
22 child, Aetna had no legal obligation to pay. The parents, 
23 the birth parents, had no legal obligation to pay and, of 
24 course, Skyler, being as he's a minor, had no obligation to 
25 pay. 
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1 Finally - well, I think those are the three reasons 
2 that we've got for not having any coverage under the Aetna 
3 plan. That extension of benefits clause in the Aetna plan 
4 that Loren Cook is pointing to and saying coverage exists is 
5 very explicit in saying that it's not available unless the 
6 premium is paid. 
7 Now that takes care of the whole argument, we 
8 believe, that Loren Cook is presenting in this case, that 
9 their coordination of benefits provision allows them to step 
10 back and be secondary, that the Aetna plan is primary. Once 
11 you get the Aetna plan out of the picture, once it's clear 
12 that they have no obligation to pay anything or even ability 
13 to pay anything for Zachary's medical expenses, the case 
14 resolves. The Loren Cook plan has to step up to the floor. 
15 They have to step up to the plate and pay the money. 
16 Now there's another issue here that's important and 
17 that is the question of the obligations under 29 U.S.C. 
18 section 11-69(c). The language of that statute, and we 
19 quoted it twice, in both our opening brief and the opposition 
20 brief and inserting erroneously the language of the Loren 
21 Cook plan. It's obvious Mr. - I said Gary today as we showed 
22 up, thank you for not being harder on me about this, because 
23 it's obvious that when Congress passed that statute, they did 
24 not insert -
25 THE COURT: You also included the code or I had the 
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1 code. It may had been from research that had been done 
2 otherwise. 
3 MR. KING: Well, I'm glad that we didn't have a 
4 misunderstanding. I was getting to something. I should 
5 probably let you tell it because it was a funny story, but he 
6 said, "When I got your brief, Bryan, I have to tell you, I 
7 went right down to the code to see if in fact the Loren Cook 
8 plan was in there." 
9 THE COURT: See if that language was that good. 
10 MR. JOHNSON: I might have withdrawn my motion. 
11 THE COURT: Just for that acknowledgment? Alright, 
12 very good. I do think I am clear on what the code says. 
13 MR. KING: Alright. 
14 THE COURT: And what the Loren Clook plan - Cook 
15 plan says on it. 
16 MR. KING: You know, we've got the policy - the 
17 public policy considerations that we talked about, but we 
18 briefed that, and unless you have specific concerns or 
19 questions, Your Honor, I think that the briefing that we were 
20 able to carry on and that Mr. Johnson presented really was 
21 good from our perspective in the sense that I think the 
22 issues are fairly straight forward in terms of that. 
23 Obviously, you may have concerns or questions. 
24 THE COURT: They - they really were, and I very much 
25 appreciate the professionally academic standards that they 
6 
I APP-Add.000504 
were at as well as is the professional manner. It made it 
much easier for me to review it and I did go through them. I 
felt that the answers - that the questions that I had as I 
started going through them were in outline form answered. So 
I really - I appreciate what oral argument you want me to 
know in addition to them, but they are set - the issues are 
set forward clearly and I think that we can discuss those 
issues and get them resolved. Thank you. 
MR. KING: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, your response. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please 
the Court and counsel. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I just want to go over 
some key factual points and then go right into my argument. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: I just want to make sure that the 
Court knows that the administrator of the Loren Cook plan, 
the health care plan, is a company called Med Pay, and Med 
Pay was first contacted about Skyler Quaid on December 3, 
1999. They were told that the Quaids - and Bob Quaid at that 
time was an employee of the Loren Cook plan here in Utah 
were in the process of adopting a special needs child who 
currently was a patient at a New York City hospital. 
On that same day Med Pay contacted the hospital, 
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Shriners Children Hospital, and were told that the child was 
a patient there and that Aetna and an Aetna HMO was the 
primary insurance for the child. Then on that same day, on 
December 3, 1999, Bob Quaid fills out his enrollment form to 
add Skyler Quaid as a member of the Loren Cook plan. 
Now six days later, on December 9th, Susan Quaid 
calls Med Pay to talk about issues relating to Skyler and is 
told at that point that the basic issue regarding Skyler was 
not whether he was covered but how the coordination of the 
benefits provision was going to work with the Aetna HMO plan 
as the primary payer. 
Now the next thing Med Pay knows, on December 28, 
1999, they are contacted by the University of Utah Primary 
Children's Hospital and asked to certify treatment for Skyler 
that had commenced five days earlier on December 23rd. 
Med Pay contacted Aetna who told Med Pay that 
medicaid had sent them a letter indicating that medicaid was 
going to pick up coverage for Skyler and on that basis, Aetna 
had proceeded to pay for the transport of Skyler to Salt Lake 
City. 
On January 5, 2000, the Med Pay personnel and Loren 
Cook have a conference call about this issue. They discussed 
that while Aetna might deny future coverage based on the fact 
that Skyler is now outside of their network and they have no 
obligation to pay for any medical care outside their network, 
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1 that the Loren Cook plan would also not have any coverage 
2 because of the coordination of benefits provision relating to 
3 the primary status of the HMO network services. The Med Pay 
4 notes for this day, January 5th, indicate that they wanted to 
5 get a copy of that Aetna plan to determine if there was a 
6 continued benefits for disabled person, because it's a very 
7 common coverage that's put in many health care plans. 
8 Counsel has encapsulated this, there are two major 
9 issues that the Court has to face. First, was there coverage 
10 for Skyler under the Aetna plan, and if there was, does this 
11 issue of premium payment affect that? 
12 Now the language at issue here of the Aetna plan is 
13 here at page 28 of the Aetna plan and it's called extension 
14 of benefits upon total disability. It says any member who is 
15 totally disabled on the day coverage under this certificate 
16 terminates, on the date coverage ends, is covered in 
17 accordance with the certificate. 
18 It is undisputed that at the time of his transfer 
19 to Utah he was totally disabled, Skyler was totally disabled. 
20 He was at the - a member prior to the initiation of the 
21 adoption proceedings and therefore - and according to 
22 counsel, and for purposes of this argument, we'll accept the 
23 position advanced by the Quaids that upon initiation of the 
24 adoption proceedings, the legal responsibility of the Cohen 
25 family for, we'll call him Skyler, for Skyler terminated and 
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1 he was no longer covered. So his coverage had terminated, 
2 alright? He's totally disabled, his coverage terminates. If 
3 that's the case - when your coverage terminates, if you're 
4 totally disabled, you're covered in accordance with the 
5 certificate. The certificate is the name they give to their 
6 coverage provision in their plan. They call it the 
7 Certificate of Coverage. 
8 So in accordance with these terms, the extension of 
9 benefits shall only commence when medical services are 
10 rendered and remains in effect until the earlier date that, 
11 and they've got, he's no longer totally disabled, which never 
12 occurred, member has exhausted the cover benefits, which has 
13 not occurred, after a period of 12 months in which benefits 
14 under such coverage are provided to the member. 
15 So you have a situation where Skyler is totally 
16 disabled on the date that his coverage under the plan 
17 terminated, and then because of that he is granted this 12 
18 month extension coverage. I think the plan language is clear 
19 that that is what happened. 
20 Not only is the plan language clear, that was 
21 Aetna's position as well in numerous letters that they sent 
22 to both Loren Cook, to the University of Utah Hospital and to 
23 counsel for the Quaids. They made it clear that Skyler had 
24 an additional 12 months of coverage. Mr. Brown, who was the 
25 vice president of Aetna for health care coverage claims 
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1 issues in the northeast, testified that he was the author of 
2 those letters and testified that not only was Skyler Quaid 
3 eligible for the extension of benefits for 12 months but that 
4 he could have gone to - this would have been a benefit that 
5 he would have had, not just at Shriners Hospital but at any 
6 of the participating facilities within their network, and 
7 it's my understanding that that network was limited to the 
8 state of New York. They had a number of participating 
9 providers in the state of New York, but none in Utah. 
10 Now the language that the Quaids want to rely upon 
11 for the argument that there was a required premium is the 
12 language here at the bottom which says the extension of 
13 benefits shall not extend the time period during which a 
14 member may enroll for continuation or conversion coverage. 
15 Continuation coverage is when you lose your employment or 
16 you're fired or the company stops or something where - and 
17 you have an opportunity to purchase - under a cobra, you get 
18 the continuation coverage on your health plan for 18 months, 
19 and you have to pay for it. You can participate in a group 
20 plan or you can convert to an individual plan. So the 
21 extension of benefits shall not extend the time period during 
22 which a member may enroll for the continuation coverage or 
23 conversion coverage. 
24 Expand the benefits for such coverage. Now when 
25 they say "for such coverage" they're talking about the 
11 
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1 continuation coverage or conversion coverage - nor waive the 
2 requirements concerning the payment of premium for such 
3 coverage. Again, this term is talking about the conversion 
4 coverage or the continuation coverage. It's not referring to 
5 a requirement that premiums be paid for this extension of 
6 benefits on total disability. 
7 Now this - I know that this seems like a straight 
8 forward reading, but the Court doesn't have to rely simply on 
9 my recitation. Mr. Brown, in his deposition, stated that it 
10 was his understanding of the provision. And he said, Your 
11 Honor, I'll tell you, in no uncertain terms he's asked if, on 
12 the prior pay, if there would be any premium requirements and 
13 he said, "That is not correct." Then he's asked, "Tell me 
14 how I'm misunderstanding your last response. I thought you 
15 indicated that there may be a situation where money that had 
16 been paid to Aetna by the Cohen family, the birth parents, 
17 would not have changed even after Zachary left the family, 
18 that it may have been true that once Zachary left the family 
19 and became Skyler Quaid there would have to be an additional 
20 premium paid for him on his behalf. Is that not right?" 
21 "Let me clarify. There is no additional premium charge for 
22 an extension of benefits." 
23 Your Honor, it would make - it would turn the 
24 extension of benefits into an illusory benefit if they 
25 charged a premium for somebody who is totally disabled. 
12 
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1 Under the definition of the plan, the Aetna plan and almost 
2 any plan, for an adult who is totally disabled it means 
3 you're not able to pursue your normal earning occupation -
4 occupation in which you earn income. If someone is totally 
5 disabled and they have no income, to require them to pay a 
6 premium when they don't have any money, it turns the benefit 
7 into an illusion and health and even health insurers don't do 
8 that to people. 
9 He goes out of his way, "Here's we're not talking 
10 about a continuation of coverage, we're talking about an 
11 extension of benefits, and there is no separate premium for 
12 an extension of benefits." Then he's asked again about it 
13 and he says, "I've seen the language that you're talking 
14 about," and it's the language I just quoted the Court. Mr. 
15 King, in his examination, was trying to get Mr. Brown to 
16 clarify - why I am I having a problem here? Here we go. "He 
17 says I see the language that you're referring to. I'm not 
18 clear on what it refers to because I'm aware that there is no 
19 premium charge for an extension of benefits." Then he asked 
20 him to look at that and the witness says - in order to read 
21 this in context I belief that the referenced premium and I 
22 can remainder of page 40 and I - and counsel's not going to 
23 contest this - he goes back and says the referenced premium 
24 is referring to the continuation coverage mentioned at the 
25 start of the clause. He says, "I am aware there is no 
13 
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premium charge for an extension of benefits." 
So in this case we have the plan language of the 
Aetna plan which refers back to continuation coverage and 
conversion coverage not being - having - still having to pay 
a premium for that. Mr. Brown's saying there is no separate 
premium for an extension of benefits providing that 
interpretation on page 40 of that language and addressing 
that issue. 
So I think, Your Honor, with respect to whether 
there is any doubt that Skyler Quaid was still covered under 
the plan, it should be laid to rest by the plain language of 
the Aetna plan and Mr. Brown's testimony and also the issue 
of whether he still would have had coverage for a year. They 
could have taken him back. So, the question: NXSo Zachary 
Cohen, or at that point Skyler Quaid, could have been 
transferred to another hospital within Aetna's participating 
provider network with Aetna's permission during this 12 month 
period?" Answer: "That is correct. During that 12 month 
extension, the Quaids could have placed him in any hospital 
besides Shriners that was in the network. He would have 
continued to receive benefits. His medical care would have 
been paid for for 12 months." 
Even though, Your Honor - and this is - even though 
he was transferred to Utah, this question - this question 
(unintelligible) if they brought him back from Utah, from 
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Primary's Children, could they have put him back in the 
network during that 12 month period, and Mr. Brown said, yes, 
they could have. 
So if he has coverage, the question then becomes 
how do we interpret the coordination of benefits provision? 
I have this letter - I think I'm beating a dead horse here -
where he talks about the coverage for Skyler. 
THE COURT: I have read those letters as well. 
MR. JOHNSON: The language the Court has to parse at 
this point is this language in the coordination of benefits 
section, they're talking about HMOs, and they say, "Also, 
when an HMO or network plan is primary and the covered person 
does not use an HMO or network provider, this plan will not 
consider as an allowable charge any charge that would have 
been covered by the HMO or network plans had the covered 
person used the services of an HMO or a network provider.'" 
The application of that language in this situation is clear. 
Aetna was the primary HMO. Skyler Quaid is a covered person. 
The Quaids chose not to use the HMO. Our plan doesn't 
provide coverage for that period of time in which the HMO had 
extended benefits to Skyler, that 12 month period. 
After that, we stepped in and we paid. The 
testimony that I introduced in the pleadings was that - or in 
the - yes, in my pleadings - was that after the point in time 
in Loren Cook understands this coverage to be ended, they 
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1 paid out over $100,000 in medical care for Skyler. But in 
2 that 12 month period, they do not, and the reason they do not 
3 is that the coordination of benefits provision are a way 
4 that, particularly self funded plans, can husband the plan 
5 resources and the plan assets. It is a mechanism for 
6 distancing themselves from charges which they have made clear 
7 in the plan document they're not going to cover. This was 
8 provided to the Quaids. Bob Quaid testified that he had a 
9 copy of this and he had received it from his employer. So 
10 they have an obligation. 
11 Plans are subject to fiduciary obligations under 
12 the laws of trust. The United States Supreme Court 
13 determined that. Those fiduciary obligations say they've got 
14 to administer the plans in a way that's beneficial for the 
15 members. One of the aspects of the administration of the 
16 plan that makes it beneficial to the members is that it's 
17 administered in a way that it can go on and keep functioning. 
18 This is an entirely self funded plan. The Loren 
19 Cook company pays all of the costs of this. They don't 
20 charge their employees anything. So they have instituted 
21 their coordination of benefits provision to minimize the 
22 expense to the plan when there are other payers out there who 
23 can pay and should pay for that health care. That's a 
24 legitimate thing for plans to do and it's part of the 
25 fiduciary duty that's imposed on them. 
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1 Now, Your Honor, let's go to the argument about 
2 section 11-69(c). That provision does not trump this plan 
3 language. That provision requires that the plan treat the 
4 adopted children or children who are in the process of being 
5 adopted the same as natural born children. 
6 That language, that requirement has been 
7 incorporated into the Loren Cook plan. At page 2 of the plan 
8 document there is a definition of children. The definition 
9 of children is specifically expanded to include adopted 
10 children or children in the process of being adopted 
11 irrespective of whether the adoption has become final. They 
12 - the plan doesn't treat adopted children or children in the 
13 process of being adopted any differently than any other 
14 natural born child. 
15 The issue here, Your Honor, is not the status of 
16 Skyler Quaid. The COB clause has nothing to do with the 
17 status. It applies across the board to covered person who 
18 are natural born, adopted, adults, children, it doesn't 
19 matter. 
20 If this were a situation where Skyler was in fact 
21 the natural born son of Sue Quaid, the determination of Loren 
22 Cook on coverage would be no different. He was someone who 
23 was eligible for an HMO, who was the primary payer, and they 
24 chose not to use that plan, they're not gonna pay those 
25 expenses. Whether the person - whether Skyler was natural 
17 
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1 born or not, if he was - if the Quaids were living in - if 
2 Sue Quaid was living in New York and they had a split 
3 household - which apparently is becoming, according to my 
4 family law partners, is becoming quite common in the United 
5 States - if they had a split household and she was in New 
6 York and she gave birth in New York to Skyler and she was 
7 working for Hoffman products, the sponsor of this Aetna plan, 
8 and then decided to move back home to Utah because of the 
9 disabilities of the child, and gave up her job there and 
10 moved home and they wanted to put everybody on the Loren cook 
11 plan, they would still face this situation. They would have 
12 had to of exhausted their benefits under the Aetna plan 
13 before they - the Cook - our plan is going to pay, because 
14 there is another payer out there who can take care of this 
15 expense and we can husband and can take care of our plan 
16 assets so that all of our employees can have them in the 
17 future. 
18 Itfs not a status issue. Section 11-69(c) does not 
19 affect the application of the COB provision in the least. In 
20 - after you look at it, it says that you have to treat 
21 adopted children under the same - you have to - you have to 
22 provide benefits to them under the same terms and conditions 
23 as applied in the case of dependent children who are natural 
24 children of participants, and it would have been no different 
25 whether he had been natural born or adopted in this case. 
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The COB is blind with respect to the status of the covered 
person. It is a status neutral term and condition of 
coverage. 
Your Honor, that's our argument. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. I appreciate 
that. 
Response, Mr. King? 
MR. KING: One thing that was referred to by Mr. 
Johnson in his comments was the fact that medicaid in Utah 
stepped in relatively early to pick up the medical expenses 
that were being incurred by the Quaids, and that's true. 
Medicaid was quite prompt in responding to inquires by the 
Quaids, under the circumstances of their situation, when this 
child was disabled and they had very, very limited means 
themselves to care not only for Skyler but for the other 
children that they have. They naturally thought that 
medicaid was an available resource. 
Medicaid provides coverage in these situation in 
what I've heard them referred to as a pay and chase basis. 
They will pay the medical expenses that are presented by a 
family in the situation of the Quaids and then look to make a 
determination of whether those expenses should properly have 
been paid by some other entity. In this case, that would 
have been the Loren Cook plan. So the fact that medicaid 
stepped up to the plate is not something that indicates that 
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1 they agree with the Loren Cook plan's interpretation of 
2 either the language of the Aetna policy or the language or 
3 the Loren Cook plan or the provisions of the United States 
4 statute. 
5 In fact, they've made clear, in my dealings with 
6 them on this particular case, that they agree to have a - me 
7 - our law firm represent the Quaids, represent their interest 
8 for purposes of a repayment obligation to medicaid. So the 
9 idea that medicaid stepped in, I don't want the Court to 
10 think that that means that there was some sort an 
11 acknowledgment on medicaid's part that the arguments that are 
12 being made by the Loren Cook plan in this case were correct. 
13 Now the issue about the extension of benefits, the 
14 problem that Loren Cook has is, let's assume - and I can 
15 understand Loren Cook's reading of that language - let's 
16 assume for purposes of the argument before you, that you 
17 agree, and that the - for purposes of the extension of 
18 benefits, there was no obligation for any payment premium by 
19 the Cohens or by Skyler or by the Quaids. The problem still 
20 is there's still no coverage under that Aetna plan. 
21 There are three independent reasons that there's no 
22 coverage. If Loren Cook is successful in knocking out the 
23 third, namely, well, the extension of benefits requires a 
24 premium to be paid, they still have to deal with the fact 
25 that there are two completely independent reasons that no 
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1 coverage exists under that Aetna plan, and they haven7t 
2 successfully done that. 
3 The first two reasons are, number one, the Loren, 
4 or rather, the Aetna plan requires that an individual be a 
5 "covered dependent" to obtain coverage under that plan. When 
6 you look at the Aetna plan definition of covered dependent, 
7 it talks about the language - and we quoted it in our 
8 statement of facts in the original memorandum on page 4 -
9 it's the number three paragraph. It says, "A covered 
10 dependent is any person in a subscriber's family who meets 
11 all of the eligibility requirements of the eligibility 
12 enrollment - and enrollment section of this certificate," and 
13 then it goes on. But a perquisite is that there be a 
14 familial relationship between the covered dependent and the 
15 covered persons, the subscribers. That ceased as of the date 
16 that the Cohens in New York signed away their rights as birth 
17 parents to Zachary and he became Skyler. So there's a real 
18 problem here. And as the covered dependent definition refers 
19 to the eligibility section of the Aetna plan, and it says, 
20 the eligibility section says, and this is found in paragraph 
21 four of our statement of facts, "To be eligible to enroll as 
22 a covered dependent, the contract holder must provider 
23 dependent coverage for subscribers and the dependent must 
24 be," and then there's an ellipses, but paragraph B of that 
25 paragraph says "The dependent must be a dependent unmarried 
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1 child, including natural, foster, step, legally adopted 
2 children, proposed adopted children, a child under court 
3 order," end of parenthesis, "who meets the eligibility 
4 requirements described in the scheduled event." That's again 
5 a reemphasis, a reiteration of this idea that there has to be 
6 a familial relationship. You can't be a covered dependent 
7 under that Aetna plan unless you have a familial 
8 relationship. 
9 Now the thing that really sort of, from our 
10 perspective, is a quite emphatic conclusion and emphasis of 
11 this idea, is the fact that there is a broader exclusion that 
12 certainly applies in this situation, to say "If you're not 
13 legally - if you're a subscriber and you're not legally 
14 obligated to pay, we have, at Aetna, no legal obligation to 
15 pay." Nobody disputes that once the Cohens signed away their 
16 rights as the birth parents they had no legal obligation for 
17 medical expenses for Zachary Cohen's treatment after that 
18 date. 
19 So there are these two separate independent 
20 reasons, even aside from the premium argument that Loren Cook 
21 has made, and until they deal with those there's a real 
22 problem with this argument that Aetna had any coverage in 
23 place at all. 
24 Now, again, we got - when we go on and we talk 
25 about section 29 U.S.C. Section 11-69, this is yet another 
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1 independent basis. Let's assume that the Quaids lose all 
2 these arguments and that the Court says, "You know, I think 
3 there probably was coverage under the Aetna plan," we still 
4 have an insurmountable obstacle - or Loren Cook still has an 
5 insurmountable obstacle to deal with - and that is the 
6 provision of 29 U.S.C. Section ll-69(c). We simply disagree 
7 in how we interpret that language. 
8 I think it's a telling thing that in the 
9 hypothetical that the Loren Cook plan proposed on page 18 of 
10 its original memo it stated the hypothetical in a way that 
11 demonstrates it's not a hypothetical. The hypothetical 
12 doesn't reflect the reality of the facts in this case. The 
13 hypothetical says, "Assume at the time of his birth (Zachary 
14 - Skyler's birth) Mrs. Quaid was employed by a company that 
15 provided HMO coverage for the Quaid family including all the 
16 children, natural or adopted." Well that last phrase, 
17 "including all the children, natural or adopted," is the 
18 discrepancy. That's the difference between what we have in 
19 this case and what the hypothetical is being posed by the 
20 Loren Cook plan. In fact, there was no coverage under that 
21 Aetna plan for any of the Quaid's other children. So you've 
22 got a situation where contrary to the requirements of Section 
23 11-69, you're treating Zachary, or Skyler, in a different way 
24 than the other children of the Quaids are being treated. 
25 That's the problem. That's the situation that Congress 
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1 intended to remedy and does remedy when put in place, Section 
2 11-69. 
3 You can't say to the Quaids and to Skyler, ''because 
4 you fortuitously had this other HMO coverage we're going to 
5 allow the Loren Cook plan to treat you, Skyler, differently 
6 than your adopted siblings." 
7 I can understand the argument that Loren Cook makes 
8 here. It's not a frivolous argument. It's an argument that, 
9 if I were in their situation, I would make, but it's not a 
10 argument that's meritorious when you look at not only the 
11 language of 11-69 but the purposes behind it, the public 
12 policy behind it. If you read this language the way that 
13 Loren Cook does, you're basically gutting section 11-69. 
14 You're not - you're providing a significant loophole under 
15 which self funded plans such as Loren Cook can come along and 
16 say, "Well, we know what 11-69 says but we're going to make 
17 the argument that's being made by Loren Cook and we can get 
18 out of it." That's a real problem because it really runs -
19 makes a significant end run around the statute. 
20 We've talked about the public policy considerations 
21 in the briefs, and I think the Court is probably well aware 
22 of them. Mr. Johnson did a very good (unintelligible) and I 
23 don't feel the need to elaborate. I mean, unless you have 
24 questions on them? 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. No, I don't, on those. 
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1 Other than the fact that they overlaid the issues with 11-69. 
2 MR. KING: They do. 
3 THE COURT: That's what I've looked to in both the 
4 briefs as well as argument. 
5 Mr. Johnson, since we got cross motions here, I 
6 think it is appropriate that there be further response, and 
7 I'm willing to have everyone gut out all of these. That's 
8 what this oral argument is here for today. Thank you. 
9 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I figured that 
10 since Mr. King got to go first, I would get to go last. 
11 THE COURT: You get to go last. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: Just briefly, the - we - for purposes 
13 of this motion, we do not dispute that Skyler's coverage 
14 terminated and if we want to say it terminated at the time, 
15 sometime in the end of November of 1999 - exactly when the 
16 Cohens signed those papers is not clear, there's a difference 
17 in testimony - but that's fine. The coverage terminated just 
18 as the extension of benefits provision anticipates, and when 
19 that happens, that section of coverage for the Aetna plan 
20 kicked in for Skyler and they continued to pay for his 
21 medical expenses at the hospital, at Shriners, under that 
22 provision. We don't - that's fine. That triggers that 
23 extension of total disability. 
24 If that was the language I used in my hypothetical 
25 then Mr. King's not the only who one who has a brain cramp 
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1 when he's writing. The hypothetical I presented to the Court 
2 today is the one. 
3 The issue of alterative coverage under an HMO plan 
4 is not a fortuitous issue here. The Hoffman products 
5 company, which employed the Cohens family, Mr. Cohen, paid a 
6 premium to purchase exactly this typical coverage. It came 
7 with an extension of benefits upon total disability. That 
8 was something that was not just hypothetically available to 
9 Skyler but was told to everyone in a number of letters from 
10 Aetna that in fact he was eligible and he was nevertheless 
11 eligible for an extension of benefits for up to 12 months. 
12 At this point in time that this letter was written, he 
13 probably still would have had a couple of weeks of coverage. 
14 It was written in November 10, 2000, and he probably still 
15 would have had an additional two weeks of coverage under the 
16 Aetna plan at that time. 
17 So that - it's not a hypothetical issue, it's not a 
18 fortuitous issue. It was real, it was a real coverage, it 
19 was a real alterative source of payment for this health care. 
20 When that happens, this plan, the Loren Cook plan is not 
21 obligated to pay under the clear language of the coordination 
22 of benefits provision. 
23 To demonstrate the statuary nature of this, let's 
24 talk about if Skyler did not have this available coverage 
25 under the Aetna plan. Let's talk about if Skyler came from -
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his mother had passed away at birth and he had no insurance. 
If that had been the case, if there was not another 
- and I'll tell you Aetna's got 100 times the resources that 
the Loren Cook plan does - if there was not another pay order 
available to take care of that, Skyler would have come onto 
our plan seamlessly and we would have stepped up and paid it* 
It's because there was this alterative payer. Like 
I tried to explain in the pleadings, how coordination of 
benefits provision work and what their purpose are and sort 
of try to allocate risk and find the appropriate payer and 
things like that, and because of that, that's why our 
language is enforceable in this case. 
We submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Thank you. 
Again, I do appreciate the explanation and the work that has 
been done both in the written pleadings as well as the oral 
argument today. I took a great deal of time to go over the 
written pleadings so that I would understand what the issues 
are and that I could provide the parties with the ruling that 
they need in a timely fashion to address these issues. 
As I have listened to the oral argument, which is 
always helpful to me and to most judges, I think, to make 
sure that we really are focusing on the issues at hand, there 
has been nothing that has changed the focus of those issues, 
and I think that I am prepared to rule. 
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1 Having read all of the pleadings, having read the 
2 case law that was also presented, and I appreciate that, and 
3 having now heard the compilation of all of this with the oral 
4 arguments today, I am prepared to rule on these cross motions 
5 for a summary judgment. 
6 My ruling, first of all, entails that I am granting 
7 Motion for a Summary Judgment for the Loren Cook company. 
8 The reasons are far more complex than that ruling and I do 
9 feel that it is important to address on the record why I have 
10 reached the ruling that I have reached. 
11 I think that the arguments that have been made by 
12 the Quaids have been exceptionally good faith arguments, but 
13 I do find that it falls to the actual reading of the plain 
14 language in the coordination of benefits clauses, in the 
15 United States code statute, the 11-69 section that is 
16 particularly dealt with here, and I just found that as I went 
17 through the reading and literally took out my old school 
18 teacher pencil diagraming the sentences, that that is the 
19 clearest way to read the plain language. It is supported by 
20 precedent and it is supported by the other actions and 
21 conducts of the parties in this case, particularly Aetna's 
22 counsel in his letters and deposition. 
23 Let's go through these issues much in the same way 
24 that they have been argued today so that my ruling can be 
25 clear and that the parties will have a clear understanding of 
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1 what my findings actually are. 
2 First of all, the applicability of the coordination 
3 of the benefits in the Loren Cook plan is absolutely key, as 
4 has been argued by both parties here today. That whether or 
5 not Aetna's coverage terminated at adoption and the 
6 coordination of benefits clause would have been totally 
7 inapplicable, or whether, as has been argued by the Loren 
8 Cook plan, that the coordination of benefits clause was fully 
9 applicable because Skyler met the requirements that made its 
10 applicability mandated and I think that's what we're dealing 
11 with here. 
12 The plaintiff argues that it ended at the adoption. 
13 In fact, as I read the language in the clause and in the 
14 contracts here, the determining factor is not whether or not 
15 when he was adopted, but when he was a member, and the 
16 language is absolutely clear that he became a member when he 
17 became totally disabled and this medically necessary 
18 treatment came into place. 
19 I don't think there's any question - except for the 
20 policy issues that rise, if it is applied at his adoption 
21 instead of the totally disabled point - but the language is 
22 clear that he became a member when he was hospitalized, 
23 totally disabled in the Shriners Hospital in New York. At 
24 that time he was still a dependent of the birth parents. He 
25 was still covered by their Aetna policy and therefore 
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1 entitled to the extension of benefits clause. I'm not 
2 persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that that legally 
3 terminated because there was no longer a family relationship 
4 or that the adoption took place and Skyler was now part of 
5 the Quaid family. It simply does not change the mandatory 
6 language that the extension of benefits shall be available to 
7 someone who is a member when he becomes totally disabled and 
8 I think the language and the facts in this case are clear, 
9 that he was a member at that time, and that is the 
10 determining factor for me. 
11 That then takes us to other parts of the argument. 
12 I think that there is no dispute as to the fact that Skyler 
13 was totally disabled, that the treatment was medically 
14 necessary, and I have covered the first issue of whether or 
15 not he was a covered dependent. I think there does need to 
16 be some discussion as to, also, the second argument and that 
17 is whether or not the premiums needed to be paid. Mr. King, 
18 in his response part of the argument, says even if the Court 
19 takes the explanation and the language interpretation that 
20 Loren Cook has put, that they cannot meet the other issues, I 
21 am addressing that issue and I am accepting the 
22 interpretation that Loren Cook makes on that. I noted that 
23 the charts that Loren Cook put up was exactly the highlights 
24 and area that I went. I do think that that is the accurate 
25 interpretation of what ^such coverage" refers back to in that 
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final paragraph that says that requires premiums. It is 
clear that the "such coverage" that the premiums are 
referring to, is the continuation or the conversion, and not 
the extension of benefits. That's just simply the way the 
language works and when, particularly when it's put in an 
outline form as it has, we simply need to go back each way 
and there is no question in that analysis that, even just a 
reading of the plain language, that the extension of benefits 
did not require the payment of premiums. 
Even though the Quaids also argument very well in 
their brief that Mr. James Brown, I believe he was the 
counsel's name for Aetna, statements are irrelevant because 
they are conflicting to the language, because I find that 
they are exactly what the language says, then they are 
relevant. So that additional evidence supported this reading 
of the case for me. 
So I do find that the other issues that the Quaids 
have raised, whether or not that legal obligation of Aetna 
terminated at the adoption because there was no family 
relationship and because there was no legal obligation since 
the Aetna coverage ended at the adoption, are not persuasive 
to me that the extension of benefits was an actual and real 
benefit that was available by the plain language of the 
contract and that that clearly was in place and there that 
meant that the coverage then of the Loren Cook plan did not 
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1 come into place because of the 12 month extension of benefits 
2 that I do find is a real and actual benefit. 
3 That then takes us to the equally important 
4 arguments that the Quaids make that even if there is a 
5 finding, which I have now found that the extension of 
6 benefits clause is applicable here, is that it should be 
7 nullified or overwritten by the U.S. code in title 29 , 
8 specifically in 11-69(c). I have looked very carefully to 
9 that issue as well, and I appreciated the argument today, 
10 both of them. That helped me in my analysis as to whether or 
11 not the 11-69 section does defeat the coordination of 
12 benefits application that I have already ruled on. I find 
13 that it does not. And again, it comes down to an absolute 
14 interpretation and reading of the language. The Quaids 
15 effectively argued that they - that 11-69 absolutely 
16 precludes the different treating of the different children in 
17 the family. Their argument is that because they are, the 
18 Loren Cook plan, is applying this extension of benefits 
19 clause and coordination of benefits clause, and is therefore 
20 applying the Aetna extension of benefits, that they are not 
21 following the same terms and conditions that is required by 
22 section 11-69 (e). I think that is a misreading of the terms, 
23 same terms, and conditions. In fact, it does not preclude 
24 looking at very specific circumstances in this case. All of 
25 the Quaid children need to be treated under the same terms 
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1 and conditions and while there have been a number of 
2 hypothetical examples presented here - and I always am amazed 
3 at how many hypothetical examples the parties can come up 
4 with when we're dealing with the actual example that we need 
5 to be dealing with, and I don't really need a lot of 
6 hypotheticals except that they do clear. What I look to is 
7 the fact here. The fact is that the same terms and 
8 conditions of the coordination of benefits clause would need 
9 to apply to all the Quaid children or 11-69 would preclude it 
10 and because one of the terms and conditions, the one I'm 
11 looking at now, is whether or not one of the Quaid children 
12 was covered by another plan, and in fact I'm finding that in 
13 Skyler's case, he was covered by Aetna and therefore he did 
14 not meet that term and condition that there be no other 
15 primary coverage that would cover it. 
16 Apparently, and this has not been argued because 
17 it's not at issue before me, all of the other Quaid children 
18 do fit that same term and condition. There is another 
19 primary coverage that covers the other Quaid children. If 
20 there weren't, then clearly that same term and condition 
21 would apply to them. Therefore, 11-69 does not preclude that 
22 from applying here because the same term - in other words, 
23 that they not be covered by other primary coverage - applies 
24 to the children equally. The - and clearly it doesn't affect 
25 the status. I agree with Loren Cook's argument that this is 
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1 not an issue of whether or not Skyler is disabled or whether 
2 or not he's adopted. The results are different here because 
3 of the underlying circumstances as I've just explained and 
4 not because of the status of his being an adopted child or 
5 having a pre-existing condition. That was another argument 
6 that was not addressed in oral argument today. It was 
7 addressed, I think quite fully, in the written arguments. 
8 That subsection 2 of 11-69(c) requires that an insurer cannot 
9 deny an adopted child coverage solely on the basis of the 
10 pre-existing condition. So that would affect the status 
11 argument. But I do find that that is not why he was denied 
12 coverage. It was not because he had a pre-existing 
13 condition. Nobody is arguing that he wasn't totally disabled 
14 and that's part of why he - I find that he was a member at 
15 the time but he was denied coverage, again, because it was 
16 the primary coverage of Aetna in place at this time. 
17 I think that both arguments were very well taken do 
18 deal with the core public policy argument. This is certainly 
19 a situation where the facts in this case are heart wrenching. 
20 There's no question that they are heart wrenching facts. But 
21 there's a difference between being heart wrenching facts and 
22 whether or not to extend this rule would create poor public 
23 policy. 
24 The Quaids argued that these really create a 
25 loophole where an insurance company then can then leave 
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1 adoptive parents with disabled children without coverage and 
2 that simply is not what happens. I do not find that there is 
3 a loophole. It is simply an application of a very standard 
4 clause that when there is payment and coverage available 
5 under one set of circumstances, that it should not be 
6 available under another set of circumstances. This ruling 
7 today only goes to those set of circumstances because I am 
8 finding and the underlying finding is really what addresses 
9 every single part of the ruling because there was coverage in 
10 place, there - this coverage is not available for the 12 
11 month time period. It's a very permanent and specific 
12 finding that because the coverage was available during and 
13 through that extension of benefits or that 12 month time 
14 period, it is not available to the Quaids through the Loren 
15 Cook plan. That is the only application - the only set of 
16 facts that this ruling applies to and it does not in any way 
17 set up poor public policy that either adoptive parents are 
18 without coverage or that the state then or any 
19 kind of medicaid then bears the burden. Again, it goes back, 
20 I find that it is not a loophole, simply an application of a 
21 valid coordination of benefits clause. 
22 Again, I want to express my appreciation for the 
23 work that was done. I know that some of the parties may have 
24 stepped in before I addressed that. This ruling is in no way 
25 a reflection on the decision that the Quaids made in bringing 
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1 little Skyler back. They had a decision to make. It was a 
2 very difficult decision at a time when their infant was very, 
3 very sick and this in no way is a reflection that that was 
4 unreasonable or even not the best decision to make to have 
5 little Skyler here within the caring support of a family here 
6 in Utah and using the medical facilities that were available 
7 to him here in Utah. 
8 What it does mean is this was a very legal basic 
9 ruling that their - that decision meant that they made a 
10 determination to not use the benefits that were available to 
11 them. They did not use approved care and so that may in 
12 fact, so the result of this ruling, may in fact be that there 
13 is not coverage for that 12 month time period. 
14 But I am persuaded that the precedent is strong and 
15 that I cannot fly in the face of the law that is already in 
16 place and I am also quite certain that the analysis that I 
17 have, as carefully as I can, gone through is applicable here 
18 and that the legal result is appropriate and supported by 
19 precedents as well as by the analysis. I am therefore 
20 granting the Loren Cook Motion for Summary Judgment, that in 
21 fact there was not - that Loren Cook has no responsibility 
22 for any medical expenses incurred by Skyler Quaid for that 12 
23 month time period from his transfer from the Shriner Hospital 
24 hospital in New York. Clearly that is a very specific 
25 finding. It does not go further than that. I have not been 
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1 asked to address whether or not the Loren Cook plan then 
2 comes in. It's my understanding that it does and the payment 
3 has been made. This ruling is specifically to the 12 month 
4 time period when the Aetna extension of benefits clause did 
5 apply and that those benefits did exist. By definition then 
6 I guess with my ruling with that, that means that the Quaid's 
7 I Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Mr. Johnson, can you prepare a findings and order 
9 I to that effect? 
10 MR. JOHNSON: I will, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: That's sufficient. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: I will submit them to Mr. King for his 
13 reading. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate your doing 
15 that. Again, thank you for everyone's work and the court 
16 will be in recess. 
17 | (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 | -c-
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GARY L. JOHNSON [4353] 
MARTHA KNUDSON [8512] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Attorneys for Defendant Loren Cook 
Company Health Care Benefit Plan 
TN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAID, individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAE), f/k/a 
ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA US 
HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN PRODUCTS 
NEW YORK MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN 
and LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT LOREN 
COOK COMPANY 
Civil No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiffs Robert and Sue Quaid (the 
"Quaids"), and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Loren Cook Company Health 
Care Benefit Plan ("Loren Cook Plan"), regularly came on before the Court for oral argument on 
App.Add.000543 
September 23, 2005. The Quaids were represented by Brian S. King and the Loren Cook Plan 
was represented by Gary L. Johnson of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. The Court, after 
having reviewed the extensive briefing, exhibits and case law submitted by the parties, and 
having heard oral argument, rules as follows: 
The Quaids brought this action for reimbursement of health care costs expended 
on behalf of their adopted son, Skylar Quaid. The Quaids claim that the Loren Cook Plan was 
responsible for health care costs incurred by Skylar at Primary Children's Hospital, and 
elsewhere, from the time that Skylar arrived in Utah on December 23, 1999, until the Quaids5 
coverage under the Loren Cook Plan ceased. The Loren Cook Plan asserts that a Coordination of 
Benefits provision in the Loren Cook Plan provides when an HMO is primary and the Covered 
Person (such as Skylar Quaid) does not use an HMO, the Plan does not consider as an allowable 
charge, any charge that would have been covered by the HMO had the covered person used the 
services of the HMO. In light of those claim, the Court makes the following findings: 
1. That Skylar Quaid, prior to his transfer to Utah on December 23, 1999, 
was a covered member under his birth parents' Aetna HMO health plan. At the time that the 
Quaids initiated adoption proceedings, Skylar Quaid was still a dependant of his birth parents and 
was totally disabled and was a member under the Aetna plan that met the requirements that 
entitled him to the "extension of benefits" provision under the Aetna plan. 
2 
App.Add.000544 
2. The Aetna plan's extension of benefits provision provided that any 
member who was totally disabled on the date coverage terminated is covered in accordance with 
the terms of the Aetna plan for a twelve-month period. 
3. The Court finds that, based upon the language in the Aetna plan and the 
testimony of James Brown, Regional General Counsel for the Northeast Region for US 
Healthcare/Aetna, that there would be no premium charge to the birth parents and/or the Quaids 
for the twelve-month extension of benefits provided under the Aetna plan. The Quaids argue that 
language in the Aetna plan indicates that a payment of premium is required, but the Court finds 
that that language does not refer to the payment of premium for extension of benefits, but rather 
refers to a payment of premium for continuation coverage or conversion coverage. This 
interpretation is supported by the testimony of James Brown. 
4. The Court finds that giving the Loren Cook Plan's Coordination of 
Benefits provision its common and ordinary meaning, that it would alert the reasonable person in 
the position of a Loren Cook Plan participant that if there were other available HMO coverage 
for a covered person, then the Plan would not consider as an allowable charge, any charge that 
would have been covered by this other, alternative HMO payor. 
5. The Quaids asserts that 29 U.S.C. § 1169(c), part of COBRA's provisions 
which were incorporated into ERISA, requires the Loren Cook Plan to provide primary coverage 
under the circumstances of this case. The Court disagrees. This section of ERISA is entitled, 
3 
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"Group Health Plan Coverage of Dependant Children in Cases of Adoption." This provision of 
ERISA provides that a group health plan shall provide benefits to dependant children placed with 
participants or beneficiaries for adoption under the same terms and conditions as apply in the 
case of dependant children who are natural children of participants or beneficiaries under the 
Plan or regardless of whether they have a pre-existing condition. 
6. The Court finds that the language of Section 1169(c) does not overcome 
the Loren Cook Plan's Coordination of Benefits provision. The language in the Loren Cook 
Plan's Coordination of Benefits provision does not turn upon the birth status of the Quaid child, 
but rather turns upon whether the child was eligible for benefits under a different HMO plan, 
which was the case here. Skylar Quaid's status as an adopted child, or the fact he had a pre-
existing condition, plays no role in the application of the Loren Cook Plan Coordination of 
Benefits provision. The triggering mechanism for the Coordination of Benefits provision is the 
availability of alternative funding from an HMO plan, not the status of the child. 
7. The Court hereby grants the Loren Cook Plan's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denies the Quaids' Motion for Summary Judgment. It is the Court's judgment that 
from the time Skylar Quaid was transferred from Schneiders Children's Hospital in New York on 
December 23, 1999, to December 23, 2000, the Loren Cook Plan had not obligation to pay any 
4 
App.Add.000546 
allowable charges that would have been covered by the Aetna HMO plan. 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Ann Boyden 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/$-• s • it—, 
BRIAN S. KING 7 
Attorney for Robert & Sue Quaid 
5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this day of October, 2005, to the following: 
Brian S. King 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\16118\0001\GH2835 WPD 
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Brian S. King, #4610 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND SUE QUAID, individually 
and as guardians of SKYLAR QUAID, 
f/k/a ZACHARY COHEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
US HEALTHCARE, INC. dba AETNA 
US HEALTHCARE, HOFFMAN 
PRODUCTS NEW YORK MEDICAL 
BENEFITS PLAN and 
LOREN COOK COMPANY HEALTH 
CARE BENEFIT PLAN, 
Defendants/ 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert and Sue Quaid, through their undersigned counsel, hereby 
give notice of their appeal from the Order, entered in the above referenced case in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on October 31, 2005. This appeal is taken to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 030901500 
Judge Ann Boyden 
App.Add.000549 
With this Notice of Appeal, Plaintiffs/Appellants tender the filing fee, docketing fee, and 
cost bond, required under Rules 3 and 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this l\_ day of November, 2005. 
£ j 3 . r ^ • 
Brian S. King 7 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been delivered 
via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gary L. Johnson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
DATED this £(_ day of November, 2005. 
•Vfo- LWL< 
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